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Abstract 
This case study explores a collaborative planning process that led to the formulation 
of the Atlantis Revitalisation Framework (ARF) of 2012. The study is based on a 
thematic content review and analysis of secondary data in the public sphere, 
personal notes and reflections that were collected during and after the policy 
framework was established. Atlantis was established in 1975 to accommodate the 
coloured community 45 km outside the City of Cape Town (CoCT) in line with 
apartheid planning policy of racial segregation. After losing state subsidies, the socio-
economic plight of Atlantis deteriorated markedly between 1994 and 2009 resulting in 
job losses and high unemployment. This economic decline triggered negative social 
issues, such as poverty, food insecurity, crime, gang activities, drug abuse and 
domestic violence. Multi-stakeholder agencies in Atlantis collectively initiated a 
rescue strategy to address the economic downturn that worsened during the 2008/9 
Global Economic Recession. To clearly understand the nuances, actions, events and 
decisions that led to the establishment of the ARF, the study explores the potentially 
‘transformative’ insights from complexity theory and activist modes of planning with a 
bias towards human-rights-based planning. These insights are then applied as 
lenses in the analysis of the ARF case study. To establish the ‘nexus’ meaning 
interconnectedness between activist planning, transformation and complexity, the 
study looks at the history of positivist planning systems and maps out the 
justifications and conditions used in its pervasive legitimation thereof. Using 
complexity theory as a lens, the study reviews the constraints and wicked problems 
that planning faces. It explores the intricate links tying open planning sub-systems 
into large networks that interact dynamically, often along non-linear routes. It also 
highlights the challenge of wicked problems and the global sustainable development 
poly-crisis. It demonstrates the difficulty of predicting future events; of dealing with 
vested interests and conflicts of values; of managing the complex interrelationships 
and interaction of decisions made at different scales, in different policy spheres, and 
at different points in time.  These challenges expose the inability of traditional 
planning approaches to adequately respond to the growing needs and lived 
experiences of expanding urban populations, particularly those in the Global South, 
and specifically those that are marginalised and excluded. Using the concept of 
‘transformation’, which entails greater sensitivity towards complexity, contextual 
reality and indeterminacy in the pursuit of quality engagements that are legitimate, 
epistemologically empowering, inclusive, transparent, and geared towards 
relationship building, the study proposes a rethink of planning practices in the Global 
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South and in South Africa specifically. It argues that such a rethink requires a shift in 
the institutional and governance arrangements of the state and civil society. Using 
the transformative insights gleaned from activist modes of planning, the study 
outlines evaluative criteria that was used in the analysis of the Atlantis case study. 
The evaluative criteria revealed what the planning issues were, including their 
historical links to segregatory planning policies of the apartheid regime. It identified 
the geographic isolation of Atlantis as a negative factor inhibiting its ability to function 
in sync with the CoCT’s regional economy. These complex issues prompted an 
activist reaction from multiple local stakeholders. Through the Atlantis Socio-
Economic (ASED) task team, they collectively initiated an adversarial planning 
process, highlighting the development of new institutional and governance 
configurations which challenged existing power relations and interests. Though not 
entirely transformative and critically reflective, the activist planning approach 
employed by ASED was forward-looking and adaptive. It involved multiple actors 
which transformed the existing governance systems and frameworks. A new 
governance regime called the Atlantis Stakeholder Assembly (ASA) was created as a 
vehicle through which planning issues were discussed. The ASA the newly 
established Inter-governmental Steering Committee (CoCT, Provincial Government 
of Western Cape (PGWC) and the National Government produced the final ARF. 
This policy framework led to the implementation of the Atlantis business rescue 
strategy, the establishment of the Green industrial hub, job training and reskilling of 
the local workforce, and access to industrial land being expedited. However, when 
the politically charged ASED task team was disbanded and replaced by the ASA 
some of the incentives for transformation, as pushed for by the activists, were 
diminished. The ASA lacked agency, political muscle and influence and it also lacked 
legislative recognition, as it had no decisive power to set the substantive agenda, 
timing, and debates regarding the developmental issues in Atlantis. This transition 
reversed the seemingly transformative governance reform championed by ASED that 
had the potential to ensure democratic accountability. The move allowed the 
technical stuff from the CoCT and PGWC to dominate the planning process and give 
direction to the ASA within the economic and political constraints of the CoCT.  
KEYWORDS: 
Activist planning, complexity theory, transformation, human-rights based planning, 
nexus, confluence, case study, evaluation criteria, Atlantis Revitalisation Framework, 
Cape Town. 
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Opsomming 
Hierdie gevallestudie kyk na ‘n gesamentlike beplannings proses wat gelei het tot die 
formulering van die Atlantis Vernuwing Raamwerk van 2012. Die studie is gebaseer 
op beoordeling van tematiese inhoud en analise van sekondêre data in die publieke 
gebied, persoonlike notas en refleksies wat versamel was gedurende en nadat die 
beleidsraamwerk bevestig was. Atlantis was bevestig in 1975 om die kleurling 
gemeenskap te akkommodeer, sowat 45 km buite Kaapstad, in lyn met apartheid en 
rasseskeiding. Nadat die dorpie sy staat subsidies verloor het, het die sosio-
ekonomiese toestand verswak tussen 1994 en 2009 met die gevolg tot ‘n verhoging 
in werkloosheid en werksbetrekking. Die ekonomiese afname het gelei tot negatiewe 
sosiale probleme soos armoede, voedsel-onsekerheid, misdaad, bende aktiwiteite, 
dwelmmisbruik en huishoudelike geweld. Multi-belanghebbende agentskappe van 
Atlantis het gesamentlik ‘n waarsku strategie begin om die ekonomiese afname aan 
te spreek wat vergerger het gedurende die 2008/9 Wêreldwye Ekonomiese 
Resessie. Om die nuanse, aksies, gebeure en besluite wat gelei het tot die vestiging 
van die ARF duidelik te verstaan, die studie ondersoek die potensiaale 
‘transformerende’ insigte van kompleksiteitsteorie en aktivistiese modusse van 
beplanning met ‘n vooroordeling wat gebaseer is teenoor menseregte-gebaseerde 
beplanning. Hierdie insigte is dan toegepas as lense in die ontleding van die ARF 
gevallestudie. Om die 'nexus' betekenisverwantskap tussen aktivistiese beplanning, 
transformasie en kompleksiteitsteorie te bepaal, kyk die geskiedenis na die 
geskiedenis van positivistiese beplanning stelsels en word die regverdigings en 
voorwaardes wat gebruik word in die omvattende legitimering daarvan, gekarteer.
Met behulp van kompleksiteitsteorie as 'n lens, word die beperkinge en slegte 
probleme waarmee die beplanning te kampe het, ondersoek. Dit ondersoek die 
ingewikkelde skakels wat oopbeplanning subsisteme in groot netwerke verbind wat 
dinamies is, dikwels deur nie-lineêre roetes. Dit beklemtoon ook die uitdaging van 
goddelose probleme en die poli-krisis vir volhoubare ontwikkeling wêreldwyd. Dit 
demonstreer die probleme om toekomstige gebeure te voorspel; die hantering van 
gevestigde belange en botsing van waardes; die bestuur van die ingewikkelde 
onderlinge verwantskappe en interaksie tussen besluite wat op verskillende skale 
geneem word, in verskillende beleidsterreine en op verskillende tydpunte. Hierdie 
uitdagings ontbloot die onvermoë van tradisionele beplanning om voldoende te 
reageer op die groeiende behoeftes en beleefde ervarings van die uitbreiding van 
stedelike bevolkings, veral dié in die globale suide, en spesifiek dié wat 
gemarginaliseer en uitgesluit word. Die gebruik van die konsep 'transformasie', wat 'n 
groter sensitiwiteit vir kompleksiteit, kontekstuele werklikheid en onbepaaldheid 
behels in die strewe na kwaliteitsverbintenisse wat wettig, epistemologies 
bemagtigend, inklusief, deursigtig en gerig is op die opbou van verhoudings, stel 'n 
heroorweging van beplanningspraktyke voor spesifiek die globale Suide en in Suid-
Afrika. Dit argumenteer dat so 'n heroorweging 'n verandering in die institusionele en 
bestuursreëlings van die staat en die burgerlike samelewing vereis. Met behulp van 
die transformatiewe insigte wat van aktivistiese beplanningswyses gesif is, word die 
evalueringskriteria uiteengesit wat gebruik is in die analise van die Atlantis-
gevallestudie. Die evalueringskriteria het aan die lig gebring wat die beplannings 
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segregatoriese beplanningsbeleid. Dit het die geografiese isolasie van Atlantis 
geïdentifiseer as 'n negatiewe faktor in die vermoë om sinchroniseer met die 
streekekonomie van die CoCT. Hierdie ingewikkelde kwessies het gelei tot 'n 
aktivistiese reaksie van verskeie plaaslike belanghebbendes. Deur die Atlantis Sosio-
Economiese (ASED) taakspan het hulle gesamentlik 'n kontroversiële 
beplanningsproses begin, met die klem op die ontwikkeling van nuwe institusionele 
en bestuurs konfigurasies wat bestaande magsverhoudinge en belange uitgedaag 
het. Alhoewel dit nie heeltemal transformatief en krities reflektief was nie, was die 
aktivistiese beplanningsbenadering wat deur ASED gebruik is, vooruitskouend en 
aanpasbaar. Dit het verskeie akteurs betrek wat die bestaande bestuurstelsels en 
kaders omskep het. ‘n Nuwe bestuurstelsel genaamd die ‘Atlantis Stakeholder 
Assembly’ (ASA) is geskep as 'n voertuig waardeur beplannings-aangeleenthede 
bespreek is.  ASA en die nuutgestigte interregerings-bestuurskomitee (CoCT, Wes-
Kaapse Provinsiale Regering (PGWK) en die nasionale regering) het die finale ARF 
opgelewer. Hierdie beleidsraamwerk het gelei tot die implementering van die Atlantis-
besigheids-reddingsstrategie, die totstandkoming van die ‘Green Industrial Center’, 
werksopleiding en hervestiging van die plaaslike arbeidsmag, en toegang tot 
nywerheidsgrond is ook bespoedig. Toe die polities gelaaide ASED-taakspan egter 
ontbind en deur ASA vervang is, het sommige van die aansporings vir transformasie, 
soos deur die aktiviste aangevuur, verminder. ASA het nie agentskap, politieke 
spiere en invloed gehad nie. Dit het ook nie wetgewende erkenning gehad nie, dit het 
geen beslissende mag om die wesenlike agenda, tydsberekening en debatte 
rakende die ontwikkelingskwessies in Atlantis op te stel nie. Hierdie oorgang het die 
oënskynlike transformerende regerings-hervorming omgekeer wat deur ASED 
voorgestaan is en wat demokratiese aanspreeklikheid moontlik gemaak het. Die skuif 
het die tegniese dinge van die CoCT en PGWC toegelaat om die beplanningsproses 
oor te neem en rigting te gee aan ASA binne die ekonomiese en politieke beperkings 
van die CoCT.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction: The Activist Planning and 
Complexity Nexus 
1.1. Introduction 
This is a case study of the planning process that led to the development of the Atlantis 
Revitalisation Framework of 2012, a project initiated to return economic life and jobs to the 
apartheid-created town of Atlantis near the City of Cape Town (CoCT) in South Africa. The 
evaluative lenses used to explore this case study are found in the literature on planning, 
power, complexity, activist planning, transformation and rights-based planning. Sager 
(1999:123) defines planning as a “bureaucratic and, in many ways, political institution, 
encompassing goal setting, option seeking, impact assessment and evaluation”, whilst 
Faludi (1973) narrowly viewed planning as a process “concerned with the best way of 
producing results". Planning is often directed towards the future and concerned primarily 
with imaginary events that have not yet taken place and often have uncertain precedence to 
the extent that they might never occur (Baum, 1999:3). Its practice, as noted by Healey 
(2007:19), has been traditionally “confined to the domain of formal government [through] 
formal competences and laws”, leading to the pervasive legitimation and/or justification of its 
power anchored in the authority of democratic institutions (Sager, 2013:1).  
At the centre of planning is the belief that “economic, cultural and political change” structured 
around the participation of individuals, groups or entire societies carries with it the potential 
to effect social change/transformation (Leat, 2005). To bring forth this “planned change”, 
early planning experts devised comprehensive theories of “social transformation” (Leat, 
2005) that were meant to produce “desired [social] outcomes (changes)” (Sandercock, 
1998a) for a largely undifferentiated public. They attempted to solve social problems using a 
range of analytical tools and techniques in which a change agent (the political 
elite/government/state) mainstreamed its version of social change (often flawed and biased) 
in a specific and equally deliberate manner to meet “public interests/goods” (Leat, 2005). In 
its attempt to coordinate such an increasingly specialised and narrowly defined activity, the 
state traditionally relied on instrumental rationality using the planner’s professional expertise 
and objectivity (Sandercock, 1998a). Planning practice thus involved making “instrumentally 
rational decisions” through the application of expert knowledge in “problem identification, 
goal determination and analysis, implementation and evaluation” aimed at meeting the 
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Over time, planning has developed into specialised fields and professions of ‘town and 
regional planning’ (also known under other names such as urban and regional planning, 
physical planning, and spatial planning), as well as the field of ‘development planning’, all 
aimed at resolving pressing “societal and political problems” (Mäntysalo, 2002:10). In South 
Africa however, both spatial planning and development planning are practiced, as part of 
‘integrated development planning’, legally required to be done by all local authorities.  
Notably, ideas related to planning such as “politics, institutions, economies, technologies, 
and social values” (Friedmann, 2004:1) are all subject to a state of continuous flux whilst, 
“the spheres of the state, the economy, and daily life overlap and interact in complex ways” 
(Healey, 2007:18). Such an overlap or interconnectedness of ideas and issues related to 
planning highlight a deeper relationship or nexus, a concept “increasingly used in 
environmental management … because it moves attention away from sectoral thinking 
towards a more balanced view of issues linking various resources (Al-Saidi and Elagib, 
2017: 1132-1133). Given this complex nexus, contemporary planning therefore struggles to 
accurately predict and deal with “future events; the interaction of decisions made in different 
policy spheres; conflicts of values … vested interests; … the complex interrelationships 
between decisions at different scales, at different points in time” (Hall and Tewdwr-Jones, 
2011). In theory, government planning should serve the entire population rather than 
particular groups (Sager, 2013:68), however in practice its actors were and are still being 
implicated as active agents largely responsible for unleashing pervasive forces of “evil, of 
exclusion, discrimination [and] marginalisation” against those excluded (Sandercock 1998a; 
1998b). Furthermore, state planning has been seen to live in “perfect isolation, if not 
ignorance, of the human-rights system(s) and its implications for development” (Uvin, 
2007:597). Often it ignores “normative, interdependent issues [such] as legitimacy, 
inclusiveness, domination and quality of argumentation” which have since become central 
tenets to the transformative debate on planning (Mäntysalo, 2002:3). 
Notwithstanding this complexity, most countries in Africa, including the Republic of South 
Africa (RSA), inherited their planning and governance systems from former colonial powers 
(Watson, 2009; 2011:203). These systems were/are almost entirely developed within a 
“framework of Western (Occidental) intellectual traditions and in response to lived 
experiences in the West” (Harrison, 2006; Watson, 2009). Various authors such as 
Sandercock (1998a; 1998b); Harrison (2006); Watson (2009) note with great concern that 
these Eurocentric planning theories and practices are largely unresponsive to the growing 
needs and lived experiences of expanding urban populations, particularly those in the Global 
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the poor, and indigenous people among others). Often these marginalised groups grapple 
with means or strategies on how to directly deal with biased power relations emanating from 
the official government planning processes (Sager, 2013:2) used “in the construction of 
politics and policies and in the formation of policy agendas and practices” (Healey, 2007:18). 
In view of this growing complexity and uncertainty of the planning and transformation nexus, 
the study therefore proposes a bold rethink of planning in South Africa in general and for the 
CoCT in particular. It argues that such a leap in planning practice would require a calculated 
shift in the “institutional and governance arrangements of the state and civil society” (De 
Coning and Wissink, 2011:3) in line with the post 1994 principles of “transparency and active 
participation among various stakeholders” (Mthethwa, 2014:16). At the centre of this shift, 
one can place transformative features often associated with activist modes of planning, 
chiefly their “epistemological, empowering and relation-building” aspects and their potential 
role within official planning processes (Sager, 2013:3). This proposed confluence of insights 
from complexity, activist modes of planning and transformation inspires a “relational notion of 
planning in which future directed action emerges from dialogue and interaction between 
multiple actors” (Sager, 2013:69). Such an approach has become prominent worldwide as 
planners continuously search for practical strategies aimed at dealing with biased power 
relations and complexity. Healey (2007:19) positions this relational way of governance and, 
by extension planning as an activity “driven by and performed through a nexus of complex 
interactions, linking the spheres of the state, the economy and civil society in diverse … 
highly uneven, ways”. Often it includes role-players in “opposition to state and corporate 
economy” (Sager, 2013:71). Simply put, this notion of confluence in planning argues for a 
“forward-looking, adaptive, multi-actor” planning and governance system aimed squarely at 
“long term transformation” (Kemp and Loorbach, 2006:103). It argues for a planning system 
that allows citizens to exert their profound influence on how planning decisions affecting 
them are made, implemented and evaluated (De Coning and Wissink, 2011:3; Mthethwa, 
2014:18).  
Increasingly, the nature of challenges currently at hand in the Global South and for Africa in 
particular, are complex and evolving (Allmendinger, 2002a). As such, instrumental or goal-
orientated planning practices and the systems that inform them (laws and institutions) need 
to be fully reconsidered in order to deal directly with the unintended effects of repressive and 
manipulative power relations (Sager, 2013:3). With such a transformative goal in mind, the 
study attempts to refocus planning discourse towards meta-discourses that are intended to 
collectively “detect and solve [planning] problems we face in our social, political and urban 




4 | P a g e  
 
“transformative possibilities [often grounded in] … histories of resistance to certain planning 
practices and regulatory regimes” (Sandercock, 1998a) seen to be oppressive and 
exclusionary. It therefore, highlights how “planners have tried over time to strengthen their 
position by cooperating [or coming together] with partners outside the official planning 
process drawing planners to direct action” with the grassroots (Sager, 2013:67). Lotz-Sisitka, 
et al. (2015:73) proposes that understanding and learning from such a rich planning history 
would enable today’s planners to comprehend accelerating change and effectively deal with 
growing complexity, contested knowledge positions, and unparalleled uncertainty in an 
inclusive manner.  
It is suggested that this ideological shift in planning practice would allow today’s planners to 
be critical or reflexive as they genuinely seek practical strategies for dealing with biased 
power relations in the official expert driven government planning processes. This shift fully 
supports the principle that “as the number of reasonably-informed decision-makers 
increases, the likelihood of a right decision approaches one” (Sager, 2013:3). Hence, the 
bold attempt to reflect and learn directly from the experiences of the excluded who often 
exerted political pressure making it relatively more difficult for elites to pursue particularistic 
interests by means of repressive manipulative strategies. In practical terms this bold 
proposition entails that today’s planners and decision makers involved in the formulation of 
appropriate plans should “attest to [the] democratising culture of inclusivity and consultation” 
(Mthethwa, 2014:18). In the study, I argue therefore that the coming together or relationship 
between the state and civil society is an important one. It is a key success factor necessary 
in transforming the current nexus of planning issues/problems into viable future solutions (De 
Coning and Wissink, 2011:3) that are relevant to the unique South African context. By 
utilising the ‘prism of change’ (transformation) (Martens, 2001:5) as a lens, the study 
carefully draws out critical planning lessons and recommendations from the vast planning, 
complexity, activist planning and advocacy literature. A bold “theory of participatory planning” 
based on genuine “human action motivated by the [collective] resolution of societal and 
political problems” (Mäntysalo, 2002:10) was carefully developed and then applied in the 
analysis of the Atlantis Revitalisation Framework of 2012. Listed below are some of the 
terms and definitions used in the construction of this transformative evaluative framework for 
planning. 
1.2. Terms and Definitions 
From the onset of this discussion, it is apparent that key concepts together with related 
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planning, complexity theory, decision-making, activist planning, transformation, advocacy as 
well as the complex nexus (connections) between them are thus defined and highlighted. 
Other planning related and study specific terminologies such as theory, nexus, governance, 
policy, complexity and confluence are also qualified to fit a specific purpose as used within 
the delimitations of this study. The terms featured in the study inter alia include: 
Activist Modes of Planning – Refers to “alternative traditions to planning [which] have 
always existed outside the state and [were] sometimes [seen] to be in opposition to it” 
(Sandercock, 1998b). They often involve stakeholders outside the official planning process 
capable of exerting political pressure that brings planners closer to direct action (Sager, 
2013). These activist modes of planning often exert resistance to certain planning practices 
and regulatory regimes (Sandercock, 1998b) in an attempt to deal with biased power 
relations in the official expert driven government planning processes. 
 
Advocacy Planning – Advocacy refers to public support for or recommendation of a 
particular cause or policy, in other words it is the “act of pleading for, supporting, or 
recommending; active espousal” of certain ideas, approaches or processes (Collins English 
Dictionary, 2017). Advocacy planning is “modelled upon the legal profession” and often used 
to defend the collective interests of the marginalised “against strong-community groups, 
environmental causes, the poor, and the disenfranchised against the established powers of 
business and government” (Hudson, Galloway & Kaufman, 1979; Walters, 2007). This study 
takes the position that advocacy is “about actions that are rooted in the history of socio-
political and cultural reform” (Samuel, 2007).  
Complexity Theory – refers to the “study of complex and chaotic systems and how order, 
pattern, and structure can arise from them” (Collins English Dictionary, 2017). Complexity 
theory, as well as chaos theory, both attempts to “reconcile the unpredictability of non-linear 
dynamic systems with a sense of underlying order and structure” (Ferreira, 2001). In this 
study, complexity theory or thinking will be used as a lens to critique rational planning and 
motivate for a post positivist conception of planning that is sensitive to context and the lived 
experiences of those affected.  
Confluence - Whilst confluence is often associated with a flowing together of two or more 
streams or rivers, it also means a coming together of people or things, or “an act or process 
of merging” (Collins English Dictionary, 2017; Oxford Living Dictionaries, 2018). In this study 
the term “confluence” shall be used to mean the coming together of complementary planning 
processes, tools, techniques in pursuit of the transformative ideals espoused in activist 
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aforementioned theories is found" (De Coning, Cloete and Wissink, 2011). Whilst nexus 
refers to the interrelatedness or the interconnectedness of planning issues and processes 
due to complexity, the notion of confluence refers to the coming together or blending of 
various modes of planning in pursuit of transformative solutions in a complex society. 
Human rights-based planning and development - This refers to planning and 
development that promotes and protects international human rights standards, and helps to 
empower people to claim their rights, as well as building out institutions that respect, protect, 
promote and fulfil human rights, as set out in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 
of 1996 (Uvin, 2007). 
Instrumental rationality – The phrase means reasoning about the best means to achieve 
particular ends, without exploring the values of the ends (which is called value reasoning). In 
planning it mostly refers to the application of expert knowledge in “problem identification, 
goal determination and analysis, implementation and evaluation” to meet the collective 
interests of an undifferentiated ‘public’ (Klosterman, 1988). It is based on the conception of 
planning that relies on ‘reason’ for making “instrumentally rational decisions” with the aim of 
coordinating increasingly specialised and narrowly defined activities using the planner’s 
professional expertise and objectivity (Sandercock, 1998a). 
Multimethod case study - Research approach that uses multiple research methods in a 
single study (Beeton, 2005). As such, this study uses a systematic literature review, thematic 
content analysis, and the case study method which make use of various methods and data 
sources in keeping with this conception of a multimethod case study.  
Nexus - The word nexus means ‘binding together’. It originated from the Latin word 
‘nectere’, meaning to bind. It is used to refer to the making of connections between members 
of a group or things in a series; to link and to bond, or to integrate. Secondly, it can also 
mean “a connected group or series” (Collins English Dictionary, 2017). It shall be used with 
reference to the interconnectedness or interrelationships between concepts such as activist 
planning, transformation and complexity, as well as between planning issues, planning 
methods and planning solutions. According to Morné du Plessis, the South African World 
Wide Fund for Nature (WWF-SA) CEO (as cited in Von Bormann and Gulati, 2014: 3) “The 
nexus concept provides a useful framework for action to resolve complex challenges”. Al-
Saidi and Elagib (2017: 1132-1133) state that the nexus concept is increasingly used in 
environmental management, especially because it moves attention away from sectoral 
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Planning - Taylor (1999) sees planning as “a form of social action directed at shaping the 
physical environment to accord with certain valued ideals, whilst Faludi (1973) views 
planning as a process “concerned with the best way of producing results" and Davidoff 
(1956:395) arguing that planning was simply “a means for determining policy”. Hall and 
Tewdwr-Jones (2011) chose to be more dramatic, they looked at planning as an “extremely 
ambiguous and difficult word to define”, since those that plan do “all sorts of different things” 
which in so many ways “mean different things” to different people. Since “no consensus 
exists” (Faludi, 1973), planning is often seen as a “diffuse phenomenon" that has been 
extensively used and as such generates a "variety of meanings depending on the context or 
use” (Allmendinger, 2002a). In this study, planning refers to the various processes 
undertaken by the CoCT in terms of legislation, to draft and implement integrated 
development plans and spatial development frameworks, as well as other forms of sectoral 
planning not legislated, such as drafting economic plans. 
Policy - De Coning and Wissink (2011:10) argues that “policies interpret the values of 
society” and that they are “usually embodied in the management of pertinent projects and 
programmes”. Stiftel (2000:04, cited in Mthethwa, 2014:18) highlights that “planning theory is 
the engine that drives the implementation of policies” and that the process of public policy-
making and implementation cannot be isolated from theories and models of planning. In this 
study, I look at planning as “a means for determining policy” (Davidoff, 1956:319), and argue 
that planning theories, models and concepts are very much at the centre of policy-making 
and analysis. Ever since policy analysis appeared on the scene, “planners have been 
concerned about their relationship with it, at times claiming that planning and analysis are 
the same” since, “policy management, project management and implementation are … very 
much at the core of development planning” (De Coning and Wissink, 2011:11). 
Positivism - Is a knowledge paradigm or theory that assumes that “theology and 
metaphysics are earlier imperfect modes of knowledge and that positive knowledge is based 
on natural phenomena and their properties and relations as verified by the empirical 
sciences” (Collins English Dictionary, 2017). In this study, positivism is linked with rational, 
positivist or instrumental planning that assumes “comprehensive knowledge, the 
predictability of the future and the possibility of value free analysis” (Harrison, 1995) in the 
“application of scientific method to [planning and] policy making” (Faludi, 1973). 
Post-positivism – Is seen as the “metatheoretical stance that critiques and amends 
positivism” (Your dictionary, 2017). Post-positivists recognise that research can never be 
totally objective and “all observation is fallible and has error and that all theory is revisable” 
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… able to support committed social movements, that is, movements that aspire to change 
the world and contribute” to transformation (Social Research Methods, 2017). This study 
looks at post-positivist planning models such as advocacy, democratic planning, radical 
planning, equity planning and communicative action and explores their transformative 
potential in an increasingly complex world (Allmendinger, 2002; Walters, 2007; Sager, 2013).   
Revitalisation - The Collins dictionary defines ‘revitalise’ as “breathe new life into, bring 
back to life, reanimate, refresh, rejuvenate, renew, restore and resurrect” (Collins English 
Dictionary, 2017). It is in the context of this same reasoning that the renewal of Atlantis, a 
township created in the apartheid era as a result of forced segregation and the separate 
development ideology of the National Party, is viewed.  
Theory - Whilst De Coning, Cloete and Wissink (2011:32) state that “a theory is a 
comprehensive, systematic, consistent and reliable explanation and prediction of 
relationships among specific variables”, Allmendinger (2002a) provides a somewhat general 
description of what theories are. He reckons that they are in fact a “collection of ideas and 
approaches”, a point supported by Faludi (1973) who looks at theory as a “form of human 
thought” invoked when answering questions as to why particular events occur.  Using such a 
pragmatic lens to describe the abstract and diffuse character of theory, it is feasible to 
assume that theory becomes synonymous with a “framework for thinking... [which] puts 
experiences into context” (Faludi, 1973).  
Transformation - According to the Collins English Dictionary (2017), transformation refers 
to “a complete change in the appearance or character of something or someone”. With 
reference to the study, transformation is applied as a prism of change or reform in the 
planning approaches (processes, tools and techniques) that adhere to positivist tenets of 
instrumental rationality, towards a post-positivist conception of planning which is sensitive to 
complexity, contextual reality and indeterminacy. This change emanates from the 
transformative influences from activist planning such as its “epistemological, empowering 
and relation-building” (Mäntysalo, 2002:3), “legitimacy, inclusiveness, quality of engagement” 
(Sager, 2013:3), and “transparency and active participation” (Mthethwa, 2014:16).  
1.3. Problem Statement 
Today’s planning practices and systems are seen to be “unresponsive to the growing needs 
and lived experiences of expanding urban populations, particularly those in the Global 
South, and specifically for those that are excluded (women, children, racial minorities, gays, 




9 | P a g e  
 
Harrison, 2006; Watson, 2009). In addition, the environment within which planning and 
decision-making occurs, continues to stand in “perfect isolation” to existing human-rights 
systems and frameworks (Uvin, 2007:597). Given its contentious past, dating back to 1975 
(apartheid era), the town of Atlantis has been a ticking socio-economic time bomb (WCEC, 
2008).  Its plight has worsened over time due to high levels of job losses and unemployment, 
linked to the loss of subsidies that originally attracted industries to the town when it was first 
established. Atlantis was specifically created to house the coloured community, 45 km 
outside Cape Town in line with the apartheid policy of racial segregation. Over time, job 
losses triggered a host of other social issues such as poverty, food insecurity, crime, gang 
activities, drug abuse and domestic violence (CoCT 2010e:1). The 2008/9 Global Economic 
Recession triggered the implosion of a once carefully planned socio-economic system, 
raising alarm among Atlantis residents and other stakeholders with vested interests in the 
socio-economic development of the township.  
The need to embrace accelerating change and effectively deal with the growing socio-
economic and environmental complexity” faced by Atlantis, was more urgent that ever (Uvin, 
2007:597). This complexity was worsened by, “contested knowledge positions and 
unparalleled uncertainty” (Lotz-Sisitka et al., 2015:73) at the local, provincial and national 
levels. Given this complex backdrop, there was an urgent need to “rethink” and transform 
planning approaches largely led by the state, based on rational thinking and dominant neo-
liberal ideologies. In response, local actors in Atlantis advocated for a relational multi-actor 
planning system that embraced transformative influences from activist planning such as its 
‘epistemology, empowering and relation-building” nature (Mäntysalo, 2002:3), its bias 
towards “legitimacy, inclusiveness, quality of engagement” (Sager, 2013:3) as well as 
“transparency and active participation” (Mthethwa, 2014:16). This organic response by 
Atlantis stakeholders relied on a “rights-based” approach to planning and decision-making 
centred around “claims, and … processes” (Sengupta, 2000a: 568, as cited in Uvin, 
2007:602) espoused in the Constitution of South Africa and its cooperative governance 
model as a basis for transformative plan-making. The question is whether this planning 
approach has helped to alleviate the problems of Atlantis. 
1.4. Background of Atlantis  
In line with the relational mode of planning (Healey, 2007; Harrison, 2006) noted above, the 
Atlantis Socio-economic Development Task Team (ASED) (2010a:5) highlighted that the 
township of Atlantis, a product of the then apartheid government was in “dire straits” 
because of the economic downturn experienced during the 2008/9 global economic 
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community in crisis due to the fact that many of its factories were closing down or relocating. 
Boasting a total population of 67 491, with 15 564 households and an average household 
size of 4,34 persons (CoCT, 2013:2), the town experienced an unusually high 
unemployment rate, estimated to be between 30% to 35%, compared to a national 
unemployment rate of 25% at that time (ASED, 2010a:7). The Atlantis Inter-Governmental 
Task Team (AIGTT) (2011:3) noted that Atlantis was “a distressed area that [was] catapulted 
into long-term economic decline given continued loss of business and jobs in the area”. To 
make matters worse, the township of Atlantis was physically isolated from the City of Cape 
Town metro and, by extension, from the economic centre of the province (WCEC, 2010a), 
making its situation relatively untenable.  
As a result of its uncharacteristically high youth population (people younger than 19 years), 
which stood at 44%, combined with 6% of persons older than 55 years, the dependent 
population of the town stood at over 50% of the total population in 2010/11. Over 50,4% of 
its population earned between R1 and R3 200 a month (CoCT, 2011e:4) a situation that 
exacerbated the effects of an already high unemployment level untenable (AIGTT, 2011:3). 
This downward spiral in the socio-economic status of the town is directly correlated to the 
rise in cases of crime, such as common assault, robbery, burglary and theft as noted by the 
South Africa Police Service in the Western Cape (SAPS, 2010:1). According to the AIGTT 
(2011:3) this unusually high level of unemployment, particularly youth unemployment, 
contributed directly to “an escalation in [youth] crime, gang activities, drug abuse and 
domestic violence, to name a few, in the area”. Additional consequences of such high 
unemployment, highlighted by the CoCT (2011e:1) include, “increased food insecurity, 
inability to pay for municipal services (water, electricity) and the demise of the social fabric of 
the society” which made the township of Atlantis an unfavourable destination for investment. 
Amid the alarm, there was a “growing consensus” that called for an urgent rescue plan for 
Atlantis. The Job Creation Trust (JCT), an affiliate of the Congress of South Africa Trade 
Unions (COSATU), was the first to respond in 2009, calling for a multi-stakeholder 
consultative process aimed at mapping out a rescue plan for the town (Dudley, 2009). This 
marked the beginning of an alternative planning and governance process in Atlantis, aimed 
squarely at the ‘revitalisation’ (Urban-Econ, 2011) of the town. A collaborative planning 
approach, drawing on members of civil society, labour, business, industry, and later on 
government, was “initiated to introduce decisive and integrated interventions that 
address[ed] Atlantis’s rapid socio-economic decline” (Atlantis Inter-Governmental Task 
Team (AIGTT), 2011:3). This effort culminated in a protracted advocacy and activist planning 
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Revitalisation [Policy] Framework (ARF) of 2012 by the Atlantis Intergovernmental Task 
Team. 
1.5. Research Aim and Objectives 
The aim of the study is to explore the implications of complexity theory on official 
government, expert heavy planning processes, as well as the emerging insights regarding 
activist planning and its inherent transformative possibilities such as its “epistemological, 
empowering and relation-building” nature (Mäntysalo, 2002:3), “legitimacy, inclusiveness, 
quality of engagement” (Sager, 2013:3), “transparency and active participation” (Mthethwa, 
2014:16), as an alternative approach to local planning initiatives. The transformative insights 
from the literature were then used to develop evaluative criteria that could be applied in the 
systematic analysis of the Atlantis Revitalisation Framework that was developed from 2009 
to 2012. To accomplish this task, the study starts by reviewing and mapping out the general 
context within which planning operates, highlighting the complexities associated with the 
processes and outcomes of planning. From such a deeper understanding of the qualities of 
a planning process leading up to the eventual plan, arguments for rethinking public planning 
were then put forward, exploring the possibility of political and institutional designs that 
reflect a socially transformative ambition (Sager, 2013:66).  
Using the concept of confluence of various modes of planning the study explores how the 
planning process was organised and how planning situations were arranged, how planning 
problems took shape and how they were solved, how worldviews, attitudes, allegiances and 
roles evolved in the process and how conflicts were handled (Mäntysalo, 2002:9). Attempts 
were made to trace back the intricate struggles and experiences of multiple actors (NGOs, 
the state, mobilised communities, private business, research community etc.) involved in the 
formal and informal planning process of the ARF, especially focussing on the links between 
activist planning, transformation and complexity. The study also outlined the critical events, 
principles as well as the radical actions taken by these various players as they challenged, 
altered or even replaced existing planning systems and entrenched ways of decision-making 
with new practices that largely adhere to the normative principles of equality, social justice 
and inclusion. Through such an exploratory effort, the study makes a case for reflective or 
critical planners that seriously consider “raising political transaction costs of actors trying to 
exploit the weakness of others for their own good” (Sager, 2013:4). They do so by building 
strategic alliances with “organisations and actors outside the official planning process and 
make these external actors exert pressure” (Sager, 2013:4), thus becoming intentional of the 
transformative potential of these evolving alternative modes of planning and decision making 
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(transformation), practical lessons and alternative strategies are carefully drawn from the 
literature and the case study to provide arguments for the transformative role of activist 
planning within a complex and evolving’ planning landscape of post-apartheid South Africa. 
1.6. Research Question 
The main research question and sub-questions of the study therefore comprise: 
What transformative role can and did advocacy and activist planning play in 
the complex processes of planning and development of the Atlantis 
Revitalisation Framework (ARF) of 2012 
The sub-questions and research objectives linked to this broad research question include 
exploring and understanding: 
i. What the literature says about the nexus between planning as government 
activity, planning in its activist modes, transformation and complexity (Chapter 
2), 
ii. What the literature says about the transformative potential and challenges 
inherent in advocacy and activist approaches to planning and decision-making 
and what criteria can be used to evaluate this (Chapter 3), 
iii. What the Atlantis Revitalisation Framework (2012) case study illustrates about 
complexity and the role of advocacy and activist planning in the planning and 
decision-making processes towards transformation (Chapter 4), 
iv. What practical planning lessons can be learnt from these dynamic collective 
planning and decision-making processes (Chapter 5). 
1.7. Research Strategy 
Due to the view that planning as a discipline has over time been "loosening its technical 
roots" and achieving an end to its self-imposed "academic isolation”, Campbell and Fainstein 
(1996:2) mention that “planning theory appears to overlap with theory in all the social 
disciplines”. Du Toit (2010) further suggests that there is an increase in academic discourse 
that indicate the development of a "closer relationship between planning and the social 
sciences" moving towards the notion of transdisciplinarity. Notably, the field of planning 
commonly borrows its practical tools from the “diverse methodologies from many different 
fields” (Campbell and Fainstein, 1996) suggesting a transition from the established planning 
traditions and practices which are known to be rather “slippery and elusive”, since the state 
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limitations,  Odendaal, Duminy and Watson (2010) argue that all sorts of planners (state 
planners included) are currently "well positioned to address the immense challenges facing 
urbanising spaces in Africa". With this in mind, the Association of African Planning Schools 
(2012) argues that "African urban systems are highly complex" and thus require alternative 
"research methods that are capable of understanding and communicating this institutional, 
environmental and socio-economic complexity" to ensure practical applicability of learned 
solutions. The case study method is argued to be such a research method able to address 
this detail and complexity. 
According to Odendaal et al. (2010) such "contextually embedded approaches ... facilitate a 
meaningful response to local issues".  The study adopted the same logic and moved 
towards a deep contextual engagement in the development of the research strategy and the 
subsequent selection of research methods, tools and techniques. To further unpack this 
complex subject, the adapted process flow chat from Kothari (2004) Figure 1 (Research 
Process Flow), depicts the proposed research framework behind a seven step research 
strategy. It must be noted that the research process itself, though presented in a linear 
schematic, was carried out in a more dynamic and iterative manner given the complex 
nature of the subject under review. This nuanced approach to the research gave it flexibility 
in adjusting the ideas, insights, concepts and the content of the study based on the feedback 
and feedforward mechanisms employed in the approach, which served to enrich the 
conceptual and analytic phases of the study. To further illustrate this logic, the graphic 
representation shows distinct stages of the research strategy, highlighting the link (nexus) 
between the research problem and its associated objectives. It also underscores the specific 
deliverables linked to each research question/objective. All the proposed steps and 
deliverables were carefully selected as outputs towards resolving the main research 
question and to "produce causal explanations based on a logically coherent theoretical 
argument [aimed at] generating testable implications" (Levy, 2008) for the case study. Each 
output of the study becomes an input for the next phase, demonstrating in practice the idea 
of nexus and its related association with the term confluence, meant to demonstrate the 






















Figure 1: Research Process Flow Chart (Adapted from Khotari, 2004) 
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1.7.1. Analytical Phases 
This strategy consists of four distinct analytical phases mirrored on the above four research 
questions which were strategically chosen as necessary elements towards answering the 
main research question. Collectively, these four stages are aimed at exploring and 
highlighting the role played by activist modes of planning in the decision-making process that 
informed the Atlantis Revitalisation Framework of 2012. Figure 2 below is a graphical 
depiction of this four-phased analytical framework. Each research question was strategically 
linked to one or more research methods and their associated research tools and techniques. 
A detailed ‘lessons learnt’ and recommendations phase is also included to ensure that the 
study generates practical suggestions on reforming current planning and decision-making 
practices and the systems (laws and institutions) that inform them (Berrisford and Kihato, 
2008: 203). To achieve these outputs, a series of sub-steps were undertaken in an iterative 
fashion resembling a dynamic complex system. This dynamic review and analytical process 
has numerous feedbacks and feed-forward interactions that depict the multiple 
interrelationships and confluence between complexity, planning, advocacy in practice.  











Phase 1: At the outset, a theoretical overview of the planning and complexity landscape was 
carried out to establish the existing nexus (connection). Using thematic content analysis as a 
research method, the thematic elements that embody the two concepts were explored and 
mapped out. As a result of instrumental rationality and its narrow justifications for planning, 
the implications of complexity theory for planning were established. Insights from activist 
planning were then presented as possible alternatives to deal with this growing uncertainty 
and complexity. 
Phase 2: Using the transformative ideas established from the planning, advocacy and 
complexity nexus, evaluative criteria for analysing planning and decision making were 
developed using the notion of confluence or coming together of various insights.  The criteria 
were based on the transformative possibilities inherent in the alternative activist modes of 
planning thus giving practical guidance on how and what to look for in past, present and 
future planning processes and their outcomes. 
Phase 3: Using this evaluative criteria and insights from complexity theory as lenses for 
analysis, the study explores the role played by activist planning and decision-making in the 
development of the Atlantis Revitalisation Framework of 2012. A multimethod case study 
review of the planning process was conducted, highlighting the main elements (critical 
events, main players and their actions) involved in this collective and relational planning 
process under review.  
Phase 4: To ensure practical learning, lessons learnt, in phase 2 and 3 of the study, were 
applied to develop methodological recommendations that provide useful insights to current 
and future planning endeavours by the state, civil society organisations and affected 
communities in South Africa. Concepts from activist planning such as advocacy planning, 
collaboration, communicative action, complexity, systems thinking and others, were woven 
together in line with the idea of seeking confluence or the coming together in planning 
thought and practice. It is argued that such a synergy of transformative ideas provides 
practical guidelines on how to start rethinking South Africa’s planning and governance 
practices and systems. The study therefore attempts to make a case for seeking 
"confluence" in the various planning traditions with transformation as a central pillar. 
1.7.2. Research Methods, Tools and Techniques  
To achieve the objectives of the study, “alternative [research] methods [were] considered 









carefully considered and deployed. In keeping with the theory of complexity, which states 
that there are many possibilities linked to social phenomena (Cilliers, 1998), the multi-
method approach applied in this study used different research methods such as systematic 
document review, thematic content analysis, case study method, and document analysis 
(Yin, 2009). It is argued that this choice of a multi-method research design fits the challenge 
and complexity at hand as it offers multiple lenses and perspectives of the same issues 
ensuring a rich analysis process. 
1.7.3. Unit of Analysis 
Since much of what planning is focused on, involves "data gathering, processing and 
interpretation" (Odendaal, Duminy and Watson, 2010), the process to develop the Atlantis 
Revitalisation Framework becomes the unit of analysis for this study. The geographic focus 
of the study was limited to South Africa, Cape Town and Atlantis specifically. The matrix in 
Table 1 below provides further clarity on this four-phased strategy as highlighted above. It 
sets out the desired research methods, research tools and techniques. The specific 
deliverables at each stage of the study process are also highlighted in the matrix: 
Table 1: Research strategy phases, methods, tools and techniques 
Study 
Phase 
Study Objective Research Method(s) Research tools and 
techniques 
Outcome 
1 Highlight the implications of 
complexity theory on planning 
and decision making in the 
Global South in general and for 
South Africa in particular. 
Thematic Analysis of 




review, Mapping of 
thematic concepts, 
Mendeley and Atlas 
Arguments for/ 
against rational 
planning and the 
implications of 
complexity 
2 Develop criteria for evaluating 
the transformative potential 
planning and decision-making 
processes and their outcomes. 
Thematic Analysis of 
planning, governance, 
decision-making, 
planning, advocacy and 
complexity literature 
Systematic literature 
review, Mapping of 
thematic concepts, 





3 Explore the role played by 
advocacy as a planning and 
decision-making tool in the 
development of the Atlantis 
Revitalisation Framework of 

















1.7.4. Systematic Literature Review 
A thematic literature review of rational planning, activist planning and complexity articles and 
books was conducted. This involved the sorting and categorisation of reading materials 
according to themes that are closely associated with state led planning, activist planning and 
complexity. An extensive search for transformative themes, topics, subtopics and sections 
was carried out on the Stellenbosch Library Website, Google Scholar database and in the 
‘reading lists’ of previous planning modules and assignments. A list of reading materials was 
developed and categorised accordingly, both manually (in folders on my computer) and by 
using Mendeley which is the referencing software chosen for this study. A critical analysis of 
the literature was carried out, to search for relevant data and to develop thematic codes 
necessary in building the case for rethinking the relationship between state led planning, 
activist planning, transformation and complexity.  
Subsequently, arguments for seeking confluence in planning traditions were developed 
using an iterative analysis of these emerging arguments. This involved the collection of 
data/themes/codes, synthesising it and seeking for patterns and meaning. These 
interpretations were useful in developing alternative propositions including the evaluative 
criteria for planning that started to indicate specific conclusions and recommendations 
preferable for our context in South Africa and the Global South in general.  
1.7.5. Case Study: The Atlantis Revitalisation Framework 
Odendaal, Duminy and Watson (2010) acknowledge that "there is an uneasy relationship 
between case research and theory", whilst Mukhija (2010) is of the opinion that "case 
studies are ideal for understanding complex and misunderstood phenomenon", such as the 
one under review. Hence, the Atlantis Revitalisation Framework case study presented an 
opportunity for detailed analytical research that utilises "facts or information already 
available, and [critically] analyse it" (Kothari, 2004). This was done using a theoretical 
framework developed in the Literature Review Chapter as a way of preserving what Yin 
South Africa. 
4 Highlight the lessons learnt and 
propose practical 
recommendations to guide 
present and future planning in 
South Africa 
Thematic Content 
Analysis and Multi 
Method Case Studies 
Mapping of thematic 
concepts 












(2013) identifies as "theoretical sensitivity". The study is generally motivated by the need to 
gain a deeper understanding of the complex planning and decision-making landscape of 
South Africa, using the Atlantis multi-stakeholder planning engagements as an example.  
This analysis may be a useful contribution towards reshaping the current planning research 
and activist planning agenda so as to inform more meaningful planning practices in SA and 
beyond (Odendaal, Duminy and Watson, 2010). It is hoped that the study can potentially 
present a case for alternative thinking in planning aimed at redressing the "pressing practical 
problems" as identified in the study (Kothari, 2004).  
While reference to some quantitative data was made, the data for the study was largely 
sourced from qualitative secondary data sources, implying meaning that no quantitative data 
surveys were conducted. A number of existing data sources were used ranging from 
personal notes kept in my journals, available project documents, parliamentary reports, 
project reports, minutes, publications, case studies, documentaries, newspaper and online 
articles on Atlantis. Thus, a bias towards qualitative data is clearly evident, given the desired 
research methodology in which the ARF case study represented the central focus. 
1.7.6. Personal Observations and Notes  
In keeping with the post-positivist principle of being sensitive to context and using 
experience as a way of developing meaning, I concede that my experiences in the planning 
process, that led to the development of the ARF, were “both the most natural and the most 
challenging of qualitative data collection methods” that I have ever used (SAGE Research, 
2013). With the benefit of hindsight, I was connected to the “most basic of human 
experiences, discovering through immersion and participation, the how’s and why’s of 
human behaviour” in the Atlantis context (Guest, Namey and Mitchell, 2013). As an informed 
insider, I was in constant contact with the actors, events, actions and processes that 
preceded the development of the ARF. As an active participant, I used my past experiences 
in writing up minutes, reports, analytical documents as reflection points in the review and 
reflection process applied to narrate the ARF case study as accurately as possible.  
The write up in Chapter 4, was therefore a “systematic description of events, behaviours, 
and artefacts in the social setting chosen for study" (Marshall and Rossman, 1989). 
Together, with the thematic literature review, the multi-method case study was used to 
provide a "written photograph" of the situation under study (Erlandson, Harris, Skipper and 









process that led to the ARF, my experiences were blended with those of the community and 
other actors, hence I was not at the time required to remove myself from the setting or 
community to be able to understand what was going on and to write about it. Though I knew 
then that I would want to revisit the experiences through my journal, I did not yet think of the 
academic application of the data collected and the lessons learnt. I, however, remained 
interested in the nuanced events, actions and processes of which I formed part. I 
unintentionally became “a careful observer and a good listener” as I absorbed, documented, 
advised and advanced in my own career path.  
Though I was largely open to other ideas, I was not immune to conflict. I was the youngest 
member of the team, representing the WCEC in the ASED Task team and dealing with 
sensitive issues, most of which predates my arrival in Atlantis. Being open also meant one 
could not avoid the unexpected in what is learnt, and this also included conflict (DeWalt and 
DeWalt, 1998). My role as a researcher for the ASED Task Team was not static but it 
constantly moved “along a continuum of informed insider to participant” (Morgan, Pullon, 
Macdonald, McKinlay and Gray, 2016). As such, most of the times, I was not a passive 
participant, rather I constantly interacted with the actors from 2009 to 2012 and beyond, and 
my role and views constantly changed depending on the purpose of those interactions. 
1.8. Limitations and Assumptions of the Study 
Since the study is a retrospective review of the planning efforts that led to the development 
of the Atlantis Revitalisation Framework, its findings could be useful as analytical lenses for 
other planning initiatives past, present or future. The study is not exhaustive and its 
analytical usefulness is therefore limited to the thematic areas that were mapped out in the 
literature review, based on literature available to the researcher. Due to the ‘activist’ nature 
and bias of the study, the selected analytical framework was limited to creating an 
understanding of the planning process, the actors involved, the role of the state, the role of 
the state planner, the interests and or values of these actors in as far as the ARF was 
concerned. The study mentions, but does not explore in detail, the outcomes of the ARF, the 
economic arguments presented, analysis of the content of the framework as well as the sub-
themes of these and other elements which are an integral part of the evaluative criteria 
developed in Chapter 3 of the study. The application of the evaluative criteria on the ARF 









The discussion of the post-positivist planning approaches was also not exhaustive, rather it 
was biased towards activist modes of planning such as advocacy, democratic planning, 
equity planning, radical planning and communicative action, thus negating analysis of other 
progressive planning approaches such as incrementalism, strategic planning, pragmatisms, 
mixed scanning, the New Right etc. and their implications for the case study.   
Due to time constraints and the retrospective nature of the case study, a desktop review of 
available reports and my personal experiences limited the data sources to the public 
records, documents, reports, minutes and communication available to me as a researcher 
for the ASED Task Team. Given more time and resources, the study could have been 
extended to include targeted interviews and focus group discussions with other participants 
of the ARF in order to highlight their views and experiences of the process. My views and the 
analysis of the case are also those of an informed insider or civil society participant whose 
agenda was biased towards increased participation of the people of Atlantis as active 
stakeholders in their own community developmental and planning processes. Therefore, I 
might lack a deeper understanding or experience of what the planning process was like for 
state planners, businesses and consultants that represented the other side of the debate 
(particularly limited by political allegiances, specific legislation, established planning 
procedures and frameworks as well as limited resources). 
1.9. Ethical Implications of the Research 
To ensure that the study adhered to the ethical principles that ensure that “participants have 
a right to privacy, confidentiality, consent, and knowledge of the purpose of the research” 
(Patten: 2009), the study relied entirely on information available in the public sphere, 
including reports, publications and minutes of meetings, in addition to personal notes of the 
processes that I was involved in as an informed insider. The identity of participants, apart 
from known public figures such as politicians and government leaders, that were publicly 
involved or associated with the ARF process, are kept confidential. The research also did not 
make use of any confidential information, thus ensuring that the actors and their views were 
“protected from both physical and psychological harm” that may result from the study. I was 
directly involved in the planning process that led to the ARF and my account is but one of 
many accounts from different stakeholders in the process. The views presented in this study 
are thus mostly my views and do not directly represent the views of those that I worked with 
in the ASED Task team. In principle, the study thus adheres to all the ethical considerations 









1.10. Chapter Outline 
Chapter 1: Introduction: Activist Planning and the Complexity Nexus 
The introductory Chapter gives a summary of the study, it outlines the research rationale, 
questions, objectives and research methods. It also introduces the concept of state-led 
planning and the complexities associated with it, highlighting the inherent linkages or nexus 
contained therein. It then proposes a shift towards a relational planning approach using the 
insights from activist modes of planning and lessons learnt from the ARF planning process.  
 
Chapter 2: The Planning and Complexity Nexus  
Chapter 2 gives a theoretical overview of the planning, transformation and complexity 
landscape and establishes the nexus (connection) that exists among them. It maps out the 
thematic elements that hold the concepts together, establishing the inherent complexities 
within traditional state led planning. Insights from activist modes of planning such as 
advocacy planning, equity planning, radical planning and communicative planning are then 
presented as possible alternatives to deal with this growing uncertainty and complexity.  
 
Chapter 3: Seeking Confluence in Planning  
Chapter 3 systematically sifts through the transformative insights established from activist 
modes of planning and uses these insights to develop practical evaluative criteria useful in 
analysing past and present planning and decision-making processes. 
 
Phase 4: Case Study: Atlantis Revitalisation Framework 
Chapter 4 systematically applies the evaluative criteria developed in Chapter 2, to 
demonstrate the practical application of the transformative criteria for planning. It explores 
the role played by activist modes of planning, specifically advocacy, in the planning and 
decision-making towards the development of the Atlantis Revitalisation Framework of 2012. 
It highlights who the stakeholders were, what were their interests, knowledge and 
belief/value systems, what planning issues did they prioritise and why, what were their goals, 
what was the role of the state and that of state planners, what institutional and/or 
governance frameworks existed, and what economic imperatives informed these. 
 
Chapter 5: Conclusion and Recommendations 
Chapter 5 answers the research questions to ensure practical learning through research. 









recommendations that are useful to inform current and future planning endeavours by the 
state, civil society organisations and affected communities in South Africa. Concepts from 
advocacy planning, collaboration, communicative action, complexity, and systems thinking 
are woven together in line with the idea of confluence in planning thought and practice. 
 
In Chapter 2, the study proceeds to explore and highlight the implications of complexity 
theory on planning, by critically reflecting on the Positivist approaches to planning inter alia 
highlighting their limitations. It also explores insights from activist forms of planning seeking 













Chapter 2: The Planning, Transformation and 
Complexity Nexus 
2.1 Introduction 
In keeping with the notion of nexus (meaning connection), Chapters 2 highlights the 
implications of complexity theory on state-led planning and decision making in the Global 
South in general and South Africa in particular”. The Chapter begins with a critical reflection 
on positivist approaches to planning and explores their intricate connections, overlaps and/or 
differences, as it exposes the pervasive legitimation and/or justification of power through 
state institutions (Sager, 2013:1). The chapter systematically maps out the conditions within 
which official planning and decision-making occurs, and reviews the constraints and wicked 
problems it contends with in pursuit of social change and/or transformation. Using complexity 
theory as a lens, the Chapter explicitly reveals how the Global South and South Africa have 
inherited planning laws, systems and attitudes embedded in Western (Occidental) traditions 
that are not fit to context. It then explores the potential of borrowing ideas and practices from 
activist modes of planning which collectively argue for a “forward-looking, adaptive, multi-
actor” planning and governance system that is intentional about “long term transformation” 
(Kemp and Loorbach, 2006:103) to deal with unending uncertainty and increasing 
complexity.   
2.2. The Planning and Complexity Nexus  
This section provides a theoretical overview of the somewhat ‘slippery’ concept of ‘planning’ 
(Campbell and Fainstein, 1996). Defined by Sager (1999:123) as a “bureaucratic and, in 
many ways, political institution, encompassing goal setting, option seeking, impact 
assessment and evaluation”, planning theory and practice has become increasingly 
contested. Moreover, the governance framework within which planning, and by extension 
decision-making occurs, continues to exist in “perfect isolation” and to a greater extent, 
appears to seriously disregard existing human-rights systems and frameworks and their 
implications (Uvin, 2007:597). Furthermore, planning practice is “inevitably interwoven with 
politics”,a realm within which ongoing “conflicts over the allocation and use of public and 
private resources” continues (Friedmann, 2004:1). Despite the ‘universalisation’ of planning 
discourse over the last five decades or so, “contextual conditions are [often] not aligned” to 









demonstrable in the Atlantis case study under review, once labelled a ‘dream coloured city’ 
during the apartheid era (Manguwo, 2008), only to be relabelled a ‘distressed town’ (CoCT 
2010d: 1), that the state finds difficult and ‘notorious’ to deal with 35 years later.  
The activity of planning and decision-making is “understood and practiced differently in 
different institutional settings”, and the conditions and constraints under which planning 
occurs also vary significantly across countries and even between cities (Friedmann, 
2004: 1). Yet, despite some contextual reforms and innovations in planning practice and the 
laws that inform them, the field continues to borrow heavily from “concepts, procedures and 
methodologies” developed in the 20th century in response to lived experiences in the West 
(Watson, 2009; Harrison, 2006: 319). Moreover, most countries in Africa, including the 
Republic of South Africa inherited their planning and governance systems from their former 
colonial powers (Watson, 2009; 2011:203). By extension, they also inherited Western 
(Occidental) intellectual traditions developed over time in response to lived experiences in 
the West amid conditions that are far divorced from local contexts in the Global South 
(Harrison, 2006:319; Watson, 2009). These Occidental planning practices and governance 
systems (or planning ‘cultures’ as denoted by Friedmann, 2004:1) were/are largely 
unresponsive to the growing needs and lived experiences of expanding urban populations, 
particularly those in the Global South, and specifically for those that are excluded (women, 
children, racial minorities, gays [LGBTQI], the poor, prisoners and indigenous people 
amongst others) (Sandercock, 1998a; 1998b; Harrison, 2006:320; Watson, 2009).  
Whilst the overall process of development implies “ongoing social change” (Seidman et al., 
2007: 22), “contemporary societies, politics, institutions, economies, technologies, social 
values are all subject to continuous, often radical, change” (Friedmann, 2004:1). In the midst 
of this dynamic reality, Rittel and Weber (1973) argue that there is a growing acceptance of 
the intricate links “tying open systems into large and interconnected networks of systems, 
such that outputs from one [system] become inputs to others” from local to global spaces. 
Given this complex nexus of different systems, planning continues to face the difficulty, 
“even impossibility, of predicting future events; the interaction of decisions made in different 
policy spheres; conflicts of values; vested interests; and the complex interrelationships 
between decisions at different scales, at different points in time” (Hall and Tewdwr-Jones 
(2011). With this in mind, Rittel and Weber (1973) concede that it has become less apparent 
where planning “problem centres lie”. In circumstance where planners actually know the 









more diffuse, contested and uncertain. As stated, by Allmendinger (2002a), the underlying 
levels of complexity simply “overwhelms us”. 
This has created intense debates over the manner in which present and future planning 
practices should adapt to new conditions in an increasingly globalising world. Drawing 
inspiration from “various strands of critical social theory” (Harrison, 2006:319), such a 
scenario demands present day planning to continuously reinvent itself as circumstances 
shift, in order for it to become contextually relevant (Friedmann, 2004:6). As a response to 
this growing complexity, Harrison (2006:319) appreciates practice-related shifts away from 
the idea of planning and decision-making as a by-product of the “autonomous reasoning 
processes of the expert” towards a “relational notion of planning in which future directed 
action [and transformation] emerges from dialogue and interaction among multiple actors” 
(Healey 2007; Harrison, 2006; Davidoff, 1956). With its activist roots, this communicative 
planning approach often seeks to explore “how certain planning roles and ideologies can be 
helpful in curbing destructive stakeholder games” inherent in instrumental planning (Sager, 
2013:4). Healey (2007); Harrison (2006) and Davidoff (1956) argue that “the right course of 
action is always a matter of choice and never of fact”, thus reclaiming the “deep political 
nature” (Krumholtz, 1994) of the craft in this unending transformation debate. Furthermore, 
these activist modes of planning render explicit various strategies with the potential to deal 
with biased power relations through relational/deliberative aspects of the process (Sager, 
2013:5). 
However, for this leap in planning theory and practice to take effect, we need a deeper 
understanding of the arguments, conditions and constraints used for the legitimation of state 
planning. The following section therefore maps out the foundational elements on which 
rational/positivist planning was conceptualised, identifying the justifications and the 
assumptions that the founding fathers made in mainstreaming the instrumental conceptions 
of the practice. Most of these are proving increasingly problematic amid emerging ‘wicked 
problems’ and the worsening global ‘polycrisis’. 
2.3. Arguments, Conditions and Constraints for Planning 
The official planning story depicts “the rise of the profession, its institutionalisation, and its 
achievements” (Sandercock, 1998b) using the “philosophies, epistemologies and theories 
broadly associated with modernism and positivism” (Allmendinger and Tewdwr-Jones, 
2005). Such a positivist conception to planning was mainstreamed using a set of arguments, 









some “pressing and enduring [thematic] questions”, still relevant in (re)shaping the persistent 
planning debate, the study makes explicit the inherent constraints that have over time 
contested the validity of those positivist claims to planning and decision-making, arguing 
later on for alternatives (Campbell and Fainsten, 1996). It also exposes the rise of a positivist 
conception of planning as a tool for “irreversible human progress” (Harrison, 1995), the 
linkages of planning with science and reason, the association of planning with the state 
and/or politics, the linkages between planning and the economy as well as the tools and 
approaches upon which rational planning practice was/is cemented (Faludi, 1973; Hall, 
1992; Klosterman, 1985; Harrison, 1995; Campbell and Fainstein; 1996; Sandercock, 1998a; 
Sandercock, 1998b; Allmendinger, 2002a & 2002b; Allmendinger and Tewdwr-Jones, 2005; 
UN Habitat, 2009; Watson, 2009; Hall and Tewdwr-Jones, 2011). 
2.3.1. On Science, Rationality and Planning   
The official “heroic story” on the evolution of planning is often pitched as a purely 
“modernists planning project” that acted as the sole “voice of reason in modern society”, and 
carried with it the “enlightenment mission of material progress through scientific rationality” 
(Sandercock, 1998 b). Nicolescu (2002) mentions that during the modern era, a pervasive 
“scientific euphoria” dominated debates of the time. He laments the fact that it became “quite 
natural to take for granted, … the correspondence between economic, social, and historical 
laws of nature” as did many early scientist and rational planners. As a result of “rapid 
industrial growth, and urbanisation and a chaotic use of urban spaces’ (UN Habitat, 2009) 
there were “concerns with public health and human congestion” (Harrison, 1995) in the 
United States of America and Western Europe. UN Habitat (2009); Watson (2009); Harrison 
(1995) and others note that there was a great need for a ‘rational’ response to deal with the 
rapidly growing and polluted cities of that era, characterised by “rapid urbanisation, 
unhealthy and polluted living conditions for the poor, vanishing open green space, and 
threatened political upheaval” (Watson, 2009). In its original form, rational planning was 
considered to be a ‘scientific process,’ concerned with maximising welfare whilst offering 
rational solutions to social and economic challenges of the 19th and early 20th century, 
through the utilisation of “analytical tools, that influenced decisions” (Sandercock, 1998a).  
Furthermore, the “science of planning and decision-making” was at that time classified under 
the management sciences, and some of the notable contributors to this scientific profession 
include: “Adam Smith (himself), Frederick W Taylor, Henry Fayor, Henry Gantt, A 









their rational planning efforts sought to bring reason to “the anarchic qualities of capitalist 
urban development” (Harrison, 1995), as shown in Figure 3 below. At best, planning was 
seen as the only practical endeavour that claimed capacity to “predict the consequences of 
its action” (Campbell and Fainstern, 1996).   
Figure 3: Example of Rational Planning and Analysis 
Planning Issues 
and Problems 
 Rational Analysis and 
Planning 
 Planned Outcomes 
     
Rapid or slow 
industrial growth 
 Economic planning, Private 
entrepreneurship and the 
competitive forces of the 
market 
 Human growth and progress; 
inclusive growth 
     
Rapid urbanisation  Architecture and urban 
planning 
 Modernisation (slum removal, 
vertical building, connectivity, 
open space) 
     
Chaotic use of the 
urban spaces 
 Architecture and urban 
planning 
 Aesthetics (order, harmony, 
formality and symmetry) 
     
Given this scientific conception of planning, it is not surprising that the majority of early 
positivist planners sought to deal with the multiple challenges of urbanisation (including the 
poor themselves) in particular ways (Sandercock, 1998a). This narrow scientific approach to 
planning assumed “comprehensive knowledge, the predictability of the future and the 
possibility of value free analysis” (Harrison, 1995). To qualify that hypothesis, Faludi (1973) 
looked at “planning [as] the application of the scientific method to policy making” in which 
planners were seen as scientists or “technocrats who focused upon procedures or 
processes (the means) while politicians and others set the ends (goals)”, thus completely 
discounting the role of politics in planning. 
2.3.2. The Goal of Planning  
Faludi (1973) cites the rationale behind a positivist view of planning as the promotion of 
“human growth by the use of rational procedures of thought-based action", whilst Harrison 
(1995) suggests that the central organising theme that ushered in the rise of modernism was 









as an “ideal to aspire to”. He views it as both a "product and as a process" of rational 
planning in which the continuous growth process “utilises the products of previous growth” to 
further/pursue this conception of “inevitable human progress”. Bauman (1992) and Watson 
(2009) underscore that rational planning was embedded in the “visions of the ‘founding 
fathers’ of planning, and the normative values which inspired them: aesthetics (order, 
harmony, formality and symmetry); efficiency (functional specialisation of areas and 
movement, and free flow of traffic); and modernisation (slum removal, vertical building, 
connectivity, open space)”. Within this era of utopian vision, architecture and urban planning 
where chosen as “both the vehicle and the master-metaphor of the perfect world that would 
know of no misfits”. Whilst such an encompassing vision of human progress acted as both a 
goal and the driving force behind planning in the Western world, it was also linked 
ideologically to the economy and its liberal conceptions of free markets (Allmendinger, 
2002a). 
2.3.3. Planning and the Economy 
Campbell and Fainstein (1996) boldly place planning at the “intersection of political economy 
and intellectual history”. Raising serious questions on; “why and in what situations should 
planners intervene” in the broader economic space (Klosterman, 1985). Arguments often 
associated with the classical liberal tradition (Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill and others) 
were/are often presented to justify “abandoning planning, reducing regulation, and restricting 
the size of government” (Klosterman, 1985; Harrison, 1995). This ideological shift was over 
time accompanied by ideas suggesting an increased “reliance on private entrepreneurship 
and the competitive forces of the market”, as championed by Milton Friedman, Friedrich 
Hayek and others (Allmendinger, 2002). Hence, early forms of planning were seen as means 
to intervene in the prevailing socio-economic decay (public health) of the early modern city 
(Campbell and Fainstein, 1996). Confronted by that reality, planning was viewed as an 
urgent response to widespread dissatisfaction with the results of “market and political 
processes reflected in the squalor and political corruption of the emerging industrial city” at 
the turn of the 20th century (Klosterman, 1985).  
Over time, the actual “timing and legitimacy of planned interventions” in the economy have 
become central determinants of the “course of events” and history (Campbell and Fainstein, 
1996). Notably, the Second World War was seen as a catalyst that led to the adoption of 
rational planning and the establishment of “comprehensive planning systems” as instruments 









application of professional expertise, instrumental rationality and scientific methods” offered 
expanded possibilities to effectively “promote economic growth and political stability other 
than the planned forces of market and political competition” alone (Klosterman, 1985). At 
best, this vision was to recreate a “brand new world from the ashes of war” (Harrison, 1995). 
In their classical view of the world, liberal voices of that era, such as Milton Friedman, 
Friedrich Hayek and others advocated for “reducing regulation and restricting the size of 
government”, arguing that this would ensure economic growth (Klosterman, 1985). In that 
neoliberal framework of governance, Klosterman (1985); Walters (2007) and Hall and 
Tewdwr-Jones (2011) identified three basic functions that the state was expected to fulfil. 
These watered-down functions of the state include but were/are not limited to:  
• “the provision of information needed for informed market choice through 
indicative planning, the development of urban information systems and the 
preparation of long-range population, economic and land use projections”, 
• “the provision of public goods through transportation, environmental and 
economic development planning”, and  
• “the control of externalities, urban renewal, community development and natural 
resources planning, the use of traditional land regulatory devices, provision of 
health, public housing and other forms of social planning to compensate for 
inequalities in the distribution of basic social goods and services”. 
Often, planning tended to overlook the “distributional effects of government and private 
actions” in an attempt to promote the “public interests” (Klosterman, 1995). The overall 
economic and political goals were hidden and presented as rational principles supporting or 
justifying certain planning endeavours and subsequently the development of certain plans 
and policies (oppressive or otherwise).  
2.3.4. Politics and Normative Values of Planning 
Early forms of town planning either by the state, or by the ruling classes (elites) became a 
strategic tool to attain both their “political and ideological goals” (UN Habitat, 2009). Bauman 
(1992) argues that the vision of these early planners was to achieve “lovingly detailed, 
carefully segregated and strictly functional urban quarters” that were visually appealing, such 
as the Garden City developed by Ebenezer Howard (UN Habitat, 2009). Motivated by their 
great concern for the ‘public’, Harrison (1995) notes that rational thinkers sought to redefine 
the ‘form and structure’ of the city. They conceptualised an urban utopia that exhibited the 









social order (Bauman, 1992). Notably, the pursuit of values linked to “equal protection and 
equal opportunity, public space and a sense of civic community and social responsibility” led 
to the justification for extensive government functions and activities (Campbell and Fainstein, 
1996). As argued by Hoch (2009) the comprehensive plans by the state and state planners 
turned their “desires and interests” into practical intentions. 
Each of these “a-political” values validated specific areas of planning, ranging from 
“indicative planning … the preparation of long range population, economic and land-use 
projections, the provision of public goods through transportation, environmental, economic 
development planning, the control of externalities, … urban renewal, community 
development and natural resource planning and the use of traditional land regulatory 
devices” (Klosterman, 1985). In this project of political independence and human progress, 
rational planning served as a “beacon … of reason [in which planners] visualised a world 
without margins, leftovers, the unaccounted for, without dissidents and rebels … [a world] in 
which everyone had a job to do and everyone would be keen to do the job” (Bauman, 1992). 
The main focus for planners of the time, was to develop mechanisms to surgically separate 
residences from industrial places, the reduction of overcrowding through strategic suburban 
expansions, leading to the creation of garden cities which were meant to allow for extra 
public spaces to be added to the existing industrial areas/residences (Harrison, 1995). In 
that ‘a-political’ worldview epitomised by the ideals of “inevitable human progress”, the 
questioning of order was unthinkable, as “it would be to choose chaos” (Preiser, 2013). The 
logical alternative was to comprehensively plan for these utopias, giving rise to what we now 
know as Town Planning (Walters, 2008).   
2.3.5. Planning, the State and Public Interest  
Formal government efforts to “plan and direct social change have always been controversial” 
(Klosterman, 1985). Sandercock (1998a) is of the view that planning attained currency, 
based on the belief that it offered “greater rationality in public policy decisions”, due to its 
basic logic, built upon “instrumental rationality” (Faludi, 1973). In the latter part of the 19th 
century, government planning was aimed at the promotion of collective public interest 
(Watson, 2009). UN Habitat (2009) observes that early modernist planners responded to the 
need of directly combating “the negative externalities of industrialisation and urbanisation” 
both at a “technical and ideological” level. In its earliest form, planning “ignored the 
distributional effects of government and private actions” which were overshadowed by an 









The belief that there was an “internal logic within social relations” (Harrison, 1995) led to the 
unjust pursuit of the public interests at the expense of “women, racial minorities, the poor, 
and indigenous people amongst others” (Sandercock, 1998b). This flawed ideology, inherent 
within positivist planning theory and practice will receive particular attention in the discussion 
on activist modes of planning, which responded to injustices done in the narrow pursuit of 
public interests. The idea of collective “public interest” was used extensively to “justify public 
purchases of goods and services and an almost open-ended range of government activities” 
giving rise to a complicated state bureaucracy that we see today in many countries, including 
South Africa (Klosterman, 1985). 
The administrative bureaucracies that formed the core management structure of the 
positivist planning era was established on “legal or rational authority” (Weaver, 2007). In 
order to make it functional, the practice was characterised by “obsessively legislating, 
defining, structuring, segregating, classifying, recording and universalisation” both the form 
and structure of human settlements (Watson, 2009). In addition to the role that the state 
played in pursuit of “social spatial transformation”, (Campbell and Fainstein, 1996), 
interventions in “health, housing and other forms of social planning” were carried out as a 
mitigation measure to “compensate for inequalities in the distribution of basic social goods 
and services” inherent in the capitalist economic model. Surprisingly, planning was seen as 
a “gender and race neutral” endeavour in which “a value neutral expert (the planner)” 
(Sandercock, 1998b) was narrowly concerned with the important function of “problem 
identification, goal determination and analysis, implementation and evaluation” to meet the 
collective interests of this undifferentiated ‘public’ (Klosterman, 1988).  
Notably, there were unprecedented challenges in reconciling the shared benefits of 
“common public interests” that arose from a number of communities which lived side by side 
(Campbell and Fainstein, 1996). Sandercock (1998b) laments the view that positivist 
planning by the state, was underpinned by the need to restrict and impose control over 
certain bodies in space, as it instituted the ideals of control and order within the state 
machinery (Harrison, 1995). The planner, especially state planners in this case, played a 
central role in shaping this view of a planner biased against the excluded. 
2.3.6. The Role of Development Planners 
Hence, a central player in this complex state machinery was the 20th century planner, seen 
as the “knower relying strictly on his professional expertise and objectivity” in his/her role 









was instrumental in the coordination of “more specialised and narrowly defined activities” in 
the interests of an undifferentiated public (Sandercock, 1998a). Friedmann (2009) views 
planning as an abstraction, that was/is “chiefly an obsession of a small group of elite 
intellectuals” guided (or even misguided) by the possibility of reason in public life 
(Sandercock, 1998a). These planners, attempted to resolve social problems through the 
utilisation of a range of analytical tools and techniques in what Leat (2005) calls “planned 
change”. Underlying this professional justification for planning for change was the belief that 
the “conscious application of [their] professional expertise, instrumental rationality and 
scientific methods could more effectively promote economic growth and political stability 
than the unplanned forces of market and political competition” (Klosterman, 1985).  
The planner, dubbed the “fourth power” of government by Klosterman (1985), bore the moral 
responsibility and duty to make ‘rational choices’ based on his “professional expertise and 
objectivity”, to efficiently do what was best for this “undifferentiated public” (Sandercock, 
1998a). Hence, planners were (and still are) seen as ‘experts’ who had a rational and moral 
“ability to apply objective and scientific knowledge in pursuit of a better world” (Harrison, 
1995). Their role was simply to guide the state and “intervene in the market and 
spontaneous social processes” (Sandercock, 1998a). Accompanying this respected 
‘profession’ were “conceptions of planning as a value-neutral, rational process” (Faludi, 
1973; Klosterman, 1985) concerned primarily with establishing the “best way of producing 
results” (Faludi, 1973).  
The expert public planners of the time borrowed extensively from tools and techniques such 
as systems thinking, strategic planning and project management developed by the private 
sector (Campbell and Fainstein, 1996). A complicated use of technical language and 
jargon/terms was common and believed to be a method to “disguise the values being 
interjected” and subsequently to obscure who won and who lost (Campbell and Fainstein, 
1996). This audacious task required specific training and specific use of scientific tools and 
techniques (Taylor, 1999). In so doing the role of the planner was seen as “unproblematic”, it 
was assumed that “planning [was] a good thing, a progressive practice and that its 
opponents were reactionary, irrational, or just plain greedy” (Sandercock (1998b). 
2.3.7. A Systems Perspective of Planning  
Robinson (1972, cited in Faludi, 1973) acknowledges that, during the sixties, there was a 
“confluence between systems analysis, operational research and planning". The systems 









alternatives prior to making a choice”, including the need for “modelling” the interrelated 
conditions of towns and cities (Allmendinger, 2002a). Based on the view that the 
relationships that exist between various patterns of city or regional systems are “constantly 
changing, giving rise to new and different conditions, some beneficial to the community, 
some deleterious” (Ratcliffe, 1974, cited in Allmendinger, 2002a), there was an inherent 
need to “devise appropriate ways of controlling the system(s) concerned” (Hall and Tewdwr-
Jones, 2011). Systems planning, a concept with its roots “in the science of cybernetics” (Hall 
and Tewdwr-Jones, 2011) or as Allmendinger (2002a or b) puts it, from “biological sciences”, 
was developed as an alternative to the ‘blue-print era’ of planning in order to provide a 
mechanism for a “continuous process” of planning and decision-making that sought to 
intelligently regulate and control “the communication among the various constituent parts” 
being planned for.  
Allmendinger (2002a) notes that the early systems approach to planning acknowledged that 
“cities and regions [were] complex sets of connected parts which [were] in constant flux”, a 
view that resonates with Hall and Tewdwr-Jones (2011) who highlight that “many 
phenomena (whether social, economic, biological or physical in character) can usefully be 
viewed as complex interacting systems”. Integral to this early ‘systems view’ of the world, 
was the assumption that the different components of the city or regional system “can be 
separated, and the interactions between them analysed” separately to an acceptable degree 
of certainty (Allmendinger, 2002a or b). In view of this early systems perspective, Faludi 
(1973) confidently suggests that the very process of taking “intelligent rational action ... 
[through] a rational thought process” would entail going through a systematic “generation of 
alternatives and choices” based on what he called “verifiable scientific evaluations”. In that 
mode of planning and administering public projects and programmes, Sandercock (1998a) 
observes that planning was obsessed with “hierarchy (goals) and the strategic laying out” of 
alternative courses of action for the ruling elites, in a seamless top-down process.  
In this positivist conception of planning, the expert planner was provided with 
“information/proposals ... [in which s/he] evaluates the arguments as they are manifestly 
made ... judging premises for their acceptability and ... whether proper inferences have been 
drawn" (Faludi, 1973). This expert planner was equipped with rational tools and techniques 
used to continuously monitor specific effects within the system (city, region) to deduce to 
what extent the controls imposed on the system were effective or in what measure, they 
required subsequent modification (Hall and Tewdwr-Jones, 2011). Allmendinger (2002) 









systematically “anticipate the dynamics of a system such as a city or region in a holistic way 
and plan accordingly”. Given that the underlying patterns are decoded through the use of a 
“combination of constraints and rational behaviour”, urban and regional systems can thus be 
“theorised, modelled and predicted” (Faludi, 1973; Allmendinger, 2001; Hall and Tewdwr-
Jones, 2011).  
Together, the thematic elements identified in section 2.3 (ranging from; rationality, planning 
goals, planning and the economy, planning and politics, planning and the state, the notion of 
public goods, the role of the state and that of the development planner, including the early 
systems perspective of planning), were all used as justifications and/or arguments in favour 
of planning, thus signifying its relevance (Campbell and Fainstein; 1996). Over time, they 
were to become areas in which great contestation ensued. This contestation has been 
attributed largely to the flawed assumptions and principles that were and continue to be used 
in legitimising and imposing the rational planning enterprise on a transient society 
(Sandercock, 1998a). The following section on complexity, wicked problems and the global 
poly-crisis, makes these contradictions centred on prediction, pre-determinism, order and 
control (Meadows, 2001) apparent in relation to dynamic social change (Seidman et al., 
2007: 22).  
2.4. The Planning, Complexity and Wicked Problems Nexus 
In order to present a valid case for a ‘relational turn in planning’, the study turns to 
‘complexity theory’, both as a lens for analysing the contested evolution of planning, and as 
a tool for analysing planning issues. In hindsight, complexity theory has “radically changed 
the way we think about science and society” it has made us question notions such as 
“fundamental truth, objective knowledge, reductionism and causality” (Cilliers, 2007:3). It 
suggests that socio-economic and environmental phenomena are “more dynamic than most 
of the traditional scientific approaches assumed”. It brings forth the idea that the 
“organisation or structure” of any planning situation cannot be understood independently 
from its context (Cilliers, 2000a:25). The concept further provides a basis for collective 
decision-making processes and creates a firm foundation for the proposal of communicative 
planning solutions appropriate to context. It helps us trace the pressing procedural and 
substantive challenges afflicting contemporary planning, to the historical foundations of 
modern planning and how rational planning practices were moulded in the West during the 
18th and 19th centuries (Harrison, 2006; Watson, 2009; Watson, 2011). It teaches us that 









“interconnected networks of systems” (Rittel and Weber, 1973) in such a way that, if we are 
to gain a deeper understanding on how to respond, we must ‘reflect and learn’ (Friedmannn, 
2009) from our immediate past. This section outlines the extent to which both global and 
local “wicked problems” (Rittel and Weber, 1973) that confront us today are intricately 
connected to our planning systems and the assumptions, justifications and ideologies that 
inform them.  
2.4.1. Wicked Problems and The Global Polycrisis 
Over time, rational planning and modernisation have been seen to be “regressive 
instruments of change” (Harrison, 1995). Friedmann (2009) notes that we are living in an 
“era where global warming, climate change, water scarcity, desertification, peak oil, the 
destruction of rainforests, and the exhaustion of non-renewable resources and biodiversity 
make headline news” almost daily. Confronted by this reality, Rittel and Weber (1973) 
deduced nearly 50 years ago, that planners were already more aware than ever, of the 
complex nature of social processes that they seek to control. The literature on planning and 
complexity extensively highlight the intricate links “tying open systems into large and 
interconnected networks of systems, such that outputs from one [system] become inputs to 
others” from local to global spaces (Rittel and Weber 1973; Cilliers, 1999; Watson, 2009; 
Friedmann, 2009; Muller, 2012; Swilling and Annecke, 2012).  
Over time, it has become less apparent where “problem centres lie” due to the overlaps and 
interconnectedness of socio-economic and environmental phenomena (Rittel and Weber, 
1973). Notably, rational and systems tools of analysis such as Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA), 
Programme Evaluation and Review Techniques (PERT), Theory of Change (TOC), Critical 
Path Methodology (CPM), Logframes among others, have become largely ineffective in 
solving these increasingly complex social problems, as identified by Friedmann (2009) and 
Muller (2010 & 2012). Due to this growing complexity, it has become “less apparent where 
and how we should intervene” in our urban and regional systems (Rittel and Weber, 1973). 
In circumstances where planners know the desired planning outcomes they want to achieve, 
their actions have increasingly become more diffuse, contested and uncertain. The 
prevailing levels of complexity simply “overwhelm us” (Allmendinger, 2002).  
On the environmental front, Watson (2009) notes the interconnectedness of the modern city 
form to the ‘oil-intensive and yet materialistic’ lifestyles of the rich and growing urban middle 
classes. She places the roots of the ‘global poly-crisis’ (Swilling and Annecke, 2012) at the 









interlinkage is negatively impacting the very planet that we live and depend upon. 
Furthermore, the emissions from coal fired power stations, vehicles and aircraft, and 
technologies which power our 21st century consumerist lifestyles, are contributing “to 
greenhouse gas emissions and hence global temperature rise” (Watson, 2009). These are 
complex global phenomena, scientifically linked to a multiplicity of negative impacts at a 
global scale, such as draughts, melting polar ice caps, recurring floods, tsunamis (Muller, 
2012) and all the other chilling calamities identified in the movie Inconvenient Truth by Al 
Gore et al. (2006). 
Increasingly, positivist planning approaches and our rational assumptions on irreversible 
human progress as a goal for planning, have failed to fully predict the global implications of 
these very plans. Proponents of sustainability like Al Gore, Watson, Swilling and others have 
provided empirical evidence tying a myriad of planning issues and outcomes to problems 
such as: “global warming, global dimming and climate change (leading to more severe 
droughts, desertification, floods, mudslides, hurricanes, typhoons, melting of polar icecaps 
and glaciers in the Himalayas, Alps and other mountain ranges, as well as rising sea-levels); 
resource depletion (energy and water shortages, future oil shortages, declining fish sources, 
rising oil and food prices that could lead to food riots); high rates of biodiversity loss and 
habitat destruction and fragmentation; over-use of poisons and chemicals; pollution; land 
degradation and growing mountains of waste. Added to these are the “negative 
consequences of globalisation, consumerism and the belief in modern technology, rising 
poverty and inequality, high population growth rates, growing informal housing and economic 
activity, economic and financial instability, including the complex social poly-crisis related to 
issues of poverty, inequality and exclusion that shape the built environment … energy 
shortages, food shortages, terror and more”. Ultimately, positivist planning has it failed to 
determine these unintended consequences of progress or perfection (Muller, 2010, & 2012). 
In a chilling reflection on the implications of the above nexus of socio-economic and 
environmental challenges and growing complexity, Rittel and Weber (1973) concluded that 
“planning problems are inherently wicked”. Whilst this can be seen as an inevitable 
acceptance of the imminent fate of humanity, such an awakening also ushers in a general 
‘consciousness’ that our narrowly conceptualised definition of ‘irreversible human progress’, 
aimed at promoting huge profits at all cost, whilst we degrade the very natural resource base 
that this progress depends upon, is not only unsustainable but unattainable (Watson, 2009). 
Swilling and Annecke (2012) cite the UN Human Development Report (1998) which 









neoliberal model of the world economy. They indicate that only “20 percent of the global 
population living in the developed nations of the Global North account for 86 per cent of total 
private consumption and expenditure, whereas the poorest 20 per cent account for [only] 1, 
3 percent”.  
Furthermore, the cost of energy needed to sustain the consumerist lifestyles of the rich 20% 
of the global population continues to escalate, amid increasing constrains imposed by a finite 
earth without limitless supplies of energy. Swilling and Annecke (2012) argue that the 
imminent impacts of declining oil reserves will be profound on cities and on urban life. A 
gloomy picture, particularly for developing countries in the Global South (Africa, Asia and 
Latin America) in which “two thirds of the [world] population live and an overwhelming 
volume of urban growth” is fast outpacing real economic growth (Harrison, 2006). With “just 
over 50 per cent” of the global human population now residing in urban areas and “nearly 1 
billion of the 6 billion people inhabiting squatter camps and slums across the world, the 
pressure on natural resources to sustain these masses has become even greater” (Swilling 
and Annecke, 2012).  
Accounts from Sandercock (1998a); Harrison (1995) and Klosterman (1988) suggest that the 
modernist dream has failed, it has essentially become a ‘nightmare’, whilst Friedmann 
(2009) observes that we are at a “major juncture in world history”. He laments the 
“convergence of these [natural and man-made] disasters” that have since coalesced to 
become ‘wicked problems’ in a web of intertwined causalities, thus assuming ‘poly-crisis 
status’ (Swilling and Annecke, 2012). This growing understanding has forced progressive 
planners and social thinkers to reflect and rethink contemporary planning practices, as 
historically moulded on a fallible positivist perspective of the world. It has become apparent 
that we cannot continue to pursue limitless human growth without ta trade-off in terms of 
“justice, equality and social transformation” (Sandercock, 1998a) and environmental 
sustainability (Swilling and Annecke, 2012). As a new crop of reflective planners emerge, 
humanity should adopt a ‘critical reflective edge’ in which “learning from practice is central to 
development planning” in the developing South and developed North alike (Friedmann, 
2009). In line with this notion of reflection and learning from our past experiences, the next 
section draws out critical lessons for planning from complexity theory and systems thinking, 
as proposed by Bouman (1992); Cilliers (1998, 2005); Taylor (1999); Meadows (2001); Kliin, 










2.4.2. On Complexity Theory and Systems Thinking 
Considering this pressing ‘global poly-crisis’ (Swilling and Annecke, 2012), and the wicked 
problems highlighted above, Cilliers (1998) reminds us that “the world we live in is complex. 
Hence, attempting to determine and control complex social, economic or physical systems 
from purely rational, scientific and reductionist methods and techniques is inadequate, as 
both history and contemporary planning results indicate (Cilliers, 1998; Swilling, 2002). In 
acknowledging that the world in which we live is “complex; we also have to acknowledge the 
limitations of our understanding of this world” (Cillier, 2005:256) thus suggesting that we 
have to confront” this complexity to ensure transformation, equity, justice and sustainability. 
Both Cilliers (1998) and Swilling (2002) recommend embracing complexity in its entirety, 
claiming that it is the key to reformulating and creating a better understanding of the complex 
human-nature condition. However, acknowledging and embracing complexity does not mean 
that the “situation allows us to be vague, nor does it imply a chaotic state of affairs” (Cilliers, 
2000a:23). We must start by accepting that socio-economic and environmental “phenomena 
are more dynamic than most of the traditional scientific approaches assumed (Teisman and 
Klijn, 2008:288) thus suggesting that, “complexity theory has implications on how we 
conceive, structure and organise our plans” (Cilliers, 2000:23). 
Swilling (2002) suggests that “complexity theory is not a single body of thought that stems 
from a clearly identifiable central source”, rather it is “an emergent condition” that can be 
traced back to the interconnectedness (Biblical, big bang or otherwise) of the universe itself. 
According to Teisman and Klijn (2008:300) there are various strands of complexity theory, 
with each strand attempting to pin down change and the dynamics of systems emanating 
from the complex interactions of the components of those systems. To fully understand a 
complex system, Cillier (2005:258) underscores that “we need to understand it in all its 
complexity” … including developing a picture of the “system’s complete environment” as 
shown in Figure 4 below. Central to the theory of complexity are ten characteristics of 
complex systems, as noted by Preiser (2013), (reserving the detail and explanations for the 
application of the principles in the Case Study in Chapter 4 and 5 of this study). For now it is 
essential to note that complex systems:  
I. Consist of a large number of components, 
II. These components interact dynamically,  
III. The interactions are usually quite rich, 
IV. The interaction is non-linear,  









VI. There is an abundance of non-linear routes, 
VII. Complex systems are open, 
VIII. They operate in conditions far from equilibrium, 
IX. The history of the system is vitally important,  
X. Subcomponents of the system cannot have access to all the information in 
the system (Adapted from Cilliers, 1998). 
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2.4.3. Implications of Complexity and Systems Thinking on Planning 
With reference to these theoretical propositions on complexity theory as highlighted above, it 
is inter alia noted that “the history of the system is vitally important” (Meadows, 2001; Cilliers, 
2000). In this case, the historical link between a positivist planning approach to science and 
rationality is inescapable. It was firmly grounded in the modernist foundations of “inevitable 
human growth” pursued in that era (Harrison, 1995). The study also outlined the historical 
foundation on which planning was established, revealing in the process the justifications 
(arguments and assumptions), conditions and constraints in terms of which the profession 









rise of planning often presented as a "heroic, progressive narrative” intimately associated 
with “modernisation, liberal democracy, and a belief in progress through science and 
technology” has been seriously challenged both from within and outside of the profession 
(Sandercock, 1998a). At the centre of this contestation is an emancipatory recognition that a 
“number of oppositional planning" practices (to be presented later) emanated from the 
oppositional actions orchestrated by the marginalised and the excluded. Their collective 
actions played a huge role in shaping the evolution of planning and decision-making as we 
know it today (Sandercock, 1998b). Insights from these oppositional practices usher in new 
dimensions in thinking that are intellectually stimulating with ideas often contradicting the 
official narrative presented in classical planning texts such as those by Faludi (1973), Hall 
(1992, 2011) and others. Given this rich history, it is inadequate to selectively regard the 
evolution of planning through a lens that emphasises only instrumental rationality and 
choosing to see planning as strictly a "regulatory or disciplinary practice”, as did Faludi 
(1973), Hall (1988), Hall (1992), Hall (2011) and others. Their positivist narratives in respect 
of planning completely omitted, intentionally or otherwise, the “transformative possibilities 
[often grounded in] … histories of resistance to certain planning practices and regulatory 
regimes” that emanated from the excluded (Sandercock, 1998b). 
It is clear that the planning enterprise “consists of a large number of components” as noted 
by Ratcliffe (1974, cited in Allmendinger, 2002). As such, communities result from a wide 
variety of constantly changing interactions between “geographic, social, political, economic, 
and cultural patterns which … form the nature and condition of society” (Ratcliffe, 1974). 
Allmendinger and Tewdwr-Jones (2005) acknowledged that the positivist conceptions of 
planning based on the “universalisation of conditions of knowledge, the neutrality of 
observation, the givenness of experience and the independence of data from theoretical 
interpretation” was proving hard to defend, given the complex interplay of its unintended 
outcomes. As such, planning issues are now known to “interact dynamically” and those 
“interactions are usually quite rich” and “non-linear” in contradiction to suggestions from 
positivist planners (Cilliers, 1998; Preiser, 2013).  
Over time, a post-positivist conception of planning began to take shape ‘as an emergent’ 
“product of the reform movement within modernism” itself (Harrison, 1995). In summing up 
this growing discord, Hall (1988); Hall and Twedwr-Jones (2011), identify some of the 
difficulties that prompted these oppositional reactions in the evolution of rational and 
systems planning. They mention that “the notion that planning was scientific; the notion that 









homogeneous aggregate; and the notion that planning was to come to terms with rapid 
growth and change”, all represent views intricately associated with instrumental rationality 
are fallacious. In view of the growing complexity in planning and the multiplicity of ‘wicked 
problems’ that confront us today, as noted by Watson (2009); Muller (2012); Swilling and 
Annecke (2012) it is argued that “there is no direct link necessary for distant elements to 
interact” (Cilliers, 1998). In this era of globalisation, planners have witnessed the 
“convergence of [natural and man-made] disasters”, some which have assumed ‘wicked 
problem’ status, manifesting in complex webs of intertwined causalities (Rittel and Weber, 
1973). 
It has also become clearer that planning as a discipline, and its theories, greatly “overlap” 
with theories and practices in all the “social science disciplines” (Campbell and Fainstein, 
1997). Allmendinger and Tewdwr-Jones (2005) see planning as a process that is deeply 
embedded within “social theory”, and has, over time, been “heavily influenced by wider shifts 
in understanding and sensibilities in social theory and the philosophy of science”. Planning 
also commonly borrows from the rich and “diverse methodologies of many different fields” 
making it almost impossible to frame its theoretical basis “from its tools of analysis” alone 
(Campbell and Fainstein, 1997). It is clear from its multidisciplinary tools of analysis and its 
various outcomes, that “there is an abundance of non-linear routes” in the socio-economic 
systems that planning tries to control (Cilliers, 1998; Meadows, 2001; Preiser, 2013). The 
view that “appropriate control mechanisms … achieve certain objectives on the part of the 
controller” (Hall and Tewdwr-Jones, 2011) is also challenged by the fact that planning 
problems or issues operate under conditions far from equilibrium and that they should be 
viewed and treated as such. As Wildavsky (1987, cited in Cullingworth and Nadin, 2004) 
observes, if planning was to be judged by its outcomes, in consideration of whether real-life 
events “followed the dictates of the plan, then planning has failed everywhere it has been 
tried”. This is the reason why planned outcomes rarely, if ever, coincide with initial the 
objectives set out in the plans themselves. 
This brief reflection on the planning practice ties in with the conclusion that planning, and by 
extension, decision-making are themselves part of “complex open” systems with emergent 
properties that need to be carefully considered if we are to benefit from their adaptive 
capabilities. Hence, tracing back and reflecting on planning history with ‘open systems’ in 
mind, is vitally important if we are to rethink or reconsider current practices and traditions 









planning, we should also realise that we can never “have access to all the information” 
regarding our socio-economic systems, when we engage in planning decisions; hence the 
need for multiple ways of seeing and doing (Bauman, 1992; Cilliers, 1998; Meadows, 2001; 
Allmendinger, 2002). Together, insights from the theory of complexity and systems thinking 
will be useful lenses in further unpacking the post-positivist critique to planning and its 
emergent property in the form of activist planning.  
 
2.5. Post-Positivist Critique to Planning  
Post-positivism, postmodernism and post-structuralism have provided both critiques and 
alternative strategies for planning theory and practice (Allmendinger and Twedwr-Jones, 
2005). As expected, debates centred on the evolution of planning persist amid new 
developments and the emergence of new paradigms. (Muller, 1998 cited in Allmendinger, 
2002). However, “alternative traditions to planning have always existed outside the state and 
[were] sometimes [seen] to be in opposition to it” (Sandercock, 1998b). Faced with wicked 
problems and complexity some planners started to be critical and questioned the basic 
components and the logic that buttressed the positivist planning establishment (Hall, 1992); 
Hall and Twedwr-Jones, 2011). This realisation necessitated a post-positivist critique of 
rational planning, both from within and from outside, the formal planning establishment.  
Taylor (1999) states that planning is not a science as purported by Faludi, Hall and others, 
and reckons that it is rather, “a form of social action directed at shaping the physical 
environment to accord with certain valued ideals”. As such, theories in social sciences have 
a “political and temporal element … they are not immune to the influence of power and its 
wider social context” (Allmendinger, 2002). Giving credibility to an unpopular view that saw 
planning as a ‘normative practice’, which like any other normative discipline draws on 
relevant scientific understandings to “realise certain valued ends” (Taylor, 1999). This insight 
suddenly broadens planning practice as “a form of human action motivated by the resolution 
of societal and political problems” (Mäntysalo, 2002:10). Henceforth, arguments on “power 
relations” cannot be discounted as irrational (Sandercock, 1998a; 1998b; Harrison, 1996; 
Alexander, 2000; Allmendinger, 2002; Watson, 2007; Sager, 2013). Clearly, certain planning 
ideas were advanced to “protect or further expand the influence of powerful interests” 
(Allmendinger, 2002. Evidently, a selection of specific planning “stories about the past” were 









In presenting a positivist narrative about planning (to the exclusion of others), the 
“professional identity” of planning was “shaped, invested with meaning, and then defended”, 
sometimes aggressively. Consequently, the boundaries that inform planning history, 
including interpretations/framing of planning theories and practices as we know them today, 
are deemed to be debatable. They are “not fixed [and are] not a given … the(y) shift in 
relation to the definition of planning and to the historian’s purpose” (Sandercock, 1998a). In 
accordance with this view,  Campbell and Fainstein (1996) saw planning as an "elusive" 
subject difficult to study and pin down, often there were some “erasures and exclusions 
implicit in the process of forging a professional identity”, as detailed in most classical 
planning texts such as those of Hall and Faludi (Sandercock, 1998a). Certainly, attempts to 
uncover and recover vignettes of “insurgent planning histories”, refutes the accuracy of the 
official heroic story on planning (Sandercock, 1998a; 1998b). In so doing, one chooses to 
determine “how to deal directly with power” (Sager, 2013:1), thus “exploring [the] underlying 
dynamics [of] political-economic, social, psychological, cultural and power relations implicit 
therein”.  
Having taken such a bold reflective stance on planning, one can begin to critically look 
beyond the “official ‘heroic’ story” of planning and acknowledge that “alternative traditions of 
planning have always existed outside the state and sometimes in opposition to it” 
(Sandercock, 1998b). The “activist modes” of planning presented in this study begin to offer 
alternative “epistemological, empowering and relation-building possibilities” (Sager, 2013:3) 
from which planners can learn. They provide “practical tasks, which take us beyond 
instrumental rationality” (Mäntysalo, 2002:9). They challenge and discount the substantive 
(ends) and procedural (means) distinction in planning as coined by Faludi, Hall and others, 
and systematically outline alternative strategies for dealing with biased power relations 
(Sager, 2013:4). Though still relevant, the limited conceptualisation of planning through 
means and ends, fails to acknowledge the integral influences of power and politics, thus 
becoming complicit in downplaying a crucial dimension in the whole planning debate. 
In view of this critique, Sandercock (1998a) questions whether we can “blame the 
implementers [of the liberal project] or the implementation process itself?” In trying to answer 
Sandercock’s question, this study reveals that each and every justification of instrumental 
rational planning as identified by Hall (1998) and Hall and Twedwr-Jones (2011); “the notion 
that planning was scientific… the notion that planning was value free; … the notion that the 
planner was planning for a society that was a homogeneous aggregate; … and the notion 









specifically targeted as needing urgent reform. In relation to this reform agenda, insights 
from Campbell and Fainstein (1996); Sandercock (1998a); Klosterman (1985); Harrison 
(1995), Allmendinger (2002) and others are systematically presented to identify progressive 
influences or perspectives that uphold transformational values linked with inclusion, equity, 
liberty, social justice and sustainability. The study evaluates “the explanatory power of each 
of these insights and their responsiveness to planning practice” (Mäntysalo, 2002:6). 
The study therefore attempts to explicitly highlight the negative outcomes of planning 
practices such as its “racist, classist as well as sexist effects” in order to learn from those 
experiences (Sandercock, 1998a). Such a bold reposition begs for a broader reinterpretation 
of positivist planning in which “the work of planning [seen] as the restriction and control of 
certain bodies in space, those of women, racial minorities, the poor and indigenous people 
among others”, is critically reviewed and adjusted to fit today’s progressive values and belief 
systems such as “inclusion, equity, liberty, social justice and sustainability”. In the same 
breath, we are also reminded to take context into account (Cilliers, 2006). Positivist planning 
practices were also interpreted and implemented differently in different places at different 
times, hence the study also factors in elements of “space and time” in its analysis 
(Cullingworth and Nadin, 2003). It further acknowledges that the unique “social, political, 
economic and cultural specificity” of any place has a crucial bearing on how planning is 
practiced in those spaces, not downplaying the forces behind the processes of colonialism, 
imperialism and globalisation (Allmendinger, 2002).  
The next section on ‘activist modes’ of planning briefly indicates how each emerging 
approach attempted, in its own way, to “redefine precisely what it is that planners do in terms 
of approach, process and allegiance” (Harrison, 1985; Campbell and Fainstein 1998 a; 
Sandercock, 1998 b). Using the concept of confluence, the analysis of activist modes of 
planning provides insights on how these relational/participatory planning processes “proceed 
… how they should be developed – how the planning process is organised and planning 
situations arranged, how planning problems take shape and are resolved, how worldviews, 
attitudes, allegiances and roles evolve in the process and how conflicts are handled” 
(Mäntysalo, 2002:9). It links each post-positivist critique to planning, as identified by Hall, 
Allmendinger, Taylor, Walters, Harrison and others, to one or more activist planning 
innovation/s that attempted to reform the assumptions, justifications, conditions and 










2.6. The Activist Planning, Transformation and Complexity Nexus 
The study briefly outlines, and gives an empirical account of modes of planning that resonate 
with an activist approach to planning and decision making. The intention here is not to 
provide comprehensive tools for the production of new planning practices. Rather, it provides 
planning practitioners with an “analytical framework”, gleaned from existing practices under 
the activist modes of planning that could enable a critical evaluation of existing planning 
practices (Mäntysalo, 2002:6). It systematically highlights how planners have, over time, 
attempted to broaden their role in planning through “cooperating with partners outside the 
official planning process and drawing planners towards direct action” with the grassroots 
(Sager; 2013:68). Among the notable activist modes of planning, Hudson et al. (1979); 
Campbell and Fainstein (1996a); Sandercock (1998b); Allmendinger (2002); Walters (2007); 
Sager (2013) and others identify democratic planning, advocacy planning, equity planning, 
radical planning, neo-Marxism, collaborative and/or communicative planning, postmodern 
planning and more.  
Given that each activist planning model critique one or more elements of positivist planning 
based on the thematic issues raised by Hall and Tewdwr-Jones (2011), the study highlights 
how certain “planning roles and ideologies within activist planning can be helpful in curbing 
destructive stakeholder games” (Sager, 2013:67). Among these contested thematic 
elements, the study identifies include: the notion of instrumental rationality and science, the 
public interest, pluralism, planning and the economy and the role of the state and the 
planner. Though the proposed reform strategies from each activist planning approach 
become central tenets to the evaluative criteria established for planning, it must be noted 
that not all the approaches are suitable for deploying in a liberal democracy. Furthermore, 
these activist modes of planning also overlap significantly. However, the study addresses 
them separately in order to present distinctive features of each model and to facilitate a 
systematic analysis of the trends while highlighting important similarities and critiques 
thereof (Sager, 2013:68). To set a firm foundation for presenting each activist mode of 
planning the study will start by looking at democratic planning followed by the other modes in 
terms of their major characteristics.  
2.6.1. Democratic, Deliberative or Participatory Planning 
Democratic planning arose in the “1960s onwards”, and was an outcome of various 
“transformations in society”, driven by the need to undo the “traditional, repressive barriers of 









of their future” (Walters, 2007). Critics of positivist planning berated planners for “imposing 
their version of an idealised bourgeois world on a resistant population”; hence the intention 
to transform planning from its ‘top-down’ approaches towards a ‘participatory’ process 
(Fainstein and Fainstein, 1996). This was supported by the belief that, “as the number of 
reasonably-informed decision-makers increases, the likelihood of a right decision 
approaches one” (Sager, 2013). Hence “definitive criticisms and ongoing community 
opposition” were mounted against the official planning system (Sandercock, 1998 b). This 
development was in opposition to the traditional planning system supported by Faludi and 
others. It contested the view that planning was a “technical and not particularly a democratic 
exercise” in which state players acted as “experts who could model and predict cities and 
regions through the tools of planning”, to ensure that they functioned efficiently and 
effectively (Allmendinger, 2002). Rather, it advocated for a mechanism, which brought 
government planners “face to face with citizens in a continuous co-operative venture” 
(Godschalk, 1967, cited in Fainstein and Fainstein, 1996).  This effort would eventually pave 
way for strategies that were responsible for drawing planners towards direct action with the 
grassroots (Sager, 2013).  
In this sense, democracy was “predicated on the axiom of majority rule”, thus ensuring that 
citizens had total control of government (Walters, 2007). In such a venture, it was assumed 
that the democratic planning process “will not only educate and involve the community in 
planning but could also educate and involve the planners in their community” (Fainstein and 
Fainstein, 1996). In view of this analysis, “decision makers acquire information about the 
public’s [opinions on] projects, policies or plans” which is necessary for ensuring that “the 
people’s will be done” (Innes and Booher, 2000). Inherent to this repositioning of power in 
planning was the belief that “the citizenry” implicitly became knowledgeable about the 
relevant issues within their communities as the democratic agents were compelled “to 
educate them as well as take direction from them” (Walters, 2007).  
This turn in planning practice could be viewed as a “struggle … for recovery of the political 
community” in which state agents were expected to be “open to the knowledge possessed 
by those in the front line (households, local communities and social movements)” 
(Friedmann, 1987 cited in Fainstein and Fainstein, 1996). However, as progressive as the 
democratic planning model was, in proposing that “the very essence of democratic 
government resides in the absolute sovereignty of the majority” (Walters, 2007), the rule of 
the majority itself, according to Fainstein and Fainstein (1996) could lead to “social 









frequently unwilling to take decisions that benefit the community in the long-term, if these 
decisions involve delaying the gratification of their own short-term convenience”. In fact, 
people have a tendency of acting “in their narrow self-interest instead of giving priority to the 
overall well-being of their broader community”. At the same time state planners were 
expected to “content with the problem of [these] conflicting interests” and had to judge 
objectively the “legitimacy of the representation of various clients” (Fainstein and Fainstein, 
1996). Whilst democratic planning saw the public as the “ultimate authority in the preparation 
of plans”, the political realities of planning indicated that this same public often held biases, 
was ignorant or had competing interests as well as unequal power distribution within its 
make up (Fainstein and Fainstein, 1996). As such, democratic planners and decision-
makers found themselves having to “make political judgements that the insulated traditional 
planner never had to make” (Walters, 2007).  
2.6.2. Advocacy Planning Model 
In view of this procedural hurdle in democratic planning, Innes and Booher (2000) deduced 
that “the traditional methods of public participation in government decision making simply do 
not work and that; they [did] not achieve genuine participation in planning or decisions” due 
to what Healey (1997) calls “narrow technical rationalism”. It proved impossible for 
democratic planners to set aside their “own value systems”, and they eventually fell in the 
same trap of imposing their own vision of a “somewhat idealised, middle-class, bourgeois 
world” (Fainstein and Fainstein, 1996; Walters, 2007) or what Sandercock identifies as 
“patriarchal, heterosexual and white values of society”. In response to this complexity, some 
planners sought to resolve this dilemma by reducing “the scale of planning objectives to suit 
political realities and borrow[ed] strategies from the corporate sector to regain some sense of 
detached objectivity” whilst others chose to commit their “professional efforts to the cause of 
society’s most disadvantaged groups” (Fainstein and Fainstein, 1996; Walters, 2007). 
According to Walters (2007), these divergent courses of action resulted in the shift to 
“incrementalist and strategic planning on the one hand and advocacy planning on the other”.  
Whilst several planning alternatives aimed at addressing pluralism were developed to curb 
destructive stakeholder power plays (Sager, 2013), positivist actors often presumed “a 
common public interest” that in reality only gives a “voice to one interest and ignores the 
poor and the weak” or what Sandercock (1998a) refers to as ‘the excluded’. This unjust 
premise led to the call and justification for advocacy planning (Campbell and Fainstein, 









lose the most in power-based argumentation (Sager, 2013). As such, advocacy was rooted 
in the rise of major riots strategically engineered by civil rights movements (Sandercock, 
1998b; Walters, 2007) protesting racial discrimination (Davidoff, 1965) and the consequent 
demands for “social justice and political equality” (Walters, 2007) in the US cities between 
1964 and 1965.  
On that basis, the advocacy movement was born, rooted in adversarial procedures that were 
“modelled upon the legal profession, and usually applied to defending the interests of weak 
community groups, environmental causes, the poor, and the disenfranchised against the 
established powers of business and government” (Hudson et al., 1979; Walters, 2007). In his 
argument, Davidoff (1965) lamented the fact that positivist decision making was blindly 
concerned with process (means) without a complete understanding of the totality of its 
outcomes (ends/goals). Inspired by the belief that citizens must participate in government 
and retain power to “prevent governmental outcomes contrary to their interests” (Fainstein 
and Fainstein, 1996), advocacy planners “firmly rejected the idea of the planner as the 
disinterested, objective technician” (Walters, 2007).  As Allmendinger (2002) notes, 
Davidoff’s plea was to ensure that planning was transformed to “become more than a 
technical exercise and instead embraces social justice” principles in its practice. This 
premise is rooted in Davidoff’s pluralist perception of decision making in which he argues 
that “appropriate planning action [could] not be prescribed from a position of value neutrality, 
for prescriptions [were] based on desire[d] functions” (Davidoff, 1965).  
However, Davidoff (1965) soon realised that despite attempts at downplaying ‘ends’ over 
‘means’, “the major issues of the nature of distributive justice” were never settled, rather 
“society was still in turmoil over the way in which the resources of the nations were 
distributed”. As Klosterman (1985) observes, politics and power played a crucial role in 
planning, a view also echoed by Sandercock (1998b) and (Sager, 2013) who also 
recognises the effects of multiple “inequalities that existed in the political process of the 
1960s”. To deal with these biased power relations, Davidoff (1995) suggested that the 
planning profession had to engage in the political process as “advocates of both the interest 
of government … other groups, organisations, or individuals concerned with policies for 
future development of the community”. As such, advocacy planning was initially based on 
the idea that those “women, minority groups, gays and lesbians who had been previously 
unrepresented would now be [re]presented” in the contentious political arena (Sandercock, 









In addition to his attack on the notion of the planner being an “objective expert, detached 
from the political process”, Davidoff also ridiculed the presumption that “there could be a 
single, common public interest in a nation deeply divided by class and economic inequality” 
(Walters, 2007). As noted by Sandercock (1998a), advocacy planners were informed by the 
belief that “public interest was not a matter of science” as postulated by rational planners, 
but rather of “politics”. Contrary to Faludi’s idea of separating ‘planning proper’ from politics, 
advocacy encouraged planners to actively “participate in the political arena”. Due to this 
oppositional stance by advocacy planners towards traditional planning methods, early 
advocacy planners worked “outside the bureaucratic system of public government, 
championing instead the rights of individual communities and taking their fight to city hall” 
(Walters, 2007). 
This new and refined role of the planner ranged from the “provision of information, analysis 
of alternative public policies and the identification of bases and spaces” that had the 
potential for increasing “interactions among empowered groups” (Klosterman, 1985; Sager, 
2013:76). Davidoff (1965) believed that such a role for planners would implicitly “enable 
citizens to play an active role in democracy”. Allmendinger (2002) depicts the planner as 
advocate/lawyer in a courtroom arguing their client’s position and seeking “to express the 
client’s interest” (Fainstein and Fainstein, 1996) while striving to clarify their ideas and clearly 
express them (Sager, 2013:76). This idealised planning process would entail the “search for 
truth in the same manner as due process in law … that requires fair notice, hearings, 
producing of supporting evidence, cross examination, reasoned decision, … to arrive at the 
relative truth or a just decision” (Davidoff, 1965). In theory, the advocacy planning model was 
accommodative of multiple plans rather than a unitary plan (Davidoff 1965, cited in Hudson 
et al., 1979). Allmendinger (2002) further notes that this idea of multiple plans increases the 
possibility of having competing plans prepared by different groups in addition to those drawn 
up by the public authority thus resulting in a competition of innovative ideas. 
The advocacy planning model is also credited for raising the “critical distributional question 
of “who gets what”, which the positivist planning model managed to meticulously avoid for 
decades (Sandercock, 1998a). Davidoff advanced his ideas of an “interventionist style of 
planning”, one that motivated for a shift from, “land-use to socio-economic planning” 
(Walters, 2007). This shift was meant to ensure that planning dealt decisively with issues 
related to “social injustice and redistribution of resources” before addressing physical 
planning issues of the city form. However, on a critical note, Sandercock (1998b) laments 









perfect both rational and pluralist democracy. In practice, advocacy planning was criticised 
for identifying the “stumbling blocks” within the rational systems planning approach without 
being able to “mobilise equally effective support for constructive alternatives” (Peattie, 1968, 
cited in Hudson et al., 1979: 390). In essence, the advocacy planers only wanted to consult 
but still plan for the “women, minority groups, gays and lesbians” using their acquired 
technical skills (Sandercock, 1998b), but this was problematic (Sager, 2013:77). 
As noted by Hudson et al. (1979), advocacy can however still be credited for motivating the 
shift from neutral objectivity in the process of defining social problems, favouring instead the 
application of more explicit principles of social justice. The approach was however later 
associated with the “manipulator model” that emphasised that the poor and marginalised 
were being assisted by “taking their ideas and translating them into the technical language of 
plans, under the guise of making these views forceful in the policy arena” (Sandercock, 
1998b; Sager, 2013:77). As planning activities became more or less fixed and less tied to 
plan preparation, advocacy planning assumed more of an entrepreneurial angle than a legal 
one (Fainstein and Fainstein, 1996). The notion of taking the poor off the streets and 
encouraging their participation in planning was seen not as “empowering them but taking 
their power away” since the process did not actually give “the poor a voice in the process” 
(Sandercock, 1998b).  
Advocacy planners were thus viewed simply as consultants who acted only on behalf of 
groups that could afford their services (Fainstein and Fainstein, 1996), and despite 
expanding the traditional role of the planner, the advocacy model was still seen as an “expert 
centred” approach that left the “structure of power intact” (Sandercock, 1998b). The view that 
participants in a pluralist system “would be bound to it by the uncertainty of the bargaining 
process” (Allmendinger, 2002) was unintentionally reduced to another form of instrumental 
participation in practice. Professionals were still responsible for setting the agenda, 
conceptualising the problems and defining the terms according to which the solution to the 
problems will be realised (Sandercock, 1998a), thus participation was used to merely “justify, 
legitimise [and] perpetuate the neo-liberal hegemony” (Muller, 2012) raising fears of co-
optation (Sager, 2013:77).  
Hudson et al. (1979) nonetheless acknowledge that Davidoff’s approach resulted in a 
stronger and more robust linkage between social scientists and the judiciary processes 
associated with planning decisions. It was also soon realised that “urban neighbourhoods 









community level (Sandercock, 1998b). Hence, “different places should be expected to 
practice and approach advocacy planning in different ways with different results” 
(Allmendinger, 2002). Despite the inherent “failures of the urban renewal programmes … in 
the name of ill-defined civic improvement”, Davidoff’s idea that planning practice “would 
become more successful when it focused on social and economic issues, instead of 
concentrating heavily on physical design”, was a call echoed by many others (Walters, 
2007). Some more radical advocacy planners began to call for “the protection of minority 
rights” within the liberal-democratic system to guard against immoderate majorities, giving 
rise to ‘political activism’ that led to equity planning (Sager, 2013:77). 
2.6.3. The Equity Planning Model 
With its roots firmly immersed within advocacy planning, some radical planning proponents 
within government argued that the advocacy model lacked the political stamina to deal 
effectively with the unintended outcomes of the rational model and the free market economy 
(Klosterman, 1985; Walters, 2007; Sager, 2013). Forester and Krumholz (1990, cited in 
Allmendinger, 2002) queried what the outcome would be if, “a group of professional 
planners, working for the city, devoted themselves to serving the needs of the poor” despite 
the fact that the national state and local politics were chasing other priorities. The thrust of 
the equity model therefore shifts the arguments from who governs to who gets what 
(Campbell and Fainstein, 1996). In that sense, equity planners intended to represent “the 
interests of the poor and marginalised through political structures aimed at equity” 
(Sandercock, 1998 b) a position which often clashes with the state and corporate politics in a 
liberal democracy (Sager, 2013:5). Notably, questions on real income distribution became 
central to the debate on planning practice (Hall and Tewdwr, 2011) and equity planners 
recognised the multiplicity of conflicting social interests, which would entail that others lost 
and others won in terms of public planning (Fainstein and Fainstein, 1996).  
In view of this argument, advocacy planning “spawned a ‘kinder, gentler’ cousin” bent on 
promoting the interests of the dis-advantaged groups within society (Walters, 2007). 
However, the important distinction between the two was that equity planners coalesced and 
structured their planning framework within local government bureaucracies and attempted to 
institute reform from within the state system while advocacy planners worked outside the 
state structures (Sandercock, 1998b; Walters, 2007; Sager, 2013). Nonetheless, their 
common goal was to “represent the shared interests of the community, coordinate the 









actions (Klosterman, 1985). Having noted that formal planners had a crucial role to play in 
“establishing equity goals and demonstrating the means for achieving them” (Sager, 
2013:71) equity planning was predicated on aggressively defending the interests of the weak 
against “strong-community groups”. It was focused on systematically promoting broad 
“environmental causes as well as the interests of the poor, and the disenfranchised against 
the established powers of business and government” (Hudson et al., 1979). Allmendinger 
(2002) vividly depicts Krumholz intentions when he suggests that equity planners should 
dedicate their efforts towards developing various planning mechanisms that would benefit 
the disadvantaged residents of the city in a radical way. Equity planners based the success 
of the model on strategic “power management”, deliberately aimed at altering the “political 
transaction costs” of oppressive or biased plans (Sager, 2013). They would do so by 
“making alliances with and working for progressive politicians” with the intention of changing 
the bureaucracy from within (Sandercock, 1998b), thus promoting a wider range of choices 
for those residents with less resources (Fainstein and Fainstein, 1996). 
In so doing, the process of equity planning began with a detailed comprehension of the 
“urban inequalities”, with equity planners seeking clarity on crude “political economic 
questions about who is getting what out of local urban policies and plans” (Sandercock, 
1998b). Walters (2007) underscores the fact that equity planning sought to “expose and 
oppose the hypocrisy of public policies that benefited private capital while espousing the 
public interest”, arguing vociferously for the correction of social injustices as a central tenet 
to reforming the planning enterprise.  Those planners that occupied public office would 
“enlist the participation of the public or client group in determining substantive goals and 
explicitly accept planning as a political rather [than a] strictly scientific endeavour” (Fainstein 
and Fainstein, 1996).  
Whilst advocacy, equity and democratic planning are overlapping approaches (Sager, 2013), 
democratic planning emphasised the participatory process, and advocacy planning 
consultation with the poor, Equity planning on the other hand was more concerned about the 
substance of programmes being planned for (Fainstein and Fainstein, 1996). Equity 
planners insisted that they would move away from the traditional a-political stance advocated 
for by rational planners, towards one that was “politically sensitive” to issues such as 
poverty, race and power relations within the decisions they were making (Allmendinger, 
2002). By accepting the very argument that “planning is the handmaiden of politics”, equity 
planners could carefully select the politicians they intended to work for, in pursuit of the 









objectives were to strategically transfer power held by planning professionals, enhance 
“access to information, and critical analytical skills, and avail institutional power to low 
income groups who had neither the resources nor the professional skills to deal with a 
complex social re-development idea” (Forester and Krumholz, 1990, cited in Allmendinger, 
2002). 
Equity planning is therefore credited for broadening the role of planners beyond physical 
planning. Its deep political nature allowed planners to reach out “towards the poor, minorities 
and other unrepresented groups, and in the process, try to serve a more inclusive pluralism” 
(Sandercock, 1998b; Sager, 2013). Klosterman (1985) argues that this position held by 
equity planners did not necessarily imply that “the shared interests of the community [were] 
superior to the private interests of individuals and groups, or that the external and long-term 
effects of actions [were] more important than their direct and indirect impacts”. According to 
Krumholz (1994, cited in Sandercock, 1998b), equity planners were seen as curiously 
seeking to “redistribute power resources” and direct participation in planning away from 
domination by local elites by gradually involving the poor working-class city residents in 
decision making. Unlike positivist planners who sought to determine whether a plan or 
policies were beneficial in the aggregate, using Cost Benefit Analysis as a tool, the equity 
planner’s focus was on determining the distribution of costs and benefits (Campbell and 
Fainstein, 1996) through “reformulation of the transaction costs of politics” (Sager, 2013:4). 
Critics of equity planning however accused equity planners for being “too ideological”, a 
point they countered by stating that “planning was [in fact] ideological” (Allmendinger, 2002). 
Despite recognising local participation within the model, Sandercock (1998b) laments that 
equity planning does not say much about it, and she decries the fact that it ignores the 
possibility of “drawing on local knowledge” by basically retaining the planner as an “expert” 
with his/her role narrowly redefined as “a communicator and a tireless propagandist [with] 
good communication skills”. It was claimed that their approach lacked technical analysis to 
which they replied that, planning is as much political as it is technical (Allmendinger, 2002). 
In preserving their technical role, equity planners recognised a responsibility of gathering 
information, conducting complex analysis as well as formulating solutions. A role that 
Sandercock’s (1998b) greets with scepticism. In her opinion this meant that equity planners 
acquired “power to shape debates and public attention” and of pressing issues that the 









Whilst traditional land-use planning and local politics had failed to change the circumstances 
of the poor, the ethical imperatives that equity planners espoused to improve urban 
conditions, made little impact in the American cities, largely due to its socialist roots 
(Walters, 2007). Instead, planning practitioners advocating for this model were cautioned for 
abusing the rhetoric on “socialising or empowerment”, which was seen as rationalisation for 
the continuation of the status quo (Sandercock, 1998b). Fainstein and Fainstein (1996) 
resolved that equity planners were not always democrats, and the fact that they favoured 
redistributional goals even in the absence of a supportive public made them unpopular in a 
liberal democracy like the US. Its left-leaning philosophy that sought to redistribute power 
and resources from the control of “capitalist elites”, emphasising “material equality rather 
than simply legal and political equality”, was deeply antithetical and resisted by American 
public opinion (Walters, 2007). 
Hudson et al. (1979) compliment the successful role played by advocacy and equity planning 
as tools for blocking insensitive plans and policies from being implemented as well as 
challenging traditional views regarding a unitary public interest for an undifferentiated public. 
Fainstein and Fainstein (1996) recollects that in principle, equity planers appeared to 
advance the interests of the poor and racial or ethnic minorities, thus ensuring that the 
formulation of ‘ends’ involved the people on whose behalf planning was being done. This 
alternative approach was aimed at correcting the belief that rational planning looked at 
“problems from a systems viewpoint, using conceptual or mathematical models, relating 
ends (objectives) to means (resources and constraints), with heavy reliance on numbers and 
quantitative analysis” outside of political contestations (Hudson et al., 1979). This essential 
reform, albeit useful, overlooked the essence of ongoing participation, which was not 
essentially their primary aim, with their main objective being limited to “equity”, and not 
necessarily “consultation” (Fainstein and Fainstein, 1996). Often equity planners’ interactions 
with organised groups were limited and their contributions to the decision-making process 
had a marginal impact on the planning issues at hand (Sager, 2013:71). This ideological gap 
in the model prompted a deeper search for alternative approaches aimed at combining 
participation and equity in the planning debate, indicating just how critical community 
organisation was within the activist planning movement (Walters, 2007; Sager, 2013:71). 
The next two sections on radical planning and social learning and communicative action 
respectively, reviews the conceptualisation of “consultation” as it explores the idea of 










2.6.4. Radical Planning Model 
According to Hudson et al. (1979) the radical planning tradition was seen as an ambiguous 
project which consisted of two streams of thought that are occasionally presented in unison 
and often used interchangeably (Sager, 2013:78). On the one side, radical planning prides 
itself on its advocacy roots, characterised by challenging hegemonic practices causing 
“poverty and exclusion” that existed because of the inherent weaknesses within the rational 
planning model (Sandercock, 1998b; Sager, 2013:78).  More than any other planning 
approach, the radical planning model consisted of “specific substantive ideas about 
collective actions”, that could be useful in achieving concrete outcomes in the immediate 
future (Hudson et al., 1979). It was structured based on an “emancipatory practice linked to 
multiple critical discourses” that can be traced to the rise of “feminist critiques” on rational 
planning, pockets of riots and civil rights movements and the ongoing struggles against 
racism, sexism, as well as the oppression and exploitation of the masses (Sandercock, 
1998b).  
The second stream of radical thought took a rather more “critical and holistic look at large-
scale social processes” (Hudson et al., 1979). Generally used as a reference for the writings 
of leftist or radical urban scholars, ‘critical urban theory’ came about during the post-1968 
period, and was famously associated with people like “Henri Lefebvre, David Harvey, 
Manuel Castells, Peter Marcuse” and others (Allmendinger, 2002; Brenner, 2009). Miraftab 
(2009) and Sager (2013) note that radical planning practices in this form was associated with 
insurgent planning processes which responded to neo-liberal specificities of dominance 
through exclusion. Hudson et al. (1979) underscore that the focus of critical urbanism, 
though it includes problem solving through resurrected community action, centred its 
arguments on the ‘theory of the state’ which was viewed as a phenomenon that shapes the 
character of “social and economic life at all levels, and in turn determines the structure and 
evolution of social problems”. 
The notion of radicalism implied in this case was more literal than revolutionary, and meant 
“going back to the roots” (Hudson et al., 1979). In so doing, the model challenged “existing 
unequal relations and distributions of power, opportunity and resources”, and sought to 
influence “structural transformation of systematic inequalities” (Sandercock, 1998b). It 
offered systematic critiques on the “effect of class structures and economic relationships; the 
control exercised by culture, the media and the historical dynamics of social movements, 









(2009) render explicit the direct link between critical theory and Marxism, suggesting that 
critical theorists like Marcuse attempted to reinvigorate and redevelop Marxism in relation to 
“Soviet socialism, fascism, domination in all forms and the continued existence of 
capitalism”. As such, critical theorists borrowed their “conceptual rationale and empirical 
evidence from both the left and the right of the ideological spectrum” (Allmendinger, 2002; 
Sanyal, 2009; Brenner 2009). According to Sanyal (2009) and Sandercock (1998b), the neo-
liberal school developed their argument against “the rent seeking state”, whilst the neo-
Marxists berated the legitimacy of the state as a neutral actor as they exposed the class-
based relationship between capital and state players. Radical/critical planning theory 
furthermore draws inspiration from a diversity of sources including “economics and the 
ecological ethic (Schumacher 1913), social architecture (Goodman 1971), humanistic 
philosophy (Illich 1973), and historical precedents (Katz and Bender 1976, Hampden-Turner 
19'75)” (Hudson et al., 1979). Often state involvement within radical planning was 
confrontational and the approach usually oppositional and executed through various 
activities performed by planners from civil society with a strong commitment to their cause 
(Sager, 2013:78)    
Together, their criticisms and overt strategies inspired the rise of alternative “institutional 
frameworks” that were not involved in regulation but inclined towards facilitation, and were 
not fuelled by the urge to “either enforce social control or engage in profit making” (Sanyal, 
2009). Radical planners initially sought to address class imbalances based on their 
“experiences with oppositional practices and a tradition of social mobilisation” (Sandercock, 
1998 b), and as such, they belonged to a very different ideological camp (Seger, 2013). By 
so doing, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and community-based organisations 
(CBOs), located closer to the people, and outside the state, were preferred as alternative 
institutions capable of initiating development from below (Sanyal, 2009). In that new 
ideological framework, critical planning theorists were concerned with the excavation of 
possible alternatives to traditional government planning through “solidarity and mobilisation 
for collective action” (Seger, 2013:78). These alternatives were seen to be radically 
emancipatory, yet systemically suppressed, within cities of the time (Brenner, 2009). These 
theorists’ view was that these insurgent alternatives would serve to empower those who had 
experienced systematic disempowerment (Sandercock, 1998b). 
Nonetheless, radical planning, like its advocacy alternative blindly assumed that “urban 
neighbourhoods were homogeneous and that [common] interests were not easy to find even 









the action, they soon hit brick walls, as they were confronted with extremely complex social 
establishments that were blurred at the “intersections of racism, poverty, sexism, 
homophobia and anti-migrant sentiments” (Sandercock, 1998b). These complex social 
establishments were intentionally overlooked by the largely conservative male elite, 
heterosexual and largely white rational planners of the era (Sandercock, 1998b). Whilst 
radical planners were encouraged to be action oriented and to be inspired by the normative 
ideals driving the movements they supported, Friedmann (2002) emphasised the need to 
keep a critical distance from the group’s practices (Sager, 2013:78).Brunner (2001) 
furthermore indicates that, despite the fact that critical planning theory served to demarcate 
an alternative to positivistic and technocratic approaches to planning in the 1970s, this line of 
analysis was incomplete. Thus, it had to be further developed in yet another new direction by 
Habermas (1985, 1987) to include aspects of mediation and communicative action.  
Dubbed the communicative turn to planning, by Campbell and Fainstein (1996) and 
Sandercock (1998b), radical planners did not rely on a “logical continuum” claimed by 
rational or comprehensive planners. Rather, radical planners went beyond mere participation 
as advocated by democratic, equity and advocacy planners, it also gained an inclination 
towards meaningful and deeper community engagement and empowerment of the people 
(Healey, 1999). This communicative shift implied a new focus on “transaction of ideas, 
values, opinions” between/among experts, bureaucrats, elected politicians and local lay 
people (activists) (Sager, 2013:78). The next section will review and present a case for such 
a transformative influence, which came about by further developing the communicative or 
deliberative planning approach.  
2.6.5. Communicative Action and Collaboration Planning 
Whilst there are many variations within the communicative action and collaboration 
paradigm, (notably the “collaborative planning approach by Pasty Healey, critical theory of 
Forester and Flyvberg’s … science of the concrete”), Allmendinger (2002) reckons that the 
work of Habermas represents the backbone of the communicative planning approach. The 
concern for planning as a communicative practice, is the central theme that connects these 
distinct variations, as they all aim for a “deliberative process, open to all groups and sectors 
of society affected by a particular issue” (Sager, 2013:90). Healey (1992) suggests that the 
1970s were associated with a serious political critique of the planning enterprise and the 
same period also saw a soft social and environmental commitment developing. It was 









the practice of planning remained caught up to obsolete ideas and procedures from a 
different age (Allmendinger, 2002). This realisation stimulated the conceptualisation and 
emergence of an alternative model, based on the notion of “social learning and 
communicative action” (Healey, 1992; Sandercock, 1998b; Allmendinger, 2002), thus 
ushering in the idea that “planning problems are social both in the sense that they affect a 
large number of people from different walks of life, and sense that acting upon them 
demands social action and commitment” (Mäntysalo, 2002:11). At its core, the 
communicative approach “explores the potential for agreement among people with 
conflicting interests”, assuming relevance for the ‘mediator role’ of the planner as he/she 
mediates negotiations on pressing planning issues (Seger, 2013:90). As such, the goal of 
communicative action is “consensus, based on mutual understanding” to enhance our 
collective ability “to cope with complex social problems” (Mäntysalo, 2002:11). 
Taylor (1999), saw communicative planning theory as a further adaptation of the advocacy 
planning model, initially championed by Davidoff. The advocacy planners who had learnt 
about “local knowledge and political skills that exist[ed] within poor communities” started this 
critical debate and reflection, and their efforts led to the “emergence of models of social 
learning and communicative action” (Sandercock, 1998b). It had become apparent that the 
scientific tradition that aspired to improve the quality of our physical and social environment 
(Rossi, Lipsey and Freeman, 2008) through the modernisation project relying on “scientific or 
instrumental rationality” (Faludi, 1973) had failed the complexity test. Public planning had 
failed to address complex social problems, hence the realisation that “their proper 
understanding requires cooperative action that transcends sub-cultural contexts of meaning” 
(Mäntysalo, 2002:11). It also become clear that the notion of modernity contained aspects 
that were problematic (Allmendinger, 2002), hence the search for “mediated negotiation 
strategies” aimed at empowering “the relatively powerless instead of reproducing existing 
inequalities of power” (Sager, 2013:90).  
To start with, Friedmann (1973, cited in Sandercock, 1998b), lamented the duality that 
existed in the “post-industrial society” arguing  that there was an inherent “crisis of values … 
and a crisis of knowing”, which fuelled the conflict between personal experiential ways of 
knowing and the rationally accepted notion of expert processed knowledge. Conceptually, 
the efforts of planners within a capitalist economy contributes to the genesis and the form of 
the built environment (Allmendinger, 2002). They ensure that it operates efficiently, and that 
it sustains existing social and economic conditions, which, in themselves are crucial cogs for 









Walters, 2007). However, this very exercise (planning) that is meant to enhance individual 
and collective wellbeing (Rossi, Lipsey and Freeman, 2008) was seen to be in conflict with 
other intentions of planning often associated with “advancing and protecting the ‘common 
good’ and the collective interests of the community, including the welfare of deprived groups 
or others threatened or harmed by development” (Sandercock, 1998b; Healey 1992; 1994; 
1999; McGuirk, 2001; Allmendinger, 2002; Walters, 2007). It thus follows from the nature of 
these complex planning issues and problems that “consensus becomes a necessary factor 
of successful planning” (Mäntysalo, 2002:11). 
Postmodernists, such as Lyotard and Bauman (Allmendinger, 2002) challenged universal 
master narratives, espoused in the modernist project which assumed an undifferentiated 
public interest (Sandercock, 1998b) and instead envisioned a heterogeneous public with 
multiple voices and interests (Campbell and Fainstein, 1996). As such, the framing of 
objectives of science and rationality were critiqued for assuming meta-narrative status that 
had “distinctly [problematic] value laden notions of social progress and human emancipation” 
(McLennan, 1992, cited in Allmendinger, 2002). Critical theorists such as Habermas, 
Foucault, Forester and others, challenged this domination of human affairs by scientific 
rationality, and criticised it for exerting hegemonic control over other, alternative forms of 
“being and knowing, altogether crowding out moral and aesthetic discourses” (Healey, 1994; 
Allmendinger, 2002; Sager, 2013). Walters (2008) suggested that such a post-positivist 
appreciation of social issues including, ‘diversity and difference’ instigated the attempt to 
reform modernist planning. To their delight, some critical theorists including; Healey, 
Forester and others, who drew inspiration from the work of Habermas, proposed an 
alternative to rational planning (Allmendinger, 2002, Walters, 2007). Their proposition was 
centred on greater “communication, tolerance and respect between/among divergent interest 
groups” as a strategy to “address power imbalances … [through] mediated negotiation” 
(Sager, 2013:90). As mentioned by Mäntysalo (2002:11) “consensus becomes a constitutive 
element of our ability to cope with complex social problems. 
Habermas (cited in Healey, 1992) stated that, instead of giving up on reason as an informant 
for contemporary society, there was a need to refocus our perspective from an atomised 
“subject-object conception of reason to reasoning formed within inter-subjective 
communication”. In this planning approach, “the skills of inter-personal communication and 
negotiation are seen as central to a non-coercive, ‘facilitator’ model of … planning” (Taylor, 
1999), to accommodate other suppressed forms of rationality. Campbell and Fainstein 









the technocratic biases underlying their professional rhetoric no planning. Instead, they were 
rather supposed to actively participate in the process of reclaiming rationality from “narrow 
instrumental/scientific objectivism” (Healey, 1992; McGuirk, 2001; Allmendinger, 2002). They 
were to adopt the principle that “power structures involve collective relationships … [which] 
require(d) collective strategies if they are to be challenged” (Sager, 2013:91). Over time, 
critical theorists led the call for “breaking down the dominance of scientific objectivism” in 
planning (Allmendinger, 2002). This ideological dismantling exercise of the traditional 
planning establishment, stimulated a shift towards acceptance of a fusion of “thinking, moral 
judgement, feeling and empathy” (Sandercock, 1998a), all human traits which, according to 
the postmodernist Bauman (1992) had been rejected as “irrationality and superstitions”. This 
shift, gave currency to the idea of multiple meta-narratives within the planning debate, as 
proposed by Cilliers (1998); Meadows (2001); Swilling (2002) and other progressive voices 
who were unashamedly opposed to a single narrative of social transformation, often held by 
the state, state actors and elites in service of the “state and the corporate economy” (Sager, 
2013:71).  
Holden (2008) noted that whilst the concept of social learning was “often cited as part of the 
desired outcome for planning processes”, the majority of the proposed narratives fell short in 
terms of addressing the ‘how and why’ it needs to occur. In light of this misalignment 
between planning and practice, Allmendinger (2002) argues that communicative action was 
never meant to replace rationality in the first place. Instead, communicative planners were 
encouraged to remove the barriers to communication through the creation of a model of 
open discourse free of distortions (Healey, 1999; Sandercock, 1998b). This perspective had 
implications for instrumental rationality which was naturally confined to a subordinate role, a 
situation that creates what Dyzek (1990, cited in Allmendinger, 2002) calls a ‘better balance’, 
more favourable to communicative rationality. Through communicative action, critical 
reflection is encouraged as the approach values “equalising information among group 
members and creating conditions within group processes so that the force of argument 
becomes be the deciding factor, rather than an individual’s power or status in some pre-
existing hierarchy” (Healey, 1992; Sandercock, 1998b; McGuirk, 2001; Allmendinger, 2002). 
As such, the communicative action approach to planning favours “qualitative interpretive 
inquiry” (Sandercock, 1998b) to problem identification and analysis as opposed to the 
“logical deductive analysis” of Faludi (1973). The activist mediator in this case has 
“responsibilities towards all parties” as they collectively put more scope to their “substantive 









Whilst communicative action was complimented for being more “inclusive” (Sandercock, 
1998b), it also had its own series of critiques. According to Habermas (cited in Healey, 
1999), “consensual positions could be arrived at” through communicative action. However, 
“contemporary social relations reveal deep cleavages of class, race, gender and culture”, 
and such “radically unbalanced power” relations (Sager, 2013:90) cannot be easily resolved 
through dialogue. Despite its bold stance on inclusion, certain issues such as “equity, social 
justice, democracy and sustainability” raised by complexity and postmodern theorists 
repeatedly surface in the literature on planning (Allmendinger, 2002). In this sense 
Sandercock (1998b) suggests that communicative planning fails to resolve the issue of 
empowerment and claims that it “acknowledges, but brackets the structural inequalities” of 
our society. Central to the argument favouring communicative action is the unbridled 
“influence of capitalism upon language or how it distorts the truth, and creates or 
perpetuates dominance” (Allmendinger, 2002) or what Sager (2003) calls “power 
imbalances”. In this regard, communicative action is therefore seen to be gender and race 
neutral, thus “suppressing the crucial questions of difference and marginality and their 
relationship to social justice” (Sandercock, 1998b) which for radical planners can only be 
resolved through revolutionary power struggles between/among conflicting forces (Healey, 
1999). 
To resolve this contradiction, Allmendinger (2002) suggests that the role of planners in a 
communicative space is to actively expose the domination of power (financial or political) 
through recognising and avoiding these distortions. In this context, the planners’ actions 
should involve a process of “micro-analysis of interpersonal interactions, listening to what is 
said and not, by whom, why and in what circumstances” (Sandercock, 1998b) as they 
promote dialogue that focuses attention on pressing social issues. To accomplish this task, 
Forester (1989, cited in Allmendinger, 2002) further develops Habermas’ four criteria of ideal 
speech: “comprehensibility, sincerity, legitimacy, and accuracy” as a basis for 
communication. To address the practical conceptualisation of communicative action, Healey 
(1992) developed a set of principles which could be seen as steps/phases of what 
communicative planning could look like in a liberal democracy:  
• Planning should use other types of analysis and, techniques; 
• No common language can be attained between discourse communities; and planning should 
therefore focus on a search for achievable levels of mutual understanding; 
• Planning should facilitate respectful discussion within and between discursive communities; 










• All kinds of knowledge and rationalities should be allowed; 
• A reflective and critical capacity must be maintained by the use of ideal speech; 
• All those with a stake are included - dilemmas need to be addressed interdiscursively;  
• Interests are not fixed ... people will alter interests through interaction and a process of mutual 
learning; 
• There is potential to challenge existing power relations through critique and highlight oppression 
and dominatory forces; and 
• The purpose is to help planners begin to proceed in mutually agreeable ways based on 
interdiscursive understanding … (Adapted from Allmendinger, 2002) 
At best, the communicative/collaborative planning model in all its variations is commended 
for removing “barriers to communication [and] creating a model of open discourse and 
removing distortions” in social processes such as planning (Healey, 1992; Sandercock, 
1998b; Allmendinger, 2002; Walters, 2008; Sager, 2013).  
2.7. Conclusion 
In keeping with Friedmann’s conception of “reflective or critical planners”, the study has thus 
far presented thus far the evolutionary process the planning enterprise underwent. The 
arguments and/or justifications that anchored rational and systems planning were 
systematically revealed. Contemporary planning challenges and their intricate link to the 
neo-liberal agenda were highlighted and made explicit. Using complexity theory and systems 
thinking, a review of the unintended outcomes of rational and systems planning was 
presented, leading to the search for alternative ways of seeing (analysis) and alternative 
ways of doing. It was noted that as debates centred on the evolution of planning naturally 
continued there were new developments in old thinking and the emergence of new 
paradigms. Such that alternative traditions to planning have always existed outside the state 
and were sometimes seen to be in opposition to it. 
The study also made explicit mention of the fact that within the positivist paradigm itself there 
existed a succession of competing theories or traditions of good planning practice often 
missing or ignored in classic planning texts. A detailed analysis of these necessarily complex 
life-styles of the marginalised and excluded provided empirical evidence of the specific 
circumstances that prevailed at the time. The particular developments that influenced new 









The Chapter also confirmed that each theoretical approach to planning was derived from 
particular circumstances with specific temporal and contextual characteristics.  
The study further illustrated how each emerging planning approach attempted, in its own 
unique way, to redefine precisely what it is that planners do in terms of approach, process 
and allegiance. It linked each post-positivist critique to planning, and by extension activist 
alternatives to rational planning to one or more issues identified by Hall and Tewdwr-Jones 
in their assessment of planning challenges. It also highlighted the specific ideological 
positions (political and economic) which the activist and advocacy modes of planning 
attempted to reform or transform and why. The study went on to present the transformative 
ideals that were central in shaping the rise of these insurgent planning approaches that 
stood in opposition to the rational/traditional planning enterprise during the 20th century. 
These transformative ideals form the core themes of Chapter 3 as the study weaves these 
insights together in an attempt to develop an evaluative framework useful in assessing the 









Chapter 3: Seeking Transformation Through Activist 
Planning 
3.1. Introduction 
In keeping with the second objective of the study, the focus of this chapter is to “develop 
criteria for evaluating the transformative potential of planning and decision-making 
processes and their outcomes”, based on insights from the literature on complexity and 
activist planning. Using the concept ‘confluence’ in planning practice, which emphasises the 
“coming together of people or things, … an act or process of merging” (Collins English 
Dictionary, 2017; Oxford Living Dictionaries, 2018), the chapter provides insights on how a 
relational planning processes that is transformative proceeds. It maps out how planning can 
be (re)organised, how planning problems are analysed, how solutions are developed, and 
how “worldviews, attitudes and allegiances” get created or changed over time (Mäntysalo, 
2002:6). From the theoretical analysis, highlighting the nexus between activist planning, 
transformation and complexity, it is seen that planning covers a very broad territory, making 
it impossible to explicitly map out all its boundaries (Hudson et al., 1979). Acknowledging 
and accepting that this expansive terrain is complex, requires a different way of seeing and 
doing; one that notes the intricate linkages and parallels that exist between planning and 
other disciplines, including the environment, the economy, politics and sociology (De Coning 
and Wissink, 2011). As Allmendinger (2002a) reasons, neither the process of urbanisation, 
“nor urban planning in particular, constitute independent, self-determinate occurrences”. 
Together they comprise a series of social events that are embedded within society, deriving 
their internal “logic and historical meaning from the general pattern of society as a whole”, 
emphasising the interconnectedness of social phenomena, referred to throughout this study 
as the ‘nexus’.  
In proceeding, the study presents an analytical framework for analysing, explaining and 
evaluating this connected real-life planning processes or the nexus with the idea of seeking 
confluence in planning practices. One of the examples of this transformative planning 
process is the participatory budgeting (PB) process in Porto Alegre. This process attempts to 
address complex and interrelated issues such as “poverty, poor housing, inadequate health 
care, rampant crime, deficient schools, poorly planned infrastructure, and inequitable access 
to services”, through transformative principles such as advocacy, honesty and transparency 









confluence in which a “blend of the aforementioned theories is found" in practice (De 
Coning, Cloete and Wissink, 2012). In their effort to universalise local government services 
the elected officials of Porto Alegre bypass traditional top-down rational planning methods, 
choosing instead to create an active role for local residents in their municipal planning and 
governance processes. Such an exercise demonstrates how transformative planners can 
actively redefine the planning process by “reinventing local democracy and invigorating 
politics [that] significantly alter the distribution of political and symbolic resources” 
(Goldsmith, 2001). As such, these collective, multi-stakeholder local plans reflect the 
interplay of various disciplines (Hoch, 2009). As seen in the PB process in Brazil, community 
leaders from various community associations (unions, cooperatives, mothers’ clubs, etc.) 
engage in dialogue with various players on issues of transportation, education, leisure and 
culture, health and social welfare, economic development and taxation, city organisation and 
urban development (Shah and Wagle, 2003). This transition has been dubbed the ‘jump’ 
from “techno-bureaucracy to techno-democracy”, allowing lay citizens to interface with 
technical staff, well-versed in matters of budgeting and engineering, as they seek local 
solutions to various issues confronting them. 
Together, the planning models reviewed in the study provide useful analytical insights 
according to which contemporary planning practices such as the PB of Brazil can be 
evaluated, analysed and critiqued. These insights blend a number of “practical tasks, which 
take us beyond instrumental rationality” and provide some solutions on “how to achieve 
legitimate and inclusive planning practices” (Mäntysalo, 2002:10). This reflective position 
enables today’s planning practitioners to borrow concepts, models tools and techniques that 
can potentially enhance and transform their specific planning process with change in mind. It 
allows planning practitioners to develop ‘context specific’ or what is now known as 
“indigenous planning systems and governance practices” (Harrison; 2006), that are fit to 
context (socio-economic and cultural particularities) and the temporal specificities of our 
spaces. This reasoning is in line with Hoch’s (2009) idea of “treating plans as products of 
practical reasoning [processes] sensitive to context and consequences”. 
Throughout this study, it has been argued that planning practice overlaps “far into the terrain 
of other professions, and its frontiers expand continually with the historical evolution of social 
problems” that need solving including the economy (Hudson et al., 1979). This brings forth 
the question, how do we develop plans and policies that are informed by normative 









human rights-based planning frameworks under complexity. Furthermore, “What does the 
literature say about the transformative potential and challenges inherent in the activist 
approaches to planning and decision-making and what criteria can be used to evaluate this.” 
In order to answer these questions and to fully understand the underlying implications of 
complexity on planning and how a combination of activist alternatives to planning can assist 
in responding to some of the pressing issues presented here, the pictorial depiction below 
sums up the suggested reconfiguration of planning.   
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Complex Adaptive Systems 
Next, the study expands on the idea of ‘confluence’ by extracting lessons learnt and useful 
recommendations from activist modes of planning and complexity. It then develops a set of 
questions or analytical criteria useful in the evaluation or assessment and analysis of past 
and future planning efforts. Based on insights presented earlier, the study divides this 
Chapter into two distinct, yet mutually reinforcing thematic areas. The first section presents 
alternative analytical tools and appropriate approaches for understanding planning issues. It 
looks at how a conception of complex adaptive systems assists planners in developing a 
detailed comprehension of urban issues. The second section reflects on lessons learnt from 
activist and advocacy modes of planning and draws out practical recommendations that can 















3.2. Understanding Planning Issues: Towards Complex Adaptive Systems 
Muller (2012); Innes and Booher (2000); and Swilling, (2002) suggest that that viewing the 
human-nature system and its dynamic interactions as “complex adaptive systems” is key in 
developing a detailed comprehension of pressing planning issues and the extent of “urban 
inequalities” (Sandercock, 1998a). They are informed by the understanding that 'we cannot 
totally predict or control' the human-nature system with certainty (Meadows, 2001). Rather, 
the human-nature system “thrives on diversity, creativity, and innovation” beyond the tools, 
knowledge and techniques available to us (Muller, 2010). Hence, learning the intricacies of 
the system becomes critical as suggested by Meadows (2001), and she reckons, there 
would be “plenty to do” once development practitioners, economists and planners are not 
“blinded by the illusion of control”.  
Cilliers (1998) introduced another dimension to the planning debate, in suggesting that the 
theory of complexity "entails that in a system there are more possibilities than can be 
actualised”. Affirming Bauman's (1992) concept of “imagined communities” which meant the 
future can, be “envisioned and brought lovingly into being” in multiple ways (Meadows, 
2001). However, for planners to better understand the planning issues at hand and to 
anticipate these possible future patterns, “specific, measurable, actionable, reliable and time 
specific indicators” must be used to justify planning decisions. Innes and Booher (2000) 
confirm the crucial role that “indicators and performance measures” play in informing and 
reforming current planning practices and planning debates with transformation in mind. They 
put forward the notion of “community indicators” premised on the idea that “cities are [also] 
like living organisms functioning as complex adaptive systems” working in a complex way 
similar to the nature-human system described above. Innes and Booher (2000) therefore 






In light of the role played by these multi-layered indicators, Meadows (2001) argues that we 
should expect surprises without being too deterministic of the patterns in the human-nature 
system. She encourages planners to “listen to what the system tells” them. Suggesting that 
i. “system performance indicators - required to provide information to the public 
about the overall health of a community or region [context]; 
ii. policy and program measures - required to provide policy-makers with feedback 
about how specific programs and policies are working, and  
iii. rapid feedback indicators - required to assist individuals and businesses to make 










they should be informed by the emerging patterns inherent in the “abundance of non-linear 
routes” (Cilliers, 1998), interlinkages, connections and feedback loops that exist in the 
system itself. From this exercise, a set of indicators that informs transformative governance 
and planning can immerge, informed by the context.  Innes and Booher (2000) believe that 
development of such a compendium of indicators requires meaningful participation and 
ongoing interactions with “those who will use and learn from [them]”, including among others, 
affected communities, NGOs, civil society, government, private sector, academia, etc.  
With this in mind, social engineers planners included are privileged with the power of 
“watching social systems [at play] and learn[ing] from their history … and discover[ing] how 
[their] properties and our values can work together to bring forth something much better than 
could ever be produced by our will alone” (Meadows, 2001). Swilling (2002) promotes this 
system thinking principle in planning by (re)focusing practitioners’ attention on “patterns 
rather than parts, probabilities rather than predictions, processes rather than structures, and 
non-linear dynamics instead of deterministic causalities” as they search for meaningful 
transformation that is contextual in nature.  
3.3. Reflections, Lessons Learnt and Recommendations for Planning Reform 
It is noted that the reform agenda in planning will be incomplete if we do not reflect and 
identify those critical lessons that shaped the development of planning towards what it is 
today. Going forward it is argued that critical lessons from activist planning, transformation 
and complexity must be interpreted together, as collectively they may assist reflective 
planners to identify transformative ideals, draw practical recommendations and initiate 
critical planning reforms fit to context as they rethink contemporary planning practices. 
Particularly those positivist arguments for planning and practices seen to be oppressive and 
counter-transformative in addressing the myriad of challenges confronting the Global South.  
3.3.1. Planning is not a Rational Science 
3.3.1.1.  Issues identified 
Campbell and Fainstein (1996) noted that planning theory tends to overlap with theories and 
practices observed in various other social science disciplines. Social sciences are also 
characterised by several conflicting theories that coexist and clash in perpetuity 
(Allmendinger, 2002). By extension, planning also extensively borrows its tools of analysis 
and technical methodologies (Campbell and Fainstein, 1996) from multiple fields, including 









surprising that planning was originally assumed to be a scientific discipline (Taylor, 1999), 
since it borrowed and utilised the “logical positivist approach” as a tool for analysis, same as 
other natural sciences such as physics, biology and chemistry.  
In addition, the practice was also seen to be seeking to establish general laws and truths 
that were/are easily deducible, and relied heavily on the early systems approach to planning 
as a universal method for problem solving (Taylor, 1999). Consequently, the foundational 
distinctions between the natural and social sciences began to be called into question 
(Allmendinger and Tewdwr-Jones, 2005). Implicitly, the ‘unity of method’ between the natural 
and social sciences which was historically accepted as a given, that dominated the social 
sciences and the practice of planning for much of the nineteenth century, began to crumble 
in the 1960s and 1970s (Allmendinger and Tewdwr-Jones, 2005). 
In view of this realisation, planning practice failed to “address the problems that planners and 
others were attempting to address” in the first place (Allmendinger, 2002). For instance, 
problems such as poverty and homelessness that planners set out to address either 
remained untouched or persisted unabated (Sandercock, 1998b; Allmendinger, 2002; 
Allmendinger and Tewdwr-Jones, 2005; Walters, 2007). This proved that the rational 
scientific view of the world, which assumed a world that could be completely understood, 
and the future states of which could be predicted in a scientific manner, was not only untrue 
but misleading and dangerous (Hall, and Tewdwr-Jones, 2011). Positivist planning practice 
was also seen to have exacerbated wealth inequality, adding more issues to an already 
overburdened society (Watson, 2009). Some of the proposed solutions to society’s issues 
ended up creating new and unforeseen challenges, such as urban motorways which 
separated communities and high-rise tower blocks that created localised havens of squalor 
and crime (Harrison, 1985; Sandercock, 1998 a; Allmendinger, 2002; Walters, 2007). 
3.3.1.2. Lessons learnt  
In its positivist conception, planning endeavours shared methodological parallels with natural 
science techniques which required one to objectively carry out detailed scientific 
investigations and analyse environmental systems e.g. society, regions, cities (Taylor, 1999). 
It relied on the use of conceptual models directed at empirically investigating and forecasting 
the interrelationships between various events and activities at different locations 
(Allmendinger, 2002; Hall and Tewdwr Jones, 2011). However, the “impossibility, of 
predicting future events” (Meadows, 2001; Hall and Tewdwr-Jones, 2011) amid complexity 









positivist planning approach. Harrison (1995) laments the gross and often misleading 
oversimplifications by expert planners, most of which were used as justifiable scientific 
reasoning in favour of certain plans. As seen through an activist planning lens, those 
‘rational’ views only served to legitimise (often forcefully) the narrow interests of certain 
groups (elites and politicians) at the expense of the marginalised and the excluded 
(Sandercock, 1998a).  
To equate such an elitist view within planning practice to ‘sound scientific rationality’ (Faludi, 
1973) was an inadequate justification for such a contested social practice. This critique was 
later used by advocacy planners of the time to discredit positivist arguments of the 
enterprise. It is not surprising that the same discomfort also found its way into the mind-sets 
of postmodern and complexity theorists (Baumen, 1992; Cilliers, 1998; Meadows, 2001 and 
others). They argued that systems, including city and regional systems, consisted of a “large 
number of components” which interacted dynamically, beyond our scientific conceptions thus 
signifying that these complex systems could not be precisely delineated. 
Allmendinger (2002) also highlighted the difference between open systems such as society, 
cities or regions and closed systems such as the carbon or nitrogen cycles found in the 
natural sciences. These open systems are often complex and adaptive which entails that 
there are multiple “possibilities than can be actualised” (Cilliers, 1998; Meadows, 2001) such 
that the diversity of outcomes cannot be accurately predicted by scientific tools alone. 
Furthermore, it became less apparent where precisely “problem centres lie” due to 
complexity, making it “less apparent where and how [planners] should intervene” as social 
engineers (Rittel and Weber, 1973). At best, the socio-economic and environmental 
complexity simply overwhelms humanity and its limited scientific tools of analysis 
(Allmendinger, 2002). This glaring reality of ‘wicked problems’, as depicted by Rittel and 
Weber (1973), meant that the professional confidence and scientific arrogance within 
planning practice, as held for generations by elites, were replaced by “uncertainty and 
introspection” (Allmendinger, 2002). 
 
3.3.1.3. Recommendations  
Planners should turn their attention towards contextual “practices and histories to explain 
what qualifies as knowledge”, thus “questioning universalising assumptions, naive realism 
and the correspondence theory of truth” (Allmendinger and Tewdwr-Jones, 2005). Planning 









variety of substantive and procedural ideas beyond the modest scientific boundaries 
(Campbell and Fainstein, 1996). From this analysis it is clear that planners need a deeper 
understanding of the planning issues or problems under review; as well as a critical 
consideration of the tools of analysis that are employed in structuring such planning issues 
or problems. Furthermore, the multiplicity of 'negative indicators of progress' (own emphasis) 
associated with a positivist notion of planning brought serious disagreements as to the role 
of the planners themselves. The next section puts this contentious view of the ‘expert 
planner’ into perspective.  
3.3.2. Non-Planners can also Plan 
3.3.2.1. Issues Identified 
The study established that the perception that elevated the trained planner (as a person who 
possessed some “substantive expertise”), also came to be challenged at the time when 
alternative views of planning were gaining currency (Taylor, 1999). Campbell and Fainstein 
(1996) revealed the difficult of defining contemporary planners. The role of the planner has 
extended beyond the confines of the state and its bureaucratic machinery, raising the 
question: ‘what are/were the role of state planners in the planning process?’  Using the post-
positivist view of the world presented in this study, it is clear that all sorts of ‘planners are 
encouraged to be part of any planning exercises and that such role-players could also adopt 
at will, any of the alternative conceptions of planning to fit the context and issues at hand. It 
was also shown that through advocacy, equity, radical and communicative planning 
approaches, state planners “don’t just plan and non-planners also plan”, a point that will be 
explored further throughout this section (Campbell and Fainstein, 1996). As a result, new 
‘institutional arrangements’ beyond the confines of the state and its institutions also surfaced 
and started to claim their rightful places in the planning enterprise previously dominated by 
the state. This diversity in institutions and roles, if explored fully, can add a creative and 
transformative spin to planning, as argued in the case study under review. 
3.3.2.2. Lessons Learnt   
Planners are encouraged (with reason) to embrace planning practices that are “inherently 
sensitive to complexity”, and which acknowledge “self-organisation” of social and natural 
systems and processes specific to a particular place and time (Cilliers, 1998; Meadows, 
2001). They are also reminded that the observer and the subject are not separate entities, 









2002). This view is a total rejection of the flawed sense of objectivity and value free analysis 
purported by Faludi (1973), Hall (1992) and others in their conceptualisation of rational 
planning.  
Healey (1992, cited in Cullingworth and Nadin, 2003) proposes that the present challenge of 
planning is to “adapt, not only to new substantive agendas about the environment and how 
to manage it”, but also to adopt new ways of conceptualising the relationship between the 
state and the market, as well as its relationship to its citizens, as far as land use and 
environmental change is concerned (Healey, 1992). In so doing, planning may appreciate 
and learn to adapt to the complex changes in the city thus gaining knowledge on these open 
interactions, seen as by-products of “planning and politics”, acknowledged to constantly 
interact and influence each other (Campbell and Fainstein, 1996). With that in mind, 
Meadows (2001) argues that futures can still be “envisioned and brought lovingly into being”. 
Reflective planners must allow themselves the opportunity to listen and to learn from what 
the ‘systems’ are telling them, without being blinded by the illusion of control and 
predetermination. Instead of instrumental rationality and its limited tools of analysis, Harrison 
(1996), as well as; Allmendinger and Tewdwr-Jones (2005) reckon that planners should 
align themselves with a “post-positivist recognition of indeterminacy, incommensurability, 
variance, diversity, complexity and intentionality”. Such an understanding of our socio-
economic and environmental systems brings into clearer focus other forms of rationality that 
are ethically and morally valid in evaluating planning options.  
3.3.2.3. Recommendations  
In terms of such a ‘dynamic systems’ view of society, the city, the region and the world at 
large, planners should not only plan cities, they should also negotiate, forecast, research, 
survey, and organise financing (Campbell and Fainstein, 1996). They must renegotiate and 
broaden the boundaries of what planners actually do. Within this post-positivist perspective, 
planners are expected to shift from causal reasoning as a basis for plan-making and move 
towards discovering and confirming meaning (Moore-Milroy, 1991, cited in Allmendinger and 
Tewdwr-Jones, 2005). Such a progressive view of planning entails, freeing the people 
(society) from the shackles of ‘privatised fears’ that modernity “injected [upon] humanity” 
during the enlightenment era (Bauman, 1992). This view does not imply that ‘anything goes’ 
(Harrison, 1995), since the ‘fears of modernity’ were privatised in a manner of speaking.  
The next section puts focuses on the notion of pluralism and diversity within planning. It 









specific perceptions and varying interpretations of what the public actually is and what it is 
not, as proposed by non-state actors who have now claimed front row seats in this ongoing 
planning debate. 
3.3.3. On Pluralism and the Public Interest 
3.3.3.1. Issues raised 
Post-positivism and related terms such as post-modernity, post-structuralism, often pitched 
as alternative worldviews to positivism and modernism, deny the existence of a single meta-
narrative or meta-discourse that unifies all forms of knowledge (Harrison, 1995). It is argued 
in this study, that a post-modern mind-set opens up spaces for ‘meta-narratives’, allowing 
the coexistence of multiple discourses in space and time (Cilliers, 1998; Swilling, 2001; 
Allmendinger, 2002). This is in contrast to the positivist model which emphasised the planner 
as the ‘undisputed knower’ who had the ability to rely “strictly on his professional expertise 
and objectivity to do what [was]/is best for an undifferentiated public” (Sandercock, 1998b). 
The notion of pluralism and multiple narratives as championed by postmodernists, among 
them Lyotard, Bauman, as well as notable complexity theorists including Cilliers (1998); 
Meadows (2001) and others, brought into focus the “central controversy of whether there is 
indeed a single public interest and whether [planners] recognise and serve it” at all 
(Campbell and Fainstein, 1996). Activist movements of the 1950s and 1960s involved in 
activist planning, challenged the assumption of scientists as rational beings, who acted in a 
manner that privileged theories and their validity on the basis of scientific evidence 
(Allmendinger, 2002). They advocated for a critical review of the ‘true histories’ behind 
planning in search for ‘hidden meanings’ and practices beyond the classical meta-narratives 
as presented by modernists planners (Sandercock, 1998a). 
3.3.3.2. Lessons learnt  
With such a post-positivist lens applied to planning, absolute truth is replaced by 
interpretation, and objectivity with subjectivity (Allmendinger and Tewdwr-Jones, 2005). This 
study is an example of such a bold rethink having gazed and reached back to past planning 
events and their developments in a desperate search for progressive alternatives to planning 
which emanated (but remained hidden) from the modernist era itself. It noted that, during the 
modern era, rational decisions were made and defined as correct concerning future courses 
of action, without questioning who was in control and with what consequences (Faludi, 1973, 









instead that it aided the systematic exclusion of “transformative possibilities” that were 
observed from the resistance of certain practices and regulatory regimes which were often 
missed or downplayed by the likes of Faludi (1973); Hall (1992); Hall and Tewdwr-Jones 
(2011) and others. Such an incomplete narrative, is evident within the vast ‘heroic prescripts’ 
on rational planning with its often-narrow focus on means (procedures) at the expense of 
ends (goals) which were to be confined to the messy realm of politics (Sandercock, 1998b).  
3.3.3.3. Recommendations  
Bauman (1992), proposed a great leap into a post-modern age or conception of the world in 
which reflective planners must envision at will, multiple imaginations (pluralism) or 
configurations of desired communities. Planners must acknowledge and accept that 
“individuals have no other means of reaching their goals except by trying to make the 
communities they imagine more authoritative than the communities imagined by others”. 
Therefore, all kinds of knowledge and rationality must be allowed (Allmendinger, 2002). 
Such a drastic switch from an objective overtone of science to a subjective and yet 
normative (Taylor, 1999) aspect of practice, is termed relativism. This view enables multiple 
perceptions and/or theories to co-exist side by side, whilst their proponents can claim equal 
validity and legitimacy in the transformation process (Allmendinger, 2002).  
Planners should allow public opinion, and not a few privileged bureaucrats, to become the 
driving force behind the building of these locally imagined communities within a diverse post-
modernist planning framework (Bauman, 1992. They should emphasise equality among all 
stakeholders, including elected officials. Such a competition for public opinion raises the 
stakes, opening up space for debate and dialogue and in the process creates room for 
innovative ideas from non-planners. (Bauman’s, 1992; Allmendinger, 2002). This space for 
innovation, if exploited fully, can potentially allow the development of alternative value 
systems and a negotiated agenda which potentially creates shared value. This relativist view 
to planning “refines our sensitivity to differences and reinforces our ability to tolerate the 
incommensurable” Cilliers (1998). This allows different “institutions, disciplines and 
communities” the space and freedom to “tell the story of what they know and what they do”, 
in their quest for attracting public attention and gaining sympathy for their ideas (Bauman, 
1992; Sandercock, 1998 a). Such an unrestricted access to planning may trigger useful 
struggles for survival which translates to struggles for “access to the human imagination” 
based and judged on their own merit and within context and temporal realities of those 









existence of a multiplicity of discourses” in a single space. This, in turn creates an enabling 
platform for “self-organisation and distributed representation”, which in its totality can 
potentially open up spaces for meaningful public participation, ongoing engagement and 
collaboration (Campbell and Fainstein, 1996; Sandercock, 1998b; Innes and Booher, 2000; 
Allmendinger, 2002; Harrison, 2006).  
3.3.4. Planning as a Normative Practice 
3.3.4.1. Issues raised   
To clearly highlight this element, the study turns to Fainstein and Fainstein (1996) who 
propose that political theorists rather than planners themselves, had a better “insight into the 
appropriate behaviours” attributed to planners during the modern era. The fact that rational 
and systems planning approaches relied implicitly on a non-political stance held by an 
“impartial expert who weighed competing objectives with rational, intellectual detachment” 
was highlighted as a concern. It was critiqued and challenged through ‘activist modes’ of 
planning, as presented in this study (Fainstein and Fainstein, 1996; Sandercock 1998a, b; 
Allmendinger, 2001; Walters, 2007; Sager 2013). The view that an impartial planner existed, 
whose choices in a rational society would “prevail over politics” (Sandercock, 1998a) was 
ridiculed by advocacy planners during the 1950s through to the 1970s, among them 
Davidoff, Krumholtz, Jane Jacobs and others (Hudson et al., 1979; Sandercock, 1998b; 
Allmendinger, 2002; Walters, 2007; Sager 2013).  
Positivist planning and decision making was based on a distinct set of values, or what 
Rabinow calls “corrective sociology of positivist social and natural sciences” (Sandercock, 
1998a). Implicitly, this set of values classified norms along the “binaries of 
healthy/pathological, normal/abnormal, productive/unproductive etc.” The value systems and 
perceived norms of that time, would ultimately determine the codes that dictated 
architectural and urban form (Walters, 2007). Klaus (1992, cited in Walters, 2007), continues 
to link the rational and design-based modes of planning to values such as “beauty, health, 
convenience, efficiency and [the] economy” in the same manner that it was done in the 20th 
century. Today, remnants of these values normally emerge as ideological assumptions 
and/or goals within policies, programmes and projects. Such values are often promoted in 
planning and planning processes, "either openly or through fuzzy, ambiguous or even 
hidden agendas" (De Coning, Cloete and Wissink, 2012). These values have also further 
expanded and they often range across a broad spectrum from, "religious or family values, 









democratic, or authoritarian values or goals". Most of these value systems persist, proving 
that recent approaches to planning merely ‘added’ their own sets of values and norms, as an 
extra layer to those already held by modernist planners (De Coning, Cloete and Wissink, 
2012).  
Despite the persistence of certain values and norms (good or bad), Sandercock (1998b) 
decries the “systematic thematic avoidance” of the view that rational planning had a ‘dark 
side’ (Yiftachel, 1989) to it. This view has often been hidden or swept aside within the 
positivist value judgements, historically or otherwise. By limiting rational and systems 
planning to procedures beyond the politics of the day (Campbell and Fainstein, 1996), 
advocates of this approach were oblivious to the fact that their preferred model perpetuated 
a draconian monopoly over power (political, money and planning) (Allmendinger, 2002). This 
stranglehold on power did not only discourage participation, but also hindered basic 
consultation in the planning process (Walters, 2007). Sandercock (1998b) expresses her 
misgivings about the manner in which this warped perspective on planning and its values 
worked to “reinforce racial segregation, [exclusion] and discrimination” against “women, 
racial minorities, the poor and indigenous people, among others”. At that time, the values 
and norms espoused by “patriarchal, heterosexual and white” elites were simply held in high 
esteem and went generally uncontested and accepted as fact. 
3.3.4.2. Lessons learnt 
The growing chorus of complaints, dominated by the voices of social scientists (democratic, 
advocacy, activist, equity and radical planners) who had joined the ranks of academic 
planners in the 1950s and 1960s contributed to the questioning of this hegemony of 
positivist thinkers (Fainstein and Fainstein, 1996; Allmendinger, 2002; Walters, 2007). De 
Coning and Wissink (2012) noted that planning content was in fact an interpretation of the 
values of society, which were by extension embodied in the management of pertinent 
projects and programmes. Amid the biases and the subjectivity of value judgements, 
planning was no longer trusted with “ethical neutrality in the framing, interpretation and 
application of knowledge” on behalf of an undifferentiated public (Allmendinger and Tewdwr-
Jones, 2005). This revolt, intellectual or otherwise, ultimately contributed to the undoing of 
the consensus within the positivist planning approaches, at least in theory (Allmendinger, 
2002; Walters, 2007; Hall and Twewdr, 2011). 
As Lefebvre (1970, cited in Walters, 2007) argued, space should not be viewed as a 









“shaped and moulded by political processes” specific to that context. Therefore, the general 
assumption that all these principles and values within rational planning were self-evident and 
thus common sense, (commanding a consensus amongst all sections of the population), had 
to be dismantled during the “civil rights and civil rebellions” era (Lindblom, 1959; 
Sandercock, 1998a). Positivist planning processes served to provide a space within the 
planning process, for the pervasive norms held by conservative middle-class intellectuals 
(Sandercock, 1998a). As observed before, the planning profession was forced however to 
gain an understanding and subsequently developed a “consciousness of race and racism” 
(Fainstein and Fainstein, 1996) as propelled through the social movements and uprisings of 
the time (Davidoff, 1956). 
3.3.4.3. Recommendations  
Planning must be viewed as a form of “social action” (Campbell and Fainstein, 1996) 
focused on shaping the socio-economic realm and its physical environment in line with 
certain valued ideals (Allmendinger, 2002). Thus, meaning that planning must be seen as a 
‘normative practice’ (Taylor, 1999), that seeks to realise certain valued ends or normative 
values (which are the realm of substantive theory and politics). Activist modes of planning 
proposed a host of socially acceptable approaches for decision making that could potentially 
result in the most desirable social outcomes, albeit in a subjective (normative) manner 
(Walters, 2007). Like any other normative practice, planners can also draw on relevant 
scientific understandings from sociology, politics, economics, etc., to accomplish their 
complex tasks within a given context and its temporal realities (De Coning and Wissink, 
2011).  
Given growing dissent both from within and without, radical planning theorists who were not 
satisfied with the efforts of advocacy, democratic and equity planners, applied a further 
critique on planning, based on Marxists views. They began to question the role played by the 
state in the accumulation and distribution of wealth. This critical political shift is further 
unpacked in the next section.    
3.3.5. Planning, the State and the Political Economy 
3.3.5.1. Issues raised 
Walters (2007) observes that economic planning was derived from the critique on industrial 









associated with the term “Political Economy” which has been loosely applied over time to the 
genre of economics associated with the process of accumulation and distribution of wealth 
as well as the role played by the state in facilitating this process (Allmendinger, 2002). 
Campbell and Fainstein (1996) proposed that planning practice is located at the intersection 
between the political economy and intellectual history. Historically, the intellectual 
contribution to this debate started with Marx’s critique and his attack of the social costs of 
industrial development. Marx was puzzled by the incessant drive to gain maximum profits by 
entrepreneurs and corporations of the time, who carelessly exploited the work force and 
severely damaged the environment (Walters, 2007).  
Furthermore, Keynes observed that economies had a tendency of slumping at certain 
periods due to lack of consumer demand within the capitalist system (Walters, 2007). In 
relation to this reality, workers were often paid far less than the total value of what they 
produced, thus Marx highlighted that there was an “excess of goods” that often-created 
crises within the capitalist system (Allmendinger, 2002). Keynes proffered a solution of his 
own to this crisis, arguing that this could be offset by intelligently managing public 
expenditures by the state, and targeting certain areas in order to stimulate demand through 
the maintenance of full employment (Walters, 2007; Alexander, 2008). However, Klosterman 
(1985) pointed out that formal attempts by the government, associated with forward planning 
and determining social change as proposed by Keynes were always problematic and 
controversial. The classical, mixed economy model based on Keynes, ideas, “often took the 
form of large scale public works programmes to create more jobs and pump money back into 
the economy, all backed by [a] comprehensive welfare state that took care of the public 
needs of health care, housing and education at the state’s expense” (Walters, 2007).  
Now dubbed ‘Keynesianism’, such state interventions which manipulated supply and 
demand were promoted as a mechanism to manage capitalism after the Second World War 
(Allmendinger, 2002). It was assumed that periodic state interventions would enable 
companies to minimise their labour costs (Walters, 2007), thus implicating planning 
management as useful tools in “staving off crises in the capitalist system” (Allmendinger, 
2002). The positive impact of these “demand stimulation strategies” on the Western 
economies were sustained for much of the 1950s and 1960s but fizzled out by the 1970s 
(Healey, 2002 cited by Walters, 2007; Alexander, 2007). The entry onto the global economic 
scene of developing, non-western countries with extremely low labour costs (that enabled 
corporates to undercut their high wage costs in Europe and America) shifted the balance of 









the great debate between proponents of government planning (Karl Mannheim, Rexford 
Tugwell and Barbara Wotton) and defenders of free markets and laissez-faire economics 
(Friedrick Hayek, Ludwig von Mises).  
3.3.5.2. Lessons Learnt 
Some commentators, like Caster (1978, cited in Sandercock, 1998a) identified planning as 
an instrument for rationalising “different demands of the factors of capital” through the 
creation and maintenance of “conditions conducive to the efficient accumulation of capital in 
the private sector (Klosterman, 1985; Walters, 2007). Neo-Marxists queried the idea that the 
economy and the market were fundamental regulating and structuring mechanisms as 
proposed by Adam Smith’s notion of the “invisible hand", which defined the relationship 
between capital and labour (Allmendinger, 2002).Instead, Marxists argued that there was 
"no such thing as public interest", they only recognised the interest of capital as the only 
interest capable of creating state mechanism such as urban planning, to ensure that it 
continued to give the impression of public control (Klosterman, 1985, Allmendinger, 2002, 
Walters, 2007).  
The radical political economy as a planning model, often associated with the New Marxism 
emerged in the 1970s “partly due to the failures of advocacy planning, and more specifically 
in response to the new theoretical analysis of the structural relationship between planning 
and the capitalist society” (Sandercock, 1998b). Marxist theorists were of the view that the 
role of planning within “contemporary societies” can only be understood via the conscious 
recognition of the “structure of the capitalist economy as it relates to the physical 
environment” (Klosterman, 1985). A view supported by Campbell and Fainstein (1996) who 
associate political economy theory with “structural theory and its predestined social forces”.  
As such, the physical manifestations of towns and cities should not be seen as a reflection of 
the dynamics of capitalism but are rather to be viewed as central cogs in its very existence 
(Allmendinger, 2002).  
Walters (2007) further argues that planning of physical places never stands in isolation and 
is in fact preceded (all the time) by economic planning. This allows planners to identify and 
determine “where, when and how to direct public and private investment, with the 
consequent effects on the physical environments of towns, cities and the countryside”. 
According to Marx “the manifestation of state activity only formed … the superstructure that 
[was] built [on] the base of the capitalist mode of production” (Walters, 2007). As such, the 









and forms of the state” as well as our views and ideas of it (Allmendinger, 2002). Historically, 
planning was tasked with orchestrating the “development of towns and cities primarily to 
promote health, the economy, convenience and beauty in urban settings” (Walters, 2007) in 
line with the values and norms held by the elites during the modern era.  
Hence, planning as a proactive practice, determines precisely “how the local and national 
political economy … influences the collective imagination” of its stakeholders (Campbell and 
Fainstein, 1996). In the modern era, state planning was seen as “a function of the state”, 
(Sandercock, 1998 a), a function aided by the use of supportive government policies, based 
on John Maynard Keynes ideas (Allmendinger, 2002). Though not presented as a planning 
model in this study, but rather as a critique, Neo-Marxists believed that "social and economic 
institutions of the capitalist society” were complicit in “systematically” promoting the narrow 
interests of certain groups (that had control of societies’ "productive capital) over those of the 
remainder of society” (Klosterman, 1985). They observed that the “day-to-day operations of 
the state and forms of state activity” were therefore within the prescribed limits set by the 
“needs and manifestations of capitalism” itself (Allmendinger, 2002). With the benefit of 
hindsight, this position meant that “private ownership of property and the imperatives of 
capital accumulation” imposed practical limits on any form of state intervention regarding 
prevailing “conflicts between fractions of capital active in the built environment” (Sandercock, 
1998b). Equity and radical planners in particular borrowed this critical analysis of planning as 
they sought a redistributive agenda in their alternative approaches.  
3.3.5.3. Recommendations 
To address these structural deficiencies, planners were encouraged to embrace the view 
that “fundamental social improvements [can] only result from ‘revolutionary activity of labour 
and the replacement of existing social institutions, benefiting capital, by new ones serving 
the interests of society at large” (Klosterman, 1985; Allmendinger, 2002). Sandercock 
(1998b) recommends that it is “necessary to have some form of coordination away from 
private interests in the built environment” to ensure that the “aggregate needs of [the] 
individual” are met. Hence, the Marxist school of thought proposed some essential reforms 
of their own (Klosterman,1985), including, “public ownership of the means of production and 
centralised planning which would replace existing market and political decisions processes”. 
Another proposal suggests the coordination of investment decisions by democratic 
procedures in the formulation of just social priorities, which would limit individual actions that 









1998b; Allmendinger, 2002). A reformed urban planning system was also encouraged as a 
means of bringing about “some balance between competing factors of capital and between 
capital and citizens through a mixture of repression, co-optation and integration. (Genzatti, 
1987, cited in Sandercock 1998b; Allmendinger and Tewdwr-Jones, 2005).  
3.4. Rethinking the Planning Process: Criteria for evaluating planning processes 
and their outcomes 
Given the analytical framework on planning developed in the above section (seeking 
confluence in planning), the study thematically summarises, the evaluation criteria that were 
drawn from the various arguments using a set of questions as practical guidelines. It also 
briefly links related sub-themes and expands on some of the transformative insights 
identified, in order to provide clarity on the analysis of past, current and future planning 
processes. It is also shown that some of the insights identified above may be applicable to 
more than one thematic area.  However, for the purposes of this study, they are presented 










Table 2: Evaluative criteria for planning processes and outcomes  
Thematic area (Main 
Questions) 
Sub-questions Planning Model(s) 
What are the Planning 
Issues at hand? 
 
• What are the planning issues or problems under review; Post positivist planning theories 
• What knowledge systems exists and how is the knowledge framed and how is 
it applied in understanding the issues; 
Radical planning 
• What other issues are they interrelated or connected to, and Complexity thinking, Equity planning, 
Radical planning, Communicative 
action, Advocacy, Participatory planning 
• What are the tools of analysis employed in structuring such planning issues or 
problems to develop a detailed comprehension of urban inequalities 
Equity planning, radical planning, 
Communicative action, Advocacy, 
Participatory planning 
Role of the planner • Who is presented as the planners; 
• Are they state or non-state planners; 
• What is their role; 
• What skills do they possess and promote; 
• What are their substantive agendas; 
• What knowledge of the system do they have; 
• What are their assumptions; 
• What other forms of rationality are they promoting; and 
• What are the existing or new institutional arrangements in place 
Equity planning, radical planning, 










What are the 
normative values?  
• What are the normative set of values being presented; 
• Who holds those value systems and why; 
• Was there pluralism in the development of the planning content; 
• Was the notion of public interest addressed;  
• What planning goals are being pursued; 
• What are the socio-economic and environmental implications of those 
planning norms and practices;  
• What new, alternative or progressive values are being proposed; 
• Is local knowledge, culture and traditions of respected;  
• What are the ideological and political arguments being used; 
• What other social science concepts, models or theories are being 
implemented or advanced; and  
• Is there consciousness of race, sex, gender etc. 
Equity planning, Radical planning, 
Communicative action, Advocacy, 
Participatory planning, Neo-Marxism 
Who are the 
stakeholders involved?  
 
• Who are the stakeholders interested or affected by the plans and policies; 
• What constitutes the public and what public interests are being favoured; 
• Are they represented in the planning process; 
• How were they represented; 
• Who is resisting the existing practices and regulatory regimes; 
• Are there spaces for debate, dialogue and collaborative action; 
• What are the power relationships between stakeholders; and  
• What are the implications of power and interests 
Equity planning, Radical planning, 
Communicative action, Advocacy, 
Participatory planning 
What institutional and 
governance 
• What institutional, governance and/or regulatory frameworks exists; 
o What are the institutional arrangements at play (informal and formal 










frameworks exists? institutional settings); 
• What are the existing planning and governance frameworks; 
o What is the role of the state; 
o Does the governance system allow self-organisation and distributed 
representation; 
• What spaces are created for collaborative and communicative rationality to 
unravel allowing co-creation and development of shared goals, and 
• Is the space accommodative and conducive to competition for public opinion 
What is contained 
(language, facts, 
information etc.) in the 
plans? 
• Is there a coexistence of multiple discourses or narratives; 
• What value or belief systems were used to inform the planning content and 
process; 
• What other social science concepts, models or theories are being 
implemented; 
• Is there consciousness of race, sex, gender etc., and 
• What are the social, economic and environmental costs of the planning 
options 
Radical and communicative action 
What are the goals, 
objectives and/or the 
outcomes of the plans 
or policies? 
 
• Whose goals or interests were prioritised in the plan; 
• What specific planning goals are being pursued; 
• Was there consultation and co-creation of the goals with affected 
communities; 
• Are there any other different or alternative imaginations or configurations of 
the planning outcomes; 
• What planning outcomes and ideological assumptions exists, and 









• Did the process uphold the normative goals of equality, justice and 
sustainability 
What planning system 
or approach is being 
used? 
• Was the process equitable; 
• Was there genuine participation of stakeholders; 
• Did conditions for communicative action exist;  
• Is there space for competition for public opinion; and 
• Was the process participatory or top down 




justifications are being 
used? 
 
• What economic ideology informs the state and other interest groups; 
• What form and what role does the state play; 
• What public priority expenditure exists; 
• Who identifies and determines where, when and how public expenditure is 
allocated; 
• Is there public ownership of the means of production; 
• Is there full employment; 
• Who stands to benefit – who wins and who loses, what are the implications of 
power and interests; and 
• Which class or interest groups exists (who wins and who loses) 
Equity and Radical Planning 
 










3.5. Conclusion  
In line with the notion of confluence, meaning the “process of merging” the Chapter provided 
insights on how a reformed planning process could be organised, how planning problems 
are solved, how worldviews, attitudes, allegiances are created and how they can be 
changed. It summarised the issues or critiques on rational planning that each activist mode 
of planning proposed and presented in the process revealing the inherent limitations, which 
subsequently led to the development of other oppositional or complementary planning ideas. 
It observed the multiple critiques and drew from it a set of lessons that could be useful in the 
debate on reforming or rethinking contemporary planning practice. The chapter also 
acknowledged that each planning approach had its own “internally consistent, mutually 
sustaining web of methods, social philosophies, professional standards, and personal 
styles”. It also blended related and complementary insights of each model as it presented a 
set of practical recommendations for reflective planners concerned about transformation.  
These ideas were systematically presented both as ideological and practical guidelines for 
contemporary planners seeking confluence in their practice at a local level. It is notable that 
each of the post-positivist alternatives was aimed at addressing specific weaknesses or 
shortcomings of the positivist model, proposing alternative methodologies, tools and 
techniques targeted at either improving or reforming it altogether. An argument was 
presented for seeking confluence in planning analysis using the various lessons learnt from 
the post-positivist critique on planning. As an outcome, detailed evaluative criteria for 
analysing the selected planning case study was developed, which will be used in the next 
chapter to explore the question “What transformative role can and did advocacy and activist 
planning play in the planning and development of the Atlantis Revitalisation Framework 









Chapter 4: Case Study: Atlantis Revitalisation 
Framework 
4.1. Introduction 
This study contributes to the increasingly pertinent discussion on the role of activist modes of 
planning within a complex and evolving planning landscape in a post-apartheid South Africa. 
With reference to one planning case study, the chapter carefully traces the actions, struggles 
and experiences of multiple actors (NGOs, the state, mobilised communities, private 
business, research community etc.) in the formal and informal planning and development 
processes. Given that “the composition of [future plans] may draw upon the ideas and 
practices of prior plans (precedent)” (Hoch, 2009), the study explores and highlights the role 
played by activist planning, transformation and complexity in the planning and decision-
making processes for the Atlantis Revitalisation Framework of 2012. 
Using the evaluative criteria developed in Chapter 3, the study outlines the complex planning 
issues and problems targeted for reform. It uses complexity theory as a lens to critically 
analyse and review the root issues and problems and their intricate connections. It maps out 
the critical events and activities that ensued, identifying who the stakeholders were, what 
their value systems were and what ideologies informed their assumptions, who they 
represented, why and how they represented them, what formal or informal institutional and 
regulatory frameworks existed, who constituted them and what role the state and the state 
planners played. Utilising the ‘prism of change’ (transformation) as a lens, this effort was 
useful in mapping how the planning process for the ARF unfolded. It also established 
whether it was "meaningfully participatory, equitable and/or just”, as advocated for in the 
literature on activist planning. Whilst the study does not specifically carry out a detailed 
economic analysis and policy outcome analysis, it highlights the important factors relevant to 
understanding the planning process itself. It also notes the radical actions taken by the 
various players as they either challenged, altered or even replaced existing planning and 
governance systems, channels, procedures and entrenched ways of decision-making with 
new practices largely adherent to the normative principles of inclusion, equality, social 









In conclusion, the chapter draws out critical planning lessons and recommendations based 
on the established evaluative criteria developed from the extensive activist planning, 
transformation, complexity and advocacy literature reflected in Chapter 2 and 3. This 
Chapter thus tests the usefulness (value and applicability) of such criteria through a partial 
analysis of the Atlantis Revitalisation Framework (2012) case study under review.  
4.2. My Involvement in the Atlantis Revitalisation Framework 
As a young employee working for the West Coast Environmental Cooperative (WCEC) in the 
capacity of Projects Officer from 2008 to 2010, I was co-opted by the then Chief Operations 
Officer (COO) of WCEC to form part of the Secretariat responsible for the documentation 
and research that informed the Atlantis Socio-Economic Development (ASED) Task Team. 
Through its established networks, the WCEC was mandated by the Job Creating Trust (JCT) 
to establish and lead a multi-stakeholder civil society body which initiated an intense 
advocacy and lobbying processes in 2009. Whilst this history is largely ignored and no 
clearly reflected in the official outcomes of the ARF planning process as presented by the 
CoCT, this study clearly narrates the events and milestones (between 2010-2012) that 
eventually led to the development of the policy framework. 
As an informed insider who participated in/and observed the planning process, my role 
evolved over time, starting as a mere minute taker responsible for the documentation of the 
advocacy and lobbying efforts. It subsequently mutated into that of an action researcher and 
report writer at different phases of the process. Between 2011 and 2012, I eventually 
assumed the role of facilitator and advisor to the ASED Task Team after I was employed by 
World Vision Atlantis Area Development Programme (ADP) as a Development Facilitator 
(DF). Having developed a keen interest in the developmental trajectory of Atlantis since 
2008, particularly in the environmental and tourism sector, I was involved in carrying out 
critical research outlining the contentious “History of Atlantis” (WCEC, 2008). This work, 
narrated in detail how Atlantis was planned and developed during the apartheid era, followed 
by the Atlantis Tourism Inventory (2008), which identified the tourism assets of the town and 
mapped out its tourism potential. Combined, this action research work positively informed 
and influenced the skills and capacity that I developed and exercised over the period in the 
development of the ARF from 2009 to 2011. As a Projects Officer for WCEC, I was tasked 
with the role of documenting the process and providing the ASED Task Team members with 









Apart from initially writing most of the ASED task team minutes during various meetings as a 
passive player, I was immediately catapulted into a more strategic role as part of the 
Secretariat headed by the then COO of WCEC. In that space, I played the role of lead author 
of the Task Team strategic documents, including but, not limited to, meeting minutes, 
drafting of reports as well as internal and external communication. In that adaptive role as an 
informed insider and through the experiential learning and action research opportunities 
presented to me, I was quickly initiated into the complex world of adversarial activist 
planning and the coordination of planning processes outside of the state. I quickly learnt 
about the inherent contradictions between plural visions of community stakeholders, 
contrasted with the limited scope within which the state operates to meet its constitutional 
mandate premised on the provision of public goods. The tension between state led planning 
and the divergent visions of the communities is ever present and the contestations are 
ongoing.  
With the benefit of hindsight, this unique personal experience alone was essential in 
broadening my insights and horizons in the planning arena. As a result of the fast-paced and 
demanding nature of the work including the practical reality of keeping the coordination of 
the planning process seamless, I had to quickly learn and adjust to the demands 
characteristic of the process. This evolving role within such a difficult space involved 
developing well thought out planning documents, research pieces and in some instances, 
the strategic planning and coordination of the ASED Task Team activities. As a result, my 
role and influence in the ASED Task Team grew and in June 2010 was noticed by the World 
Vision Atlantis Leadership. This interest prompted a remarkable career switch in the 
contentious world of advocacy and community transformation. In 2011, I was employed as a 
Development Facilitator (DF) for the Atlantis Area Development Programme (ADP). In this 
new role I was responsible for managing the ADPs Advocacy and Education projects which 
required ongoing facilitation of multi-actor, community development processes ranging from 
Early Childhood Development (ECD) and Youth Development Forums as well as economic 
development initiatives, including, but not limited to advocacy and lobbying initiatives similar 
to the ASED Task Team. Eventually, this evolving role mutated into an advisory capacity to 
both the civil society secretariat and the then chairperson of the ASED Task Team. In that 
period, I made several strategic inputs to the planning process, including contributions 
towards the institutional make up and knowledge management aspects of the advocacy and 
lobbying work carried out by the ASED task team. This critical role and the influence I 









planning documents that narrated the planning process of the ARF, as cited in this research 
work. 
The work and strategic input that resulted from the advocacy activities of ASED and other 
players are barely cited in the final Atlantis Revitalisation [Policy] Framework (ARF) currently 
being implemented by the CoCT and the Western Cape Provincial Government. However, 
the final vision and operational elements of the Atlantis Revitalisation Framework 
incorporated fundamental elements of the ASED Task Team’s insights and ideas including 
some of its most contested propositions on the Green Economy, business retention and 
more. Even though this research work is not focused on analysing the actual content of the 
resultant policy framework, it does highlight the critical events and the struggles of the 
stakeholders, particularly the civil society movement in Atlantis. It establishes the contested 
but essential advocacy and lobbying influence which eventually shaped the development of 
the Atlantis Revitalisation [Policy] Framework. Thus far, I have endeavoured to highlight my 
evolving role within this space and how the dynamic thinking and deliberations in this 
adaptive and ever-changing planning, policy and advocacy processes, eventually moulded 
my career path and my study interests in this field. As a starting point, a brief review of the 
policy and legislative framework that informed, guided and, to some extent, constrained the 
planning efforts that ASED was involved in, is outlined below. This policy landscape, 
particularly the National Constitution of South Africa (1996), provided the role players, 
particularly the ASED with a reference point centred around participation and cooperative 
governance. The ASED used these legislated provisions to mobilise, challenge and claim 
legitimacy in the planning process using existing “policy and programme measures - 
required to provide policy-makers with feedback about how specific programmes and 
policies [were] working” (Innes and Booher, 2000). 
4.3. Policy and Legislative Framework 
The policy and legislative framework that informed the ARF includes international, national, 
regional and local policy guidelines and principles (UrbanEcon, 2011). The section below 
maps out these ever expanding and constantly evolving policy guidelines and principles that 











4.3.1. International Policies  
At the global level the ARF was influenced by the Agenda 21 (UNCED, 1992) policy 
programme of the United Nations (UN). Agenda 21 (UNCED, 1992) is linked with the 
sustainable development arguments and thus provided a comprehensive blueprint for action 
to be taken globally, nationally and locally by organisations such as the UN, government, 
and other major groups in every area in which humans’ impact the environment. It promoted 
sustainable agriculture and rural development (SARD) which was prioritised in Chapter 14 of 
Agenda 21. The Kyoto Protocol (1997) was established as an international agreement linked 
to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. It set binding targets for 
37 industrialised countries and the European community for reducing greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions according to which countries were expected to meet their emission targets 
primarily through set national measures. The Kyoto Protocol also provided additional means 
of meeting these country targets through market-based mechanisms such as emissions 
trading (known as the carbon market), the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and the 
Joint Implementation (JI). Together these mechanisms were aimed at stimulating green 
investment and assist member parties in meeting their emission targets in cost-effective 
ways. The ARF members, particularly the WCEC, played an influential role in championing 
the incorporation of these Green Energy arguments in the planning process as well as 
documents developed over the said period.   
4.3.2. The National Policy and Legislative Framework of South Africa 
4.3.2.1. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996  
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996, serves as the overarching 
legislation that binds all laws and policies together. Notably, Section 152 of the Constitution 
outlines the objectives of local government, namely: 
• To provide democratic and accountable government for local communities; 
• To ensure the provision of services to communities in a sustainable manner; 
• To promote social and economic development; 
• To promote a safe and healthy environment, and 
• To encourage the involvement of communities and community organisations in the 









In terms of Section 153 of the Constitution, to structure and manage its administration, and 
budgeting and planning processes to give priority to the basic needs of the community, and 
to promote the social and economic development of the community. 
4.3.2.2. The Local Government Municipal Systems Act (No.32 of 2000) 
The Municipal Systems Act (No. 32 of 2000) in Section 4(2), lists the duties of a municipal 
council, within its financial and administrative capacity, as follows:  
• Exercise the municipality’s executive and legislative authority and use the resources 
of the municipality in the best interests of the local community; 
• Provide, without favour or prejudice, democratic and accountable government 
• Encourage the involvement of the local community; 
• Strive to ensure that municipal services are provided to the local community in a 
financially and environmentally sustainable manner; 
• Consult the local community about the level, quality, range and impact of 
municipal services provided by the municipality, either directly or through 
another service provider and the available options for service delivery; 
• Provide members of the local community equitable access to the municipal services 
to which they are entitled; 
• Promote and undertake development in the municipality; 
• Promote gender equity in the exercise of the municipality’s executive and legislative 
authority; 
• Promote a safe and healthy environment in the municipality, and 
• Contribute, together with other organs of state, to the progressive realisation of the 
fundamental rights contained in sections 24, 25, 26, 27 and 29 of the Constitution. 
Local Economic Development is one of the most strategic tools through which local 
municipalities give effect to duties, as prescribed by the Municipal Structures Act. This fact 
becomes even more applicable, once a municipality’s LED strategy is functionally integrated 
with its Integrated Development Plan. Section 26(c) of the Municipal Systems Act, further 
specifies that the Integrated Development Plan of a Local Municipality must contain its Local 
Economic Development aims as this award the municipal LED Strategy legal status as part 









4.3.2.3. Reconstruction and Development Programme RDP (1994) 
Even though, the RDP (1994), is no longer an active policy of government, it was originally 
designed as an integrated, coherent socio-economic policy framework. Aimed primarily at 
addressing the historical imbalances in the South African economy built through many years 
of systematically enforced racial division in every sphere of society. For years, rural areas 
were divided into under-developed “Bantustans” and well-developed, white-owned 
commercial farming areas whilst the towns and cities were divided into townships without 
basic infrastructure for blacks and well-resourced suburbs for whites. Segregation in 
education, health, welfare, transport and employment also left deep scars of inequality and 
economic inefficiency. Hence the RDP was initially aimed at setting South Africa firmly on 
the road to eliminating hunger, providing land and housing to all its people, providing access 
to safe water and sanitation for all, ensuring the availability of affordable and sustainable 
energy sources, eliminating illiteracy, raising the quality of education and training for children 
and adults, protecting the environment, and improving health services while making them 
accessible to all. 
4.3.2.4. Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) (1996) 
GEAR was adopted in 1996 as an official economic policy, replacing the RDP. It mandated 
all spheres of government to: 
• Enhance educational opportunities of historically disadvantaged communities; 
• To shift health resources to hospitals and clinics in rural areas and townships; 
• Improve water and sanitation in rural communities, and 
• Improve on land distribution and reform. 
It also highlighted the fact that the land reform programme and the combination of asset 
redistribution with enhancement of tenure, had an important role in improving the long-term 
prospects for employment and income generation in the rural economy. The reasoning then 
was that the provision of basic household infrastructure was relatively low cost hence the 
need for government led programmes that accelerated labour-based infrastructural 
development and maintenance of public works in urban and rural areas. However, the 
challenges then faced by the labour market policy was to promote dynamic and efficiency 
skill enhancement and the expansion of reasonably remunerated employment whilst 
supporting a labour-intensive growth path which simultaneously generated jobs for the 










4.3.2.5. Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative of South Africa (ASGISA, 2006) 
ASGISA (2006) resulted from the goal set by government “to halve poverty and 
unemployment by the year 2014”. It was proposed then, that the Republic had to maintain an 
average growth rate of 5% until the year 2014 and both increase and improve labour-
absorbing economic activities. The Joint Initiative on Priority Skills Acquisition (JIPSA, 2006) 
was promulgated as a component of ASGISA, and sought to equip people with skills so that 
they could participate in accelerated growth. JIPSA comprised of a high-level task team that 
was mandated to identify urgent skills needs and advise on how best these could be met. 
The government acknowledged that the single greatest impediment to its public 
infrastructure programme as well as private investment programmes was the country's 
shortage of skills. JIPSA identified several interventions which included special training 
programmes, bringing back retirees and expatriate South Africans, and attracting new 
immigrants. Also planned through JIPSA was a major upgrade of the Further Education and 
Training colleges sector and a strategic revamp of the Adult Basic and Education Training 
programme, based on models developed in New Zealand and Cuba. (ASGISA, 2006) 
4.3.2.6. Other National Policies and Legislation  
Other notable elements of national legislation that potentially influenced the development of 
the Atlantis revitalisation policy, included the White Paper on South African Land Reform 
(1997) which aimed at establishing land ownership and use, whilst acknowledging that land 
played an important role in shaping the political, economic and social processes in the 
country. The Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act (2003) encapsulated a broad 
definition of Black Economic Empowerment (BEE), defining it as an integrated and coherent 
socio-economic process, located in the context of the country’s national transformation 
programme (i.e. the Reconstruction and Development Programme). The policy is aimed at 
redressing the imbalances of the past by seeking sustainable and equitable transfer and 
confers the ownership, management, and control of South Africa’s financial and economic 
resources to the majority of its citizens. It seeks to ensure broader and more meaningful 
participation in the economy by black people in order for them to progressively achieve 
sustainable development and prosperity.  









strategic direction for South Africa’s industrial development. Again, this policy also followed 
the principles of the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) and played a 
fundamental role in efforts aimed at achieving ASGISA’s goals. The Regional Industrial 
Development Strategy (RIDS) (2006), likewise presented a comprehensive framework for 
industrial development in South Africa. It was built on the outcomes of the National Spatial 
Development Perspective (NSDP) which acknowledged the fact that the landscape of 
economic development was not equal across all regions of the country. Given the location of 
Atlantis, the Integrated Sustainable Rural Development Strategy ISRDS (2000) was a 
noteworthy policy instrument aimed at transforming the rural part of South Africa into an 
economically viable sector, able to make a significant contribution to the GDP of the country. 
The policy was designed to realise a vision towards attaining “socially cohesive and stable 
rural communities with viable institutions, sustainable economies and universal access to 
social amenities, able to attract and retain skilled and knowledgeable people, who are 
equipped to contribute to growth and development”.  
The National Local Economic Development Framework (NLED) 2006 - 2011 was intended to 
build a shared understanding of LED in South Africa and put into context the role of local 
economies in the national economy. It sought to mobilise local people and local resources in 
an effort to fight poverty, while the National Spatial Development Programme (NSDP) (2006) 
was developed to address the distortions of the past apartheid spatial economy. The NSDP 
was adopted in 2003 as an instrument to inform the respective development plans of the 
national, provincial and local governments, which included Integrated Development Plans 
(IDP’s), Provincial Growth and Development Strategies (PGDS’s) and the Medium-Term 
Strategic Framework (MTSF). The NSDP was aimed at fundamentally reconfiguring 
apartheid spatial relations and to implement spatial priorities that meet the Constitutional 
imperatives of providing basic services and alleviating poverty and inequality in a new South 
Africa.  
Given the Green sector potential as advocated for in the ARF, the Energy Security Master 
Plan Electricity (2007 - 2025) was a crucial piece of legislation. Its goals are premised on 
broad government policy and objectives as presented in the Energy White Paper (1998) 
which aimed to address the energy requirements of the poor, enhance the competitiveness 
of the economy by the provision of low cost, high quality energy inputs to the industrial, 
mining and other sectors and to achieve environmental sustainability. The National 
Environmental Management Waste Act No.59 of 2008 is another crucial piece of legislation 









managed in order to minimise potential damage to the socio-economic and bio-physical 
environments and to build capacity”. In addition, it is focussed on assisting “the South 
African industrial sector to properly manage waste by requiring provinces and municipalities 
to develop integrated waste management plans that are co-ordinated and aligned with the 
relevant integrated development plans and other plans and programmes of provincial and 
national government”.  
The New Economic Growth Path Plan (NEGPP) (2010) states that “South Africa was to 
embark on a new economic growth path that was aimed at creating more jobs and to 
eradicate poverty”. In its original form, NEGPP was aimed at “creating five million jobs within 
10 years while reducing national unemployment 25 percent to 15 percent”. The new growth 
path “committed South Africa to work with other countries in the continent to build a single, 
integrated African economy, embracing one billion consumers and to focussing on the 
immediate expansion of economic links with the rest of the Continent”. Based on the 
potential to unlock multiple employment opportunities, the NEGP prioritised at least six key 
sectors of the economy, including “infrastructure development, agriculture, mining, green 
economy, manufacturing and tourism”. All these sectors were likewise prioritised by the 
stakeholders that participated in the crafting of the ARF. Significantly, “the green economy 
was identified to have the potential to provide 300 000 jobs by 2020, with 80 000 of those 
jobs in manufacturing, whilst also acknowledging a potential rise to over 400 000 jobs by the 
year 2030”. The Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) was then tasked with “raising 
capital to drive the growth of the green industrial economy in line with South Africa's 
commitments to drastically reduce carbon emissions over the next few years”.  
4.3.3. Policy and Legislative Framework for the Western Cape Province  
At the provincial level, the Provincial Government of the Western Cape (PGWC) developed 
the Provincial Growth and Development Strategy (PGDS) (2008). The policy was set to 
“provide an effective development agenda, not only for government, but for all the 
stakeholders working together”. The IKapa Elihlumayo policy guideline combines short-term 
and long-term strategies and as provides guidance in terms of appropriate geographical 
targeting of service delivery in the Province. In addition to the PGDS (2008), the WCPG also 
developed the Provincial Spatial Development Framework (WCSDF) which aims to “address 
the biased nature of past public investment”. The framework noted explicitly that “former 
infrastructure and development strategies have largely benefited a small proportion of the 









strategies that counteract these inherent historical imbalances”. In addition, the Western 
Cape Micro-Economic Development Strategy (WC-MEDS) (2005) is a policy instrument that 
consists of “a comprehensive framework of cost-efficient interventions to boost the Western 
Cape’s economy with the view that it may be sustainable in the future”. The WC-MEDS was 
developed with the hope of intentionally creating an economy that facilitates transformation.  
The PGWC also had its own version of the Strategic Infrastructure Plan (2006), and this 
policy tool was aimed at “achieving the 5% growth rate set by ASGISA”. It acknowledged 
that “an efficient and reliable institutional and physical environment was necessary for these 
ambitious targets to be realised”. Furthermore, the Human Capital Development Strategy for 
the Western Cape (2006) was developed by the PGWC in recognition of the fact that 
“unemployment was a serious concern for the Western Cape, particularly with regard to the 
youth”. It noted that “it was only through increased employment and subsequent economic 
growth that the Western Cape could become ‘a home for all’ in accordance with the ASGISA 
goals”. It was observed that “the unemployment challenges were as a result of a lack of 
essential skills, coupled with the general lack of opportunities for both the everyday worker 
and the aspiring entrepreneur”. The Human Capital Development Strategy (HCDS) was 
therefore aimed at “transforming the existing skills and opportunities situation in the Western 
Cape Province through nurturing and developing the educational system”. 
The White Paper on Sustainable Tourism Development and Promotion in the Western Cape 
(2001) is based on the fundamental principles of “social equity, environmental integrity, 
economic empowerment, co-operation and partnership and sustainability, and is driven by 
the challenges of transforming the society and economy of the Western Cape”. It is noted 
that “tourism development must play a critical role in supporting the Constitution’s 
commitment to improving the quality of life of all citizens, while protecting the natural 
environment for the benefit of present and future generations”. The policy is informed by the 
goals of “reconstruction and development – to meet basic needs, to develop human 
resources, to build the economy and to democratise the state and society”.  
4.3.4. Policy and Legislative Framework of the City of Cape Town 
At the local government level, the City of Cape Town’s Integrated Development Plan (CoCT 
IDP 2007 - 2012) was formulated, based upon its comparative and competitive advantages. 
The City of Cape Town (CoCT) is noted as a key player in the national and regional 









unique natural environment and people also help to position it as one of the country’s 
leading tourist attractions and as a centre of education, innovation, learning and creative 
thought (UrbanEcon, 2011).  The City of Cape Town Draft Spatial Development Framework 
(CoCT Draft SDF 2010) provides guidelines to “manage urban growth, and balance 
competing land use demands, by putting in place a long-term (20+-year), logical 
development path to shape the spatial form and structure of Cape Town”. Flowing from the 
drivers of urban growth in Cape Town, and their spatial implications, three strategies were 
identified to place Cape Town on the path to becoming a sustainable and equitable City. The 
CoCT’s plan for employment, and to improve access to economic opportunities identifies 
Atlantis town centre and the Atlantis industrial area as key priority urban nodes and industrial 
areas to be developed. The plan also aimed to manage urban growth, and to create a 
balance between urban development and environmental protection as well as building an 
inclusive, integrated, vibrant city. 
The City of Cape Town Review of the Economic Development Strategy (CoCT EDS Draft 
2009) proposes a multi-pronged strategy for the City of Cape Town to be implemented over 
a 3 - 20-year period, depending on the programme, focusing on the following areas: 
• Positioning Cape Town as a globally competitive city with a strong bias towards SMMEs  
• Positioning Cape Town as a global knowledge and innovation hub; 
• Strengthening and growing key sectors such as the creative industries, and tourism; 
• Reducing poverty through enhancing access to economic opportunities and meeting 
basic needs; 
• Encouraging the establishment of innovative green industries such as manufacture of 
solar water heaters and other renewable energy and energy efficient technologies; 
• Strengthening the relationship with the research and learning institutions as a source of 
more appropriate skills to meet the growing demands of the Cape Town economy; 
• Targeting interventions in the informal settlements to create tangible economic 
opportunities and sustainable livelihoods and 
• Implementing area-based interventions, including nodes and corridors, with integrated 
transport, land use and services including local economic development opportunities.  
 
The Cape Town Densification Strategy (2009) looks at ways of making more efficient use of 
its limited urban space given the need to find space for more people to live and work. The 










• Encourage an average density of 25 dwelling units per hectare across Cape Town in 
the short to medium term; 
• To draw up guidelines to assist planners in deciding development applications; 
• To introduce incentives that encourage higher densities, and disincentives to prevent 
low-density sprawl, and 
• Make densification a priority in certain areas targeted by the strategy. 
Blaauwberg District Plan (2009) captures Blaauwberg’s spatial development vision which is 
to have a district of diversity where coast becomes the City‟s playground and its growth axis 
forms a model for integrated settlement along which public transport is the mode of choice 
for its residents and job generation prospers, all the way from a revived southern core to a 
self-sustaining Atlantis in the north. Key spatial strategies emanating from this include: 
• enhancing the accessibility and value of the natural and rural environment and open 
spaces for the people of Cape Town; 
• establishing an integrated grid-based movement system; 
• consolidating and intensify development on the accessibility grid; 
• directing urban growth and promote compact, integrated development, and 
• develop more great people places. 
The conceptual framework proposes a series of urban, natural and coastal special places, 
which comprise areas/locations of unique significance, which being public in nature, should 
receive public investment to create places with high amenity value. These places included 
the Atlantis Dunes, Silwerstroomstrand, Mamre and Pella linked in some way to the town of 
Atlantis. The Blaauwberg District Plan (2009) specifically seeks to conserve remnants of 
sensitive and threatened vegetation types and control development pressure in the key 
sensitive areas such as Silverstroom Strand, Atlantis and the northwards expansion of the 
urban area near the Blaauwberg Conservation Area.  
The Cape Town Development Edges Policy: Urban and Coastal Edge (2009 draft) sought to 
“prevent any further development along 300 kilometres of the Peninsula’s coastline”. The 
buffer zone identified varied from about 100-metres from the high-water mark to as much as 
a kilometre. The aim of this legislation is to “prevent new development encroaching on the 
coast”, which the city highlights as being unsightly and often serving to restrict public access 
to the beaches and the oceans. In terms of the draft legislation, “no more housing or private 









be permitted either”.  
4.4. Atlantis Township: The Overview 
4.4.1. Introduction 
Atlantis was once envisioned as a “dream city”, where socioeconomic variables were largely 
predictable and controllable in line with apartheid planning policy (WCEC, 2008). The 
township was a direct product of a purely positivist social engineering project which 
subsequently deteriorated to a troubled township of the City of Cape Town, one which the 
Western Cape Provincial Government struggles to manage and control, both socially and 
economically. Within this seemingly dysfunctional socio-economic system there was a rare 
moment in which a sense of unity, common purpose and comradeship developed, when a 
random and largely organic advocacy process emerged from a series of emotive and 
sometimes adversarial reflections, notably those initiated by the Congress of South Africa 
Trade Unions (COSATU) affiliate, the Job Creation Trust (JCT). It started with a holding 
multi-stakeholder reflection meeting at the West Coast Environmental Cooperative (WCEC), 
which was in itself a JCT funded project (WCEC, 2010a). The meeting held on the 10th of 
July 2009, dubbed the JCT – Atlantis Economic Development Stakeholder’s Meeting was 
aimed at getting “feedback from all stakeholders regarding the economic and socio-
economic state of Atlantis” at the time (Dudley, 2009). 
This largely civil society led meeting instigated a series of activities that later created a space 
for activism and communicative action, accessible to a multiplicity of voices from NGOs 
and/or civil society movements, private business and several government departments. The 
disparate group of stakeholders had divergent views on the issues, possible solutions to the 
problems and the responsibility for fixing them. Nonetheless, the multiple role players made 
a collective commitment to freely deliberate about the prevailing socio-economic issues 
facing Atlantis, all driven by a common goal of rescuing the town from its deteriorating socio-
economic situation at the time (ASED, 2010a). As a result, a number of initiatives, networks 
and collaborations were established at local, regional and national levels, which collectively 
responded to the ongoing socio-economic decline of the town, which began in the 1990s 
despite largely progressive and transformative policy frameworks of the post-94 ANC led 
government. The study is specifically limited to the multiple events, actions and reactions of 
the different stakeholders after the 2007/8 global recession and the South African Economic 









4.4.2. Background and Context  
Planners of the ‘dream city’ of Atlantis failed to predict the interconnectedness of the socio-
economic system of Atlantis and of Cape Town, the country and the world over (Manguwo, 
2013). They narrowly defined the boundaries of the Atlantis socio-economic system through 
the framing of societies by racial segregation as espoused by the then apartheid ideology 
(WCEC, 2008). This view however overlooked the negative and positive interrelationships 
these multiple social systems could have with each other and with their immediate and 
distant environments. The largely conservative male elite, and white planners of the time, 
ignored the complex social establishments of its people blurred at the “intersections of 
racism, poverty … anti-migrant (black) sentiments” (Sandercock, 1998b). As such socio-
economic complexity in Atlantis is ongoing, daring and perplexing to say the least. Notably, 
its dynamic attributes have continued to attract a lot of attention from academics, planners, 
NGOs, activists and industrialist as well as the Provincial and National government in recent 
years. In keeping with the principles of complexity theory presented by Cilliers (1998), the 
history of a system should not be discounted in the analysis of planning issues at hand. 
Hence the next section briefly outlines the history of Atlantis to give a better understanding of 
the context. 
4.4.3. Establishing Context: A historical Profile of Atlantis 
Atlantis is a predominantly coloured town that falls within the City of Cape Town Metropolitan 
Municipal area (UrbanEcon, 2011). It is located approximately 40km outside of the Cape 
Town Central Business District (CBD), and can be accessed via the R27 or N7 roads that 
connect Cape Town to the West Coast towns of Saldana, Vredenburg and, ultimately 
Namibia. The socio-economic review carried out by ASED (2010a) highlights that Atlantis 
“was [originally] established as an industrial mecca in 1975”.  Manguwo (2013) notes that the 
apartheid Government of those days established Atlantis “as a growth point with the 
intention of improving the quality of life for the [coloured] people in the Western Cape”. It is 
also illustrated in this historical profile of Atlantis, that the town “was designed to provide 
modern homes, factories and jobs for its residents (coloureds)” as stipulated in the national 
development plan compiled by the then apartheid government (WCEC, 2008).  
In this grand vision of segregated ‘utopias’, apartheid city planners of the time functioned in 
sync with the rest of the 19th century planners, tasked to passionately design “carefully 
segregated and strictly functional urban” (Bauman, 1992) spaces. In this case, Atlantis was 









lines. The WCEC (2008) further suggests that “Atlantis was a government initiative 
developed against the backdrop of South Africa’s 20th century history” and it is within this 
rich era of growth, development and progress that the town “was built to fulfil 20th century 
apartheid objectives … strongly based on the assumption of separate development”. The 
planning objectives of the apartheid system completely ignored suggestions by Meadows 
(2001) which pointed out that, on many occasions, rational planners were often “blinded by 
the illusion of control” due to their rational assumptions of how the socio-economic systems 
should function. 
As a result of limited access to land, there was a “shortage of 60 000 houses” (WCEC, 2008) 
in the Cape Peninsula and this led to the forceful relocation of over 60 000 coloureds from 
the central city to the outskirts on the Cape Flats. This simple process of forced relocation 
ignored “a large number of [system] components” (Cilliers, 1998) and their subsequent 
interrelationships within the immediate socio-economic setup of Cape Town, such as the 
existing livelihoods and economic opportunities. As a consequence of this de-facto social 
engineering project, the “coloureds in the province were struggling economically, due to low 
wages, unemployment, and social disruptions” (Manguwo, 2013), a phenomenon that 
planted the seeds for crime and violence which is evident today in the Cape Flats and 
Atlantis.  
The WCEC (2008) further argues that a combination of all “these factors set the stage for the 
planning and development of Atlantis, which was intended to be a rational solution to all 
these [socio-economic] problems” in Cape Town and on the Cape Flats. In an attempt to 
assume total control of the multiple interactions between the various socio-economic 
subsystems that existed within Cape Town and the Cape Flats at the time, the then 
Apartheid Government felt that this ‘chaos’ had to be contained by one simple ‘linear 
solution’, in the guise of a town (Atlantis). This town had to be planned for and developed 
from scratch without any form of consultation or meaningful participation of the intended 
beneficiaries and as such, Atlantis was predetermined to be “a city that would ease the 
Cape’s housing crunch, provide employment to Coloureds, encourage separate 
development and decentralise South African industries” (ASED, 2010; Manguwo, 2013). 
However, this top-down state-led planning process had a number of unintended social, 
economic and political complexities/consequences of its own. 
Atlantis was established as a result of a few favourable components selectively focused on 









underground aquifer and relative isolation”, which made the town an ideal “location for the 
apartheid era planners, who sought to develop poorly or undeveloped areas for non-whites”. 
The WCEC (2008) also mentions that “the sandy soils of Atlantis were not ideal for farming 
purposes while the open flat terrain gave planners the chance to design a model city, the 
isolation of Atlantis was [largely seen as] politically expedient allowing the separation of 
Coloureds from the city centre of Cape Town”. The National government of the time was 
motivated by the prospects of this project and “committed a lot of resources (human and 
financial) … with the intention to limit the Coloured population to the Cape Flats and Atlantis 
itself” (Manguwo, 2013). As with any rational plan, “Atlantis was an opportunity to 
accomplish [these] multiple important goals positively without forced removals or other 
politically costly endeavours on which the other drastic apartheid schemes relied”. (WCEC, 
2008) 
The state and its agency, the Divisional Council of the Cape (Divco) were “responsible for 
the design, programming, construction and promotion of Atlantis” on behalf of its intended 
beneficiaries (Manguwo, 2013). The town was then marketed as “an active, vibrant, growing 
community [with] shopping centre, offices, a hotel, recreation halls, libraries and a full range 
of sporting facilities … [that included] 4 high schools, 11 primary schools, several crèches, a 
multisystem high school and a technical institute as well as state-assisted housing for those 
earning below R1 000 per month,  … health services and clinics [with] free expert advice in 
establishing” oneself in the town (Manguwo, 2008). These social amenities have more or 
less remained the same 35 or so years after the establishment of the town, and have in fact 
become largely insufficient in servicing the growing population of the town which now stands 
at “67 491” (CoCT, 2013).  
On the economic front, the ASED (2010a) highlights that “Atlantis was developed around the 
Atlantis Industrial Area as part of the previous government’s defence arms manufacturing 
projects and the establishment, via tax and other incentives, of clothing and textile 
industries”, which became the major employers for the majority of the people in the town. 
“The establishment of these businesses and the transport of people and goods to Cape 
Town were heavily subsidised by the apartheid government. The progress of the town 
faltered when it was challenged by the changing socio-political circumstances of the 1990s. 
The town experienced its initial economic failure during crucial period between 1975 and 
1994, putting the apartheid [planning] ideology to the test. (Manguwo, 2013). Whilst, the 
distribution of income and resources were concentrated among the minority (white 









inequality in line with the transformative possibilities and instead was an attempt to entrench 
socio-economic segregation and the notion of decentralisation.  
The Atlantis project initially relied on the idea of incentives and subsidies to attract 
businesses to the area, an approach that ignored the fact that a system consists of a large 
number of components Ciliers (1998) that interact in a dynamic way. Incidentally businesses 
responded and moved to the area, but in a case of unexpected impacts, the WCEC (2008) 
points out that 45% of these jobs were held by people from outside Atlantis. A number of the 
businesses that responded and took advantage of these incentives were also “light 
industries and manufacturing companies that were not too costly to relocate”. These same 
industries could easily close down when economic conditions became unfavourable as was 
experienced after 1994, and recently in 2008/9. Furthermore, Manguwo (2013) states that 
“the majority of the new jobs were low paying jobs” due to the fact that “until 1979 Atlantis 
was considered a rural area, [in which] companies could pay workers 15% less than they 
would in Cape Town”. ASED (2010a) suggest that “manufacturing came to an abrupt end 
when these incentive programs ended [in 1994] and the defence manufacturing contracts 
were stopped and many companies started closed up factories or permanently relocated 
their businesses elsewhere”.  
In addition, “most of the businesses and factories that existed were owned by whites and 
Indians [who] had the economic resources (needed to start businesses) that coloureds of the 
time generally lacked” (WCEC, 2008). Despite the notion of a ‘dream coloured city’ 
popularised when Atlantis was initially formed, the coloured people themselves constituted 
much of the working class relying on jobs externally created, “despite a government led 
initiative that practically encouraged or favoured Coloured ownership. Not surprisingly, a 
number of the white-collar jobs in management and engineering were occupied by people 
who commuted from outside Atlantis” a scenario that was not initially envisaged in the 
rational planning processes of the town, yet persists to date (Manguwo, 2013).  
4.4.4. Recent Socio-Economic Issues 
The town of Atlantis was projected to grow and estimated to provide residence to 500 000 
people by 2010 (WCEC, 2008). Conservative estimates at the time, expected the population 
to reach approximately, 250 000, which was however disproved by the 2011 National census 
which established the population of Atlantis was in fact 67 491 people. It also noted that the 









2013). According to ASED (2010a), 44% of the population was younger than 19 years old 
and this combined with 6% of persons older than 55 years, put the dependent population of 
the town at over 50% of the total in 2010/11. Furthermore, 50, 4% of its population earned 
between R1000 – R3200 a month (CoCT, 2011a:4) a situation that made the effects of an 
already high unemployment level untenable (AIGTT, 2011:3). The town has over time 
experienced an unusually high unemployment rate estimated to be between 30-35% (ASED, 
2010a:7), which was above the national figure of 25%. However, the unofficial sources cited 
by ASED (2010f) state that the unemployment figure of the town could be as high as 64%”.  
Such high levels of unemployment fuelled an increase in crime and violence in the town. 
According to the AIGTT (2011:3) this unusually high level of unemployment, particularly 
youth unemployment had implications in terms of the “escalation [of youth] crime, gang 
activities, drug abuse and domestic violence, to name a few, in the area”. Additional 
consequences of the high unemployment levels highlighted by the CoCT (2011e:1); include, 
“increased food insecurity, inability to pay for municipal services (water, electricity) and the 
demise of the social fabric of the society” which made the town of Atlantis an unfavourable 
destination for both local and national investment. According to World Vision Atlantis (2011) 
an NGO that focuses its interventions on the plight of the poor and children in the area, 
“crime and drugs fuelled by unemployment are the main causes of social dysfunction in the 
town”. The organisation attributed the high rate of child neglect, child abuse and violence 
against women to an increased loss of the sense of community. The organisation also 
argued that the “social fabric of the town [was] seriously being eroded” and this was directly 
linked to the proliferation of illegal and informal business such as the trade in drugs and 
alcohol that was now a common feature of the township culture. The illegal sales of drugs 
and alcohol fuelled the vicious cycle of poverty and the level of destitution in the town. Easy 
access to cheap drugs and alcohol by the unemployed, and mostly youths, condemn them to 
a cycle of perpetual poverty and dependency. 
To that effect, the Atlantis Inter-Governmental Task Team (AIGTT) (2011:3) noted that 
Atlantis was “a distressed area that [was] catapulted into long-term economic decline given 
the continued loss of business and jobs in the area”. In addition, the global recession of 
2008/9 which had both regional and national implications also negatively “impacted … the 
local industries”, especially the manufacturing sector that historically been the backbone of 
Atlantis (ASED, 2010a). The manufacturing sector shrunk (continues to shrink) with major 
companies such as “Arwa Consortium, Herdmans, 23 Sportswear, Novel Textiles and Novel 









textile and electronic industries completely shutting their doors and leaving thousands of 
semi-skilled Atlantis residents jobless between 2008 – 2010 (ASED, 2010a). This downward 
spiral in the socio-economic status of the town is directly correlated to the rise in cases of 
crime such as common assault, robbery, burglary and theft, which were noted to be on the 
rise by the Western Cape South Africa Police Service (SAPS) (2010:1).  
To make a dire situation worse, the township of Atlantis is physically isolated from the City of 
Cape Town metro and by extension from the economic hub of the province (ASED, 2010a). 
The once easily controllable town that epitomised order in the 1970s, has become 
increasingly volatile with the police failing to control the rising gang violence and crime within 
its once orderly streets (Manguwo, 2013).  
4.5. Atlantis Revitalisation Framework Planning Process  
The largely progressive policy and legislative landscape of South Africa (highlighted above) 
is largely mismatched by the socio-economic reality in the township, the implied socio-
economic benefits, not reflected in the current state of Atlantis. The complex interplay of 
planning issues in the township amid particularly by high levels of unemployment (33%) 
(ASED, 2010a; WCEC, 2010a) has been attributed squarely to the closure of a number of 
factories within the Atlantis Industrial area. This perplexing and worsening reality instigated a 
growing sense of alarm and shared concern from the majority of stakeholders in Atlantis. 
The Job Creation Trust Fund (JCT) was the first to act in July 2009 (Dudley, 2009). It 
approached the West Coast Environmental Co-operative (WCEC) (an environmental co-
operative based in Atlantis, established in 2001), to discuss future collaborations and to play 
a central role in addressing the worsening plight of Atlantis’ people suffering from extremely 
high levels of poverty, inequality and a worsening culture of crime and violence (WCEC, 
2010a).  
In July 2009, it was decided that the WCEC should spearhead a process of establishing a 
working group representative of all the key role-players in Atlantis, inclusive of Civil Society, 
Labour and Business (Dudley, 2009). The mandate of this working group was to come up 
with a list of bankable economic opportunities that the JCT as funder could get directly 
involved in (Dudley, 2010a). The JCT could also leverage its national influence to bring other 
funding agencies onboard to channel their resources to Atlantis and assist in retaining 
existing jobs and creating new employment opportunities (WCEC, 2010a). In January 2010, 









meetings were held in Atlantis (Dudley 2010a; 2010b; ASED, 2010b). Various stakeholders 
from civil society, particularly the JCT affiliated unions, including COSATU, SACTWU, 
SATAWU and various businesses in distress at the time, participated (ASED, 2010b). The 
WCEC co-ordinated and chaired the meetings and ensured that all relevant stakeholders 
with an interest in the process were invited. The two local councillors and the Member of 
Parliament (MP) for the area were also invited but opted not to participate in the process due 
to the political nature of the issues and their allegiance to their political party, the Democratic 
Alliance (DA) (Dudley, 2010b). The process was perceived to be biased towards their 
political opponent, the ANC, due to the various ANC affiliates that initiated and participated 
in the advocacy process from the beginning. By extension, the CoCT and the PGWC under 
the political leadership of the DA, were initially not interested or invested in the discursive 
political process that developed at the time. 
4.5.1. Issues Identification 
The participating business stakeholders highlighted that they were experiencing huge 
financial challenges with implications for their workforce including layoffs and/or putting 
workers on short-time (ASED, 2010a). They also highlighted the need for ‘technical 
processing graduates and a skilled workforce locally’ to address the challenge of firms hiring 
skilled workers from other countries instead of locals. They further stressed the need to bring 
back apprenticeships (especially female apprentices) in order to improve the skills base of 
the town. On the civil society front, COSATU indicated that there was a major concern within 
the metal industries sector, due to multiple company closures. Its members expressed 
displeasure with the increasing number of labour brokers, blamed for contributing to further 
job losses. SACTWU indicated that over 2000 jobs had been shed since June 2009, citing a 
number of companies that had shut their doors in Atlantis such as Desiree Quilted and SA 
Fine among others (WCEC, 2010a). They also mentioned that Herdmans, L’uomo and 
Vrede Textiles were on the brink of closure at the time, highlighting the need for a deeper 
relationship between unions, workers and companies to avert further job losses, particularly 
through strategic government support. SATAWU members also mentioned the increasing 
challenges faced by the transport sector due to overcrowding of transport operators, and 
also expressed concern with the BRT system and its perceived contribution towards job 
losses in the industry (ASED, 2010a). 
On the other hand, local leaders and local activists, (among them influential ex-politicians, 









general community members) were largely concerned about the social implications of the 
increasing unemployment (ASED, 2010e). As indicated, the job losses were directly linked to 
the erosion of the “social fabric of the town” (World Vision South Africa, 2011). This state of 
affairs was directly linked to the proliferation of illegal and informal business such as the 
trade in drugs and alcohol, that have since become a common facet of the township culture. 
By extension, the levels of unemployment (particularly youth unemployment) was a direct 
driver of the rapid increase in youth crime and complex gang activities, often linked to 
substance abuse (drugs and alcohol). In addition, levels of domestic violence and other 
social crimes often linked to poverty, also increased (AIGTT, 2011). As such, the majority of 
the township population was classified as indigent due to “increased food insecurity, inability 
to pay for municipal services (water, electricity) and the demise of the social fabric” (CoCT, 
2011e:1). 
4.5.2. Stakeholder Engagement and Political Influence 
All the stakeholders involved in the COSATU Job Creation Trust meetings agreed that 
Atlantis was in urgent need of a turnaround strategy. An urgent call was made by both 
COSATU and a reputable ex-ANC MP to revive the now defunct Atlantis Development 
Forum (ADF) (Dudley, 2010b). The ADF was suggested as a suitable structure to bring 
together all the stakeholders interested and affected by the plight of Atlantis, including the 
local municipality, councillors, business sector and civil society. Through this ADF, it was 
proposed that funding be sourced and a group of specialists recruited to assist with the 
research and marketing of the collective’s objectives. The WCEC COO was appointed on 
the 4th of February 2010 to lead and facilitate the deliberative process necessary to map the 
way forward. As a result of the pressing socio-economic issues identified, four urgent 
objectives were prioritised:  
• An immediate rescue plan for companies and businesses in Atlantis which required 
immediate assistance to prevent retrenchments and/or closure; 
• An in-depth investigation into the economic drivers to understand the macro and 
micro economic environment, the companies in Atlantis; 
• A current skills audit to establish the available skills and the type of skills required by 
local industries, and 









These actionable tasks were also in line with the JCT 2009 stakeholder meeting resolutions, 
thus depicting the influence of civil society (Unions and local leaders) (Dudley, 2009; WCEC, 
2010b). Furthermore, the need to strategically engage other stakeholders, especially 
government agencies and departments, such as the Department of Economic Development, 
the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), the Industrial Development Cooperation (IDC), 
the Development Bank of South Africa (DBSA), the WCPG and the CoCT, was underscored 
(Dudley, 2010b). However, due to a lack of traction and inconsistent participation by 
members of the original COSATU JCT group in the follow-up planning meetings, a decision 
was made to aggressively consult with the local councillors, business and government 
officials and to co-opt the Western Cape COSATU mother body to provide leadership and 
political influence.  
In subsequent meetings, the then Western Cape COSATU Secretary General, Tony 
Ehrenreich was robbed into the deliberations, which attracted the attention of a high-
powered national government delegation that later committed time and resources towards 
addressing the worsening plight in Atlantis (ASED, 2010b). Notable players that were 
engaged included Ebrahim Patel – Minister of Economic Development, Rob Davies - 
Minister of Trade and Industry and the director of the CCMA. These individuals were 
strategically targeted to commit and participate in a consultative meeting on Atlantis due 
their political influence and national roles in the economic cluster. At the local level, a 
number of stakeholders including Fred Gona the then MP for the area and Dan the then 
Mayor for the CoCT were also invited to contribute to the deliberations. On the 5th of March 
2010, a high-powered delegation that included the above-mentioned government Ministers 
and the Director of the CCMA was hosted in Atlantis. Various participants from local civil 
society, among them the WCEC, COSATU SACTWU, World Vision, AYDEF and the majority 
of businesses in distress, were present (ASED, 2010b). 
This delegation convened a press conference after the highly charged deliberations were 
concluded. A number of resolutions and tangible commitments were made, including the 
request put forward by Minister Patel that the local stakeholders put together a Task Team 
(ASED, 2010a). Its role was to immediately come up with a possible rescue plan for 
companies in distress and report back to the Ministers, who would then ascertain where and 
what interventions were required from the economic cluster by the end of March 2010. The 
Task Team, later named the Atlantis Socio-Economic Development (ASED) Task Team, was 









from civil society (amongst them COSATU, SACTWU, WCEC) and some respected 
community leaders who were once active in the labour and political movements. It was then 
agreed that the WCEC, in collaboration with the other ASED Task Team members, should 
take the lead in putting together a comprehensive economic development strategy for 
Atlantis detailing the following objectives: 
 
I. Drafting a rescue plan for companies in distress that require immediate interventions, 
not only for the short term, but also for the medium to long term; 
II. Conducting an in-depth investigation into the Macro and Micro Economic drivers of 
the local, national and international economy;  
III. Conducting a skills audit on the current skills base available but also on what skills 
will be needed for the future and then device a Skills Development Strategy based 
on the needs-assessment; 
IV. Developing a marketing and promotions strategy that will promote Atlantis as a 
preferred Investment destination, also addressing the negative image and 
disinformation around Atlantis portrayed by the media and other individuals;  
V. Hosting a high-level Conference with all stakeholders inclusive of all spheres of 
Government and its Agencies, and;  
VI. Establish a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) to act as the mouth piece for 
Development and Promotion as well as to receive and disburse funds for Economic 
development in Atlantis. (ASED, 2010a) 
In his communication the Western Cape Secretary General for COSATU emphasised with 
ASED that the area required immediate attention as he called for the urgent “development of 
the recovery plan”, stating that the plan had to consider both the economic and social 
difficulties in the area (Ehrenreich, 2010). He reminded the multi-stakeholder task team to 
remain “mindful of the historical factors that led to the establishment of Atlantis”, in their 
analysis. Despite having made valuable inputs to in the documentation, planning and 
coordination aspects of the process at the time through my WCEC role, I wasn’t officially part 
of the ASED task team as yet. I was however later on co-opted by the COO of WCEC and 
other task team members to officially play a role in research, planning and communication 
for the ASED task team. In that period, a number of focus group meetings were conducted to 
obtain valuable input for the Draft Atlantis Economic Plan from civil society, labour and local 
business. On the 30th of March 2010 the WCEC assumed the Secretariat role for the ASED 









the above objectives. However, the task team opted not to commit to it due to lack of trust 
among the role players (WCEC, 2010a).  
Despite the lack of resources (financial and human) both for the WCEC and the Task Team, 
my involvement in the task-team immediately became more defined. Due to my experience 
in the research and documentation of the Atlantis Historical Profile as well as the Tourism 
Inventory that I developed within the WCEC, I soon started contributing directly to the 
process through the provision of background research (WCEC, 2008). To that effect, I 
presented a case study to the task team that detailed a similar process in the Eastern Cape 
published in the Big News of April 2010, Edition 155 (Manguwo, 2010a). The case study 
outlined the role played by the Eastern Cape Economic Development and Environmental 
Affairs Department (DEDEA) and highlighted various differences and similarities between 
the two areas. Both areas experienced job losses and factory closures, and were previously 
disadvantaged with the majority of people being black and/or coloured, as in the case of 
Atlantis. However, it was also noted that the Eastern Cape process had political buy-in as it 
was supported at the Provincial Executive Council level by Mcebisi Jonas, who led DEDEA, 
whereas in Atlantis, the councillors and the MP for the area chose not to participate in the 
various stakeholder workshops intended to put together a rescue plan, for the area. It 
seemed that political allegiance to the DA and towing the political line was more important, 
than being collectively involved with their political opponents in addressing the plight of 
Atlantis and its people. By extension, Local and Provincial government involvement and 
commitment to the Atlantis rescue process was inevitably limited to existing programmes 
and social services and lacked any meaningful participation of local stakeholders. 
4.5.3. Role of State Departments and Agencies 
The Atlantis Socio-Economic Review (ASER) (2010) document was produced without the 
participation of either the CoCT or the PGWC (ASED, 2010a). It provided an overview of the 
social and economic status of Atlantis and the proposed rescue strategy as understood by 
the ASED Task Team. It featured much of my previous research work on the Historical 
Profile of Atlantis and a desktop analysis of the pressing issues identified by the 
stakeholders as reflected in official documents and public media. In April 2010, the task team 
initiated a meeting with the Western Cape Provincial Department of Economic Development 
and Tourism (DEDAT) to discuss the content of the Atlantis Socio-Economic Review (ASER) 
(2010) and to establish what interventions were available or feasible from the Provincial 









together come up with a number of interventions to be workshopped by all stakeholders in 
Atlantis. However, neither DEDAT or the CoCT provided sufficient feedback and 
commitment to enable the proposed rescue process forward in any meaningful way (PGWC, 
2010a; WCEC, 2010a). The task team agreed that the proposed response from the CoCT 
and DEDAT were nothing more than an information sharing process in which pamphlets and 
fact sheets detailing DEDAT support services/areas of assistance (including the VuthaMlilo 
Regional Economic Development Programme on research, SMME development and 
support, skills development, sector development, Trade and development through 
WESGRO, Tourism development and promotion (and CTRU), Liquor regulation and 
Licensing, Access to social development services and more), were shared (ASED, 2010d; 
2010e). These programmes were already known and were insufficient to address the 
systemic challenges that were outlined in the rescue strategy. 
The CoCT was not to be outdone in their myopic response, as it sought to educate the task 
team on the underlying factors that explained why Atlantis was in such a mess. It noted that 
“the alarming economic decline in Atlantis [was] caused by multiple factors such as 
globalisation, structural economic deficiencies, the current world-wide-economic 
crisis/recession, industrial inefficiencies, ad-hoc and unsustainable government interventions 
and a lack of local community coherency”. As if to restate its constitutional obligations, the 
CoCT reaffirmed that, as “a local authority”, it was “obliged to play a pivotal role in local 
economic development through the provision of economic infrastructure (roads, bulk service 
infrastructure) and services (e.g. water, electricity, land use management) combined with 
social services that enhance human capital development (e.g. health services, sport and 
recreational facilities)” (WCEC, 2010a).  
Given this a context, the CoCT highlighted that it could make the following contributions 
towards the socio-economic rescue of Atlantis: social assistance to the unemployed through 
its Council’s Indigent Policy that included free water and sanitation, free electricity, a rebate 
on refuse removal tariffs and a  debt moratorium, an Indigent Grant Table was also shared to 
clarify the available assistance. In terms of business support, the CoCT proposed “Possible 
Business Retention Measures” which included: deferment of service payments, rebate on 
services accounts, partial exemption from or deferment of property tax. Also included was 
the support programme for emergent and small business through the Business Development 
voucher Programme, Informal Trading Management, Library Business Corners, Red Doors 
and Business Places”. Other notable forms of support mentioned was the Urban Agricultural 









themselves. This agriculture assistance package included “access to land, basic 
infrastructure, tools, production inputs (seeds, compost) and training” (WCEC, 2010a).    
The largely top down and linear responses and lack of consultative dialogue in the planning 
process of these interventions were contrary to the CoCT governance principles. The CoCT 
states that “successful local economic development is a concurrent responsibility of many 
role-players including government (all three spheres), business, labour and civil society” 
(CoCT, 2011e). Hence its inability to engage in constructive dialogue with the ASED task 
team was seen as ‘distasteful’ and anti-progress. It contradicted the CoCT’s own values 
stating that “the desired local economic objectives will only be satisfactorily achieved if all 
relevant role-players assign appropriate urgency and resources and the strategic 
interventions are sustained over the longer term” (CoCT, 2011e). Both the CoCT and WCPG 
failed to assign appropriate agency at the time, instead choosing instrumental rationality and 
a re-education of the non-state actors on how government works and what was available.  
In seeking further political buy-in and support, the ASED task team updated the ASER 
(2010) document (ASED, 2010d). They shared the new document titled ‘Atlantis Spatial 
Economic Development Plan’ (2010), which incorporated the two distinct but equally 
pedestrian inputs from both DEDAT and CoCT with that of the National Department of 
Economic Development (DoED) (ASED 2010e). This move evoked an immediate political 
response from the then Economic Development Minister, Ebrahim Patel who engaged the 
task team to provide support and impetus to addressing the plight of Atlantis. The National 
Minister provided a comprehensive response to the ASED task team document via the 18th 
of June 2010 “Aide Memoir” which highlighted the decisions and way forward, as agreed 
between the Minister and the Atlantis Task Team (Economic Development Department, 
2010a).  A set of tangible steps were identified, including the establishing of defensive 
measures for Atlantis industries, identifying growth opportunities for Atlantis, roadshows for 
government departments and agencies, and a conference in Atlantis, to publicly launch the 
measures. This exercise required the task team to provide a complete list of all businesses 
in Atlantis, and to identify all businesses in distress. It also proposed the hosting of a 
strategic planning workshop via the facilitation of an influential state agency such as the 
DBSA or IDC. This planning workshop would be aimed at brainstorming spatial development 
planning, identification of potential areas of growth (sectors), identification of opportunities 
for investment; both public (infrastructure and services) and private, which the ASED task 









outcome of this planning process was to come up with a comprehensive list of ideas 
disaggregated for their readiness for implementation.  
Minister Patel also appointed Ms Setepane Mohale from his office to liaise with the Task 
Team and other role players like the JCT and the DBSA to assist with the roll-out of the plan 
(Economic Development Department, 2010a). This robust and initiative from National 
Government prompted the Western Cape MEC for Economic Development (Minister Alan 
Winde) to act and meet with the ASED Task Team to further clarify the PGWC’s input, its 
proposed interventions and the way forward. It was also agreed that the Task Team should 
request Ms Mohale to conduct a pre-planning meeting with the ASED Task team, WCPG, 
CoCT, JCT and DBSA to identify and invite all the key stakeholders to a meeting aimed at 
establishing a working group to drive the rescue process and come up with a comprehensive 
rescue plan for the area, as stated in Minister Patel’s “aide memoir”. This working group 
included Mr John Peters from DEDAT, met a number of times and prepared for the all-
stakeholders planning workshop. DEDAT’s involvement led to the prioritisation and 
commitment of state resources to the rescue plan (WCEC, 2010b).  
4.5.4. The Atlantis Socio-Economic Planning Workshop 
The Atlantis socio-economic planning workshop was held on the 16th of August 2010, with 
participation from a wide range of stakeholders representing over 15 government 
departments and government agencies, 8 strategic partners such as banks, over 21 local 
businesses, 3 local labour unions, 18 civil society members and over 16 different community 
players who were either affected by and/or interested in the process (ASED, 2010f). A total 
of 104 stakeholders participated in the deliberations which were expected to: identify 
potential growth opportunities for Atlantis and its environs; develop a spatial development 
plan; identify potential areas or sectors of growth; highlight opportunities for investment in 
public (infrastructure and services), as well as private investment (Economic Development 
Department, 2010b). The DBSA was initially selected as the agency to lead the 
brainstorming session, however due to the political nature of the deliberations, the more 
experienced COSATU Western Cape Secretary General ended up chairing and facilitated 
the process (ASED, 2010f).  
Whilst the deliberations did not change much because of the involvement of skilled 
facilitators, the role played by COSATU in facilitating the planning, “informed by particular 









existing plans that were discussed and developed by ASED in advance. The ASED 
representatives from business, labour and civil society made detailed presentations, 
highlighting which highlighted their views and expectations from the planning process. This 
was immediately followed by sector-specific planning sessions intentionally guided by the 
research input from WCEC and the ASED task team (ASED, 2010f). Prior to the planning 
workshop, the WCEC and the ASED task team developed a comprehensive thematic 
planning document that identified 15 thematic areas from Land, Agriculture (commercial 
agriculture and urban agriculture), Green Energy, Tourism and Environment, Housing, 
Health and Social Amenities, Education and Youth Development, Cooperatives and SMME’s 
Development and Support, Skills and Business Development, Business Rescue Process, 
Procurement, Transport and Communication, Atlantis Foundries, Clothing, Textiles, footwear 
and Leather Sector, Funding, Planning and Implementation (ASED 2010g). As an outcome 
of the Atlantis Socio-Economic Planning Workshop, a strategic blueprint document was 
developed, which identified issues, envisaged responses and specific representatives to 
enact these responses (ASED, 2010f). Whilst the final document reflected the various 
interests of the Task Team members, the discursive process that produced it, exposed the 
inherent challenges around trust, hidden agendas, individual interests, skills and/or capacity 
issues, political influence, divergent values, and to a certain extent the questionable ethics of 
the stakeholders. Nonetheless, this planning workshop process was useful in clarifying the 
substantive issues, mapping various interests, getting agreement on pressing issues, the 
identifying tangible solutions and most importantly responsible individuals and agencies 
required to act with urgency.  
4.5.5. Follow-up Actions 
In mid-August 2010, a detailed workshop report titled the Atlantis Spatial Economic 
Development Workshop (2010) was produced by ASED (2010f). This was immediately 
followed by an “aide memoir” from EDD dated the 25th of August 2010 (Economic 
Development Department, 2010b). The aide memoir from the EDD officials explicitly 
unpacked each thematic area as deliberated in the planning workshop, including the 
identification of government stakeholders, mandated to respond to the issues raised. A 
follow-up meeting between the ASED task team and the IDC officials was immediately 
conducted at the WCEC offices in Atlantis (WCEC, 2010c). They highlighted the need to 
carry out a comprehensive audit of the town in addition to the work that the task team had 









its consultancies. This audit would be a “comprehensive current analysis of Atlantis” which 
would include: 
• Assets audit of the town –assets registry of the area; 
• Skills audit (identification of artisans and local skills in the town); 
• Economic activities in the town and GDP output; 
• Social needs assessment, and 
• Relationships between business and the community.   
In addition, the IDC team informed the ASED task team about the IDC run programmes or 
interventions targeting businesses in distress, which included the “Business Retention and 
Expansion Programme that targets existing businesses looking at their expansion”. Other 
issues that were highlighted include the fact that “targeted or specific issues [should] be 
taken up for further development instead of a blanket development approach, and that the 
ASED task team should be formalised into a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) which would act 
as an intermediate structure between business and the municipality in terms of looking at: 
• Land rationalisation; 
• Consolidation of the revitalisation of Atlantis, and 
• Unlocking of the buffer zone between residential and industrial land. 
At the provincial level, the IDC identified the “promotion and integration of development 
along the West Coast region as well as social inclusion of the community into the local 
economy”. The IDC also emphasised the development of trust among developers through 
transparent and honest cooperation or collaboration and encourage the unlocking of 
resources for the development process. It was recommended that a steering Committee 
(National, provincial, CoCT, Task-Team/SPV) be established to oversee the provision of 
resources and evaluate and monitor the deliverables. This would be preceded by the 
development and establishment of clear Terms of Reference for the Steering Committee, 
prior to any resources being allocated. Further discussion on the way forward was 
conditional to the submission, to the IDC, of all working documents produced by the task 
team including the Rescue Strategy, the thematic planning document, the planning 










4.5.6. Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) 
Due to differences in strategy and the vested interests exhibited by the ASED task team 
members themselves, there was no agreement on the appropriate model for the special 
purpose vehicle. As a result, three different models were proposed and circulated 
electronically. These proposed models included the proposal for an Agency from the unions, 
the Atlantis Development Forum (ADF) from an ex-politician and community leader, a 
development association named Atlantis Socio-economic Development Association 
(ASEDA), as proposed by me (Manguwo, 2010b) and the Atlantis Socio-economic 
Development Secondary Cooperative (ASEDSCO) as proposed by the COO of the WCEC 
(ASED, 2010i). Whilst the team agreed on a definite structure that included a chairperson 
and representative members of civil society, labour and business, the rift and bickering 
among its various members worsened. This tension led to individual proposals being tabled 
to various government entities at different times with individual members claiming to be 
acting on behalf of the task team and by extension the community. Bothered by this self-
serving culture that had replaced, what was once a unified front, I wrote the Atlantis Socio-
Economic Development Process progress report for the period 16 August to 25 November 
2010, reminding the role players of our initial mandate and the need for transparency and 
unity of purpose (ASED, 2010j). To that effect, I also shared a position paper that I wrote, 
reminding the group of the original objectives of this exercise and how important it was to 
return to the open plenary and give feedback on the progress thus far. To my surprise, I 
received a heavy lashing and a stern political lecture from the ex-politicians and community 
leaders involved. The stakes were simply too high and the noise from a young and 
inexperienced individual who was not a ‘local’, was deemed unnecessary. Apart from the 
heavy tongue lashing and bashing on my character the calls for transparency and unit of 
purpose were noted but not immediately acted on. They were simply ignored and brushed 
aside as the players targeted their allies in the system to strategically swing the resources 
towards their vested interests.  
This lack of a coherent strategy by the ASED task team created a prolonged period of 
inaction between August and December 2010 which immediately tipped the balance of 
power towards the PGWC and the CoCT. In December 2010, DEDAT hastily called the task 
team for a briefing session during which members were informed of and introduced to 
Urban-Econ Consultancy responsible for consolidating and prioritisation of the proposed 
projects in Atlantis (PGWC, 2010b). Whilst, this development came as a shock to the Task 









become common practice for South African scientists, academics and professional 
researchers to be drawn into the [planning and] policy formation process as drafters of policy 
documents and background ‘research papers’”. I reasoned that if one had carefully read the 
IDC follow-up meeting notes that I produced, it would have been clear that the need for an 
outside consultant, with expertise to analyse economic trends on behalf of the Task Team, 
was already proposed and strongly supported by the IDC representatives (Manguwo, 
2010b). As such, this ‘consultant’ was to be perceived as a neutral player, disposing of 
advanced tools and techniques to develop actionable project analysis and prioritisation 
scales, as argued by the IDC. In my view, the pre-condition as set by IDC, to take 
possession of all the Task Team documents (minutes, reports, research, briefs etc) was 
tantamount to the task team selling its claim to the ideas, insights and plans contained 
therein. Once that was done, the influential role the ASED task team once played (based on 
the information and knowledge they created and possessed) simply dissipated as the Task 
Team quickly turned into a bystander, to be consulted as and when necessary. 
4.5.7. Atlantis Project Prioritisation – Urban-Econ Consultancy 
Immediately after the briefing session by DEDAT (PGWC, 2010b), Urban-Econ engaged 
directly with the ASED task team, sharing its organisational profile and a project proposal 
that highlighted its mandate (Urban Econ, 2010a; 2010b). Its Terms of Reference (TOR) 
were to “prioritise credible economic development projects to meet development objectives 
in the Atlantis area and determine the roles of various spheres of government in the 
implementation thereof”. In terms of the Urban-Econ brief, the exercise had three objectives:  
I. Consolidating existing information documents, strategies and plans that 
existed for the Atlantis area and to formulate a comprehensive inventory of all 
economic development projects desired for the area; 
II. Assessing, on a high level, the potential viability and impact of each project in 
order to determine which projects are the most realistic and strategic to 
implement, and 
III. To highlight the critical role players and inputs required to take each prioritised 
project further, specifically, the roles and responsibilities of the various spheres 
of government which needed to be clarified for each prioritised project, as well 
as how these projects and roles can be integrated in a coordinated and 









The Atlantis Integrated Project Implementation Framework (2011) also known as the Project 
Prioritisation and Integrated Implementation Framework for the Socio-Economic 
Revitalisation of the Atlantis Area was produced by Urban-Econ (UrbanEcon, 2011). It 
carried out a comprehensive review of existing documents and particularly the thematic 
report from the Planning workshop. It then developed a project database and ran what it 
called a prioritisation model, to determine the highest impact and most viable projects for 
implementation. The findings of the prioritisation model were workshopped to ASED task 
team before a second workshop was organised to present the finalised model in May 2011. 
The final report also included a detailed implementation framework which stated clear roles 
and responsibilities for the integrated implementation of priority projects and other supporting 
and/or enabling activities. A final presentation to the ASED Task Team and key stakeholders 
was conducted. This created tensions, with some ASED members claiming that the CoCT 
had co-opted certain members of the movement and subjected original priorities to those 
already decided by both the CoCT and the PGWC. 
Urban-Econ concluded that “the enablers of socio-economic revitalisation (institutional 
capacity, policy and legislation, information and studies, various services and infrastructure) 
coincided with the mandates of various spheres and departments of government as required 
in a developmental state, aiming to improve the quality of life and economic opportunities in 
the Atlantis area”. It noted that these institutional and policy enablers are often “the pre-
requisites of the new economic activity opportunities”. (UrbanEcon, 2011) This “professional” 
opinion swiftly shifted power from ASED to CoCT and PGWC which immediately started to 
spearhead the process. 
4.5.8. The City of Cape Town and Revitalisation Framework for Atlantis (2012) 
After the Urban-Econ report was workshopped and shared with various stakeholders, its 
findings and recommendations, (specifically the one that highlighted the fact that “the 
enablers of socio-economic revitalisation … fit with the mandates of various spheres and 
departments of government”), (UrbanEcon, 20011) prompted the CoCT to suddenly become 
active in the process (CoCT, 2011a). In June 2011, the CoCT sought urgent “approval from 
the Council, to apply for funding from the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) to carry 
out a business retention and expansion study in Atlantis” (CoCT, 2011c). It acknowledged 
that “the Atlantis crisis had been recognised by all three spheres of government”, adding that 
an “intergovernmental task team had been established to develop and implement a rescue 









members who associated the move with a manipulation of ASED mandates and interests. 
However, it was only later in July 2011, that the Mayoral Committee sought to “obtain 
approval for the establishment of two inter-governmental structures between the City of 
Cape Town and the Provincial Government of the Western Cape, in order to ensure better 
policy and administrative co-ordination between the two spheres of government” (CoCT, 
2011b). On the 3rd of August 2011, the Executive Mayor and members of the mayoral 
committee recommended the establishment of two Intergovernmental Sector Committees, 
namely the Intergovernmental Sector Committee on Economic Growth and Development 
and the Intergovernmental Sector Committee on Social Inclusion and Development.  
The Terms of Reference (TOR) for the Intergovernmental Sector Committee on Economic 
Growth and Development stated that it was a committee “jointly chaired by the Deputy 
Mayor and the Special Advisor to the Premier”. It would meet once a month and a 
Secretariat for the Intergovernmental Sector Committee on Economic Growth and 
Development would be “provided by the Province and for the Intergovernmental Sector 
Committee on Social Inclusion and Development by the City”. As such, the “respective 
secretariats would be responsible for arranging meetings, sending out agendas, taking and 
distributing minutes, and co-ordinating inputs and other functions as might arise from time to 
time”. (CoCT, 2011b)  
In the same month, the CoCT also recommended that “the Mayoral Committee support, and 
recommend to Council, the proposed process for the establishment of a Green Technology 
Manufacturing Cluster on land owned by the City in the Atlantis industrial area” (CoCT, 
2011d). The ASED task team called an urgent meeting to discuss the new developments 
and voice their reservations. The proposed Green Technology Manufacturing Cluster in 
Atlantis was motivated as the ideal location for a green manufacturer (with a range of 
economic benefits) conservatively estimated to create “up to 2200 blue collar jobs … and an 
economic impact of around R3, 125 billion in the Western Cape”. Based on the potential 
economic impact and job opportunities, the City's Property Management Department in 
conjunction with Wesgro and Greencape, recommended the establishment of a Green 
Manufacturing Cluster in Atlantis, Cape Town. This was aimed at attracting “investments in 
the manufacturing industry, required to supply components for utility-scale renewable energy 
projects because of the imminent approval by the National Department of Energy of power 
purchase agreements that would lead to the establishment of a number of renewable energy 









The above policy processes were crucial as precursors to the discussion on the Proposed 
Framework for the Revitalisation and Development of Atlantis as developed in August 2011. 
After several deliberations involving various players, the Atlantis Inter-Governmental Task 
Team (2011) produced its Draft Atlantis Revitalisation Framework document (CoCT, 2011e). 
The proposed framework was immediately shared with the ASED task team members to 
solicit their input. References in the proposed framework included the Atlantis Spatial 
Economic Development Workshop Final Report (2010) and the Atlantis Integrated Project 
Implementation Framework (2011), prepared by the ASED Task Team and Urban-Econ 
respectively as part of the multiple studies reviewed by the CoCT to produce its strategic 
framework (Atlantis Intergovernmental Task Team, 2011). The proposed framework 
highlighted that Atlantis was “potentially a significant industrial node in both Cape Town and 
the broader regional spatial economy. It also noted that its long-term economic decline 
reduces the impact that catalytic developments such as the Saldanha industrial development 
zone may have along the West Coast and broader Cape Town city region, thus, weakening 
the region’s economic competitiveness and long-term growth trajectory. The proposed ARF 
stated that there was a “growing consensus that [the] revitalisation of Atlantis required a 
partnership approach, drawing on government, business, industry, labour, and civil society to 
introduce decisive and integrated interventions to address Atlantis’s rapid socio-economic 
decline in the immediate-term, and facilitating economic recovery and growth over the 
medium- to long-term”. 
The proposed ARF aimed “to articulate a constructive and meaningful working relationship 
where responsibilities between/among the key stakeholders (government, business, and civil 
society) are agreed and shared, to enable successful implementation of the strategies and 
actions for the revitalisation and subsequent growth and development of Atlantis”. The 
proposed ARF document highlighted four key aspects:  
 
i. Key role-players were identified and described, with comprehensive terms of 
reference for each of the structures proposed (to provide substantive and meaningful 
roles and responsibilities to these bodies); 
ii. A description of the proposed Framework and how it would operate, was followed by 
a look at the working relationships for implementation, the proposed implementation 
vehicle and methodology (i.e. the phased approach); 
iii. The framework approach to project and programme development was proposed in 









interventions identified to kick-start the consultation and discussions around 
implementation, and  
iv. Existing or planned sector or spatial strategies and their relationship or linkage to the 
proposed framework were clarified within specific sector or spatial strategies finding 
place and feeding into the overarching proposed Framework. 
In September 2011, the CoCT Council recommended that “the Mayco, in principle support 
the Atlantis Revitalisation Framework”, and sought approval from the Executive Mayoral 
Committee “for the Inter-governmental Steering Committee to embark on a public 
consultation process to finalise the framework and compile action plans for focused 
interventions”. The role and responsibilities of the ASED task team had been weakened and 
the subsequent consultations were a mere formality. In May 2012, the CoCT City Manager 
Achmat Ebrahim, issued an invitation to an information session focusing on the Atlantis 
Revitalisation Framework (CoCT, 2012). It was stated in the invitation, that the “City of Cape 
Town’s Economic and Human Development Department, in collaboration with the Provincial 
Department of Finance, Economic Development and Tourism and the National Department 
of Economic Development, had developed the Atlantis Revitalisation Framework – a 
document which would guide the re-development of this important industrial area”. The 
ASED task team and the role it played prior to the development of the ARF was however not 
recognised. This scheduled public information session would introduce “the draft framework 
to the … members of the public, business, civic society and interested parties”. The press 
release also noted that the Atlantis Revitalisation Framework articulated “a constructive and 
meaningful working relationship between/among key stakeholders, i.e. government, 
business and civil society, where responsibility is agreed upon and shared to enable the 
successful implementation of strategies and actions”.  
In addition, “hard copies of the framework [were] also made available at the information 
session” and various public facilities, such as the Avondale library, Thusong centre, Mamre 
library, etc. The consultation process was merely a formality, as studying the information and 
reflecting on its contents was time consuming and as such the stakeholders, including the 
now weakened ASED task team, had limited time to adequately process the information 
contained in the draft ARF and to consult various stakeholders for ideas. With the benefit of 
hindsight, the consultative process was a façade to muzzle the politically biased ASED task 
team from deliberating substantively whilst getting the broader stakeholder groups to 









4.6. Analysis of Atlantis Revitalisation Framework: Application of the Evaluative 
Criteria 
Using the evaluative criteria, the study demonstrates how the positivist planning approach 
adopted by both the apartheid state and recently, the post-1994 dispensation, missed out on 
embracing complexity in the analysis of planning issues affecting the town of Atlantis and the 
development of practical solutions. The values and ideologies held by those in power are 
also highlighted, indicating how information and knowledge of the system was selectively 
used to construct what Swilling (2002) calls false certainties. The analysis of the ARF also 
links pressing planning issues and their solutions to complexity theory and its characteristics. 
It is however noted that the study does not fully apply all 10 characteristics of complexity as 
suggested by Cilliers (1998), and summarised in the literature review section in Chapter 2. 
Instead, it borrows selectively from the rich theory of complexity and complex adaptive 
systems in its analysis of the emerging activist led planning processes.  
Without being too deterministic, the study selectively uses thematic elements of the 
evaluative criteria as it explores its implications for rethinking contemporary planning with the 
idea of seeking confluence in the state led planning, complexity and activist planning nexus. 
Using a phased approach in this analysis, two critical phases that had implications for the 
Atlantis Revitalisation Framework are outlined. These analytical phases include the pre-2008 
phase, which in essence has two distinct sub-phases of its own, the pre-1994 phase that 
saw the establishment of Atlantis from 1975, followed by the post-1994 phase which 
witnessed the structural changes to the state and its socio-economic systems, from 
apartheid segregatory policies towards a “constitutional developmental state”, premised on 
the notion of redistribution. As far as Atlantis is concerned, the post-1994 phase was 
sustained until the 2008/9 Global Economic Recession, which directly triggered the 
subsequent development of the Atlantis Revitalisation Framework. This partial analysis on 
the complex Case Study of Atlantis will not be exhaustive, as it only seeks to highlight the 
lessons learnt and propose practical recommendations to guide present and future planning 
in South Africa, in Chapter 5. 
4.6.1. Pre-2008/9 Global Economic Recession Phase 
In keeping with the the insights from complexity theory, the study unpacks how the largely 
instrumental planning processes for Atlantis led to a set of wicked problems faced by the 









4.6.1.1. Issues Analysis 
The pre-1994 government led by the National Party was blinded by the “illusion of control” 
prediction or determinism as it relied on “separate development and decentralisation” as 
strategies to counter the challenges of overcrowding and limited resources, as it encouraged 
development in homelands or other specially planned towns (Manguwo, 2013). This view 
was aligned to what Rabinow (cited in Walters, 2007) calls “corrective sociology of positivist 
social and natural sciences”. These value systems ultimately determined the codes that 
dictated the architectural and urban form of the apartheid state (Walters, 2007). It was 
argued that if left unchecked and to their own devices, “the black and coloured urban 
populations” would increase “exponentially threatening to overwhelm the white cities of Cape 
Town, Johannesburg, and Durban” (WCEC, 2008). In that era, the idea of “optimum city 
size” held greater significance for planners the world over amid “concern internationally that 
urban areas were becoming too big such that resources were going to be too concentrated 
in one area, making cities inefficient due to overcrowding”. As such, the main cities of Cape 
Town and Johannesburg drew much attention (Manguwo, 2013).  
State planners of the time viewed Cape Town “as a city that had a rapidly growing 
population within a limited space, due to its physical features” and it was predicted that the 
city would become “too polluted, congested and undesirable, and that further growth would 
be forced to sprawl into never ending suburbs that wasted valuable agricultural land”. 
Therefore, the planning of Atlantis was largely a reaction to the shortage of houses in the 
Cape Peninsula (WCEC, 2008). Atlantis was a secondary solution to the overflow that was 
created by the forceful relocation of 60 000 Coloureds from the central city to the outskirts on 
the Cape Flats. The pressures from the “mining of high-quality silica, overcrowding and 
traffic problems” in the Cape Flats were similar to the City-centre, prompting the planning 
and development of Atlantis, then referred to as the “dream coloured city”. (WCEC, 2008) 
4.6.1.2. Goal for Planning Atlantis 
As an offset of a controversial “government initiative”, Atlantis was “built to fulfil 20th century 
apartheid objectives … strongly based on the assumption of separate development”. It was 
established with the intention to “segregate and classify” its people along racial and class 
lines in line with the values and visions of the National Party. Driven by instrumental 









decisions without any consultation with the coloured people, seen here as subjects to be 
planned and decided for (Manguwo, 2013). 
4.6.1.3. Role of the State, State Planner, Interests and Value Systems  
As a response to the fear (imagined or otherwise) of being obliterated, “the 20th century saw 
the rise of Afrikaner nationalism aimed at radically preserving its threatened Afrikaans 
identity and status in the face of rapid industrialisation and racial integration”. As the global 
village was undergoing rapid industrialisation in the mid-1950s, the inclusion of 
transformative principles supporting integration and redistribution, were unavoidable in the 
many dialogues on the political economy of individual states. In response, the elected 
National Party chose to represent Afrikaner interests instead, and consciously “focused on 
perpetuating discriminatory racial legislation” that was largely ignorant of what transpired at 
the global socio-economic level. Using newly acquired power and resources, the National 
Party ignored the rich interactions in socio-economic systems, both at home and abroad, 
and assumed a narrow or biased ‘consciousness of the whole’ system regardless of the 
prevailing trends.  
The state planners of the time proposed and sponsored “an ideal separate development 
system (apartheid), meaning apartness”. In this social system, the National Party envisaged 
that “racial groups were meant to develop separately, with whites considered as the most 
developed race that deserved political, economic and social control of the country while the 
other races were meant to develop in isolation but with assistance from the white dominated 
government”. In this regard, the apartheid planners established the Divisional Council of the 
Cape (Divco) in 1973, which was a white elected authority appointed mandated to develop 
Atlantis as a growth point on behalf of the coloured people. This Atlantis Development 
Committee, which included only two Coloureds, was created by the National Party authority 
on behalf of the coloured populace, and “was tasked to oversee the development and 
governance of Atlantis”. To complete its mandate, the committee appointed a team of 
“planners and consultants to design the project and in 1974 ... [a gentleman] by the name 
Piet Burger was appointed the Project Director”. Like a true rational planner, Mr Piet Burger 
described Atlantis as a “town planners dream” which could be laid out according to the most 
modern ideas of town planning, with ample parking space and lanes for buses. He, like 
many other rational planners of the time, failed to comprehend that the interactions in the 
system were “usually quite rich” (Ciliers, 1998) and that the homelands and planned 









envisaged white dominated cities. All of this ignored the fact that “complex systems are 
[generally] open” (Preiser, 2013) and thus defy notions of control and order as epitomised by 
efforts  at “containing racial mixing”, to that extent that South Africa, today has one of the 
most diverse populations in the world (Manguwo, 2013). 
4.6.1.4. Planning System and Approach 
Through its legislative powers, the “white government institutionalised apartheid”, resulting in 
the white minority dominating “the major metropolitan areas and pushing the blacks out of 
the main cities into reserves and marginal townships” (WCEC, 2008). In this social 
engineering project, the goal of integration was demeaned in favour of segregation and the 
concept of ‘imagined communities’, purported by Bauman (1992) was relegated in the hands 
of a few. Apartheid was the ‘meta-narrative’ of the system in terms of which legislation and 
instrumental planning were used as rational tools to support this unjust social engineering 
project.   
4.6.1.5.  Complexity and Wicked Problems 
The forced relocation of coloured people to Atlantis and other settlements in the Cape Flats 
ignored “a large number of system components” (Preiser, 2013), such as livelihoods and 
economic opportunities. As a result, the majority of “coloureds in the province were 
struggling economically, due to low wages, unemployment, and social disruptions”. The 
interaction of multiple subsystems in Cape Town did not fit the simple “linear solution” meant 
to sweep away the people of colour and these interactions presented a number of social, 
economic and political complexities of their own. As such, Atlantis (as an open system) and 
its subcomponents, such as industries, schools, transport etc., had unintended “interactions” 
with the Cape Metro systems that were “usually quite rich”. Fredericks et al. (2010) highlights 
that the major employers for the majority of the people in Atlantis were “part of the previous 
government’s defence arms manufacturing projects and clothing and textile industries the 
established via tax and other incentives. Initially the “establishment of these businesses and 
the transport of people and goods to Cape Town were heavily subsidised by the apartheid 
government. This largely cosmetic sense of progress for the “dream coloured city” easily 
faltered when it was challenged by the socio-political circumstances of the 1990s, leading to 
the first wave of economic failure for the town. This development put “the apartheid ideology 









Trends in the social sector also indicated that planning that “deals with only a single sector 
or issue …[which] does not take into account the different dimensions of poverty (including 
social, policy and biophysical/environmental)”, results into unlikely outcomes that affect the 
root causes of poverty (World Vision International, 2009). Atlantis’ establishment was 
intended to address the root causes of poverty and inequality, but was rather an attempt to 
entrench socio-economic segregation and decentralisation. The unequal distribution of 
income and resources concentrated in the hands of the minority for years in remained 
largely unchanged.  
Amid a reliance on government incentives and subsidies to attract large businesses to the 
area (aimed at creating employment) some unintended outcomes ensued with about “45%” 
of the jobs created by the businesses that moved to the area, held by people from outside 
Atlantis (Manguwo, 2008). Most of these businesses were owned by whites and Indians who 
had the economic resources (needed to start businesses) that coloureds of the time 
generally lacked” (WCEC, 2008). Despite the notion of a dream coloured city, the coloured 
people themselves constituted much of the working class “despite a government-led initiative 
that practically encouraged or favoured coloured ownership”. A number of the white-collar 
jobs, including management and engineering positions were taken up by people who 
commuted from outside Atlantis”, a scenario that was not envisaged in the planned city of 
Atlantis. Most of the businesses that responded and took advantage of the incentives were 
“light industries and manufacturing companies that were not too costly to relocate” and these 
same industries could easily close down when economic costs became unfavourable. In 
addition, “the majority of the new jobs were low paying positions in the factories, and since 
1979, Atlantis was considered a rural area, companies could pay workers 15% less than 
they would in Cape Town”. As a result, “manufacturing came to an abrupt end when these 
incentive programmes ended [in 1994] and the defence manufacturing contracts were 
stopped many companies closing down factories or permanently relocating their businesses 
elsewhere” (Fredericks et al., 2010).  
4.6.1.6. Information and Knowledge Systems 
The National Government and a number of developers that saw decentralisation as a 
welcome alternative for the city, lacked comprehension of the “abundance of non-linear 
routes” in the system (Cilliers, 1998). The NP planners claimed that their idea of optimum 
city size was factual and based on scientific reason. This limited view largely ignored the 









arguments for “optimum city size” faced criticism from other progressive planners and 
academics such as “Professor Dewer from the University of Cape Town. He argued that 
cities grow for a reason as the “concentration of resources provide the infrastructure that is 
attractive for businesses [which] … will ultimately result in a higher standard of living for the 
poor”. He believed that “decentralisation policies forced capital to conform to the interest of 
the state [and] that the higher cost of creating jobs away from the cities made it extremely 
expensive and debilitating to overall economic growth” (WCEC, 2008). This alternative 
position from Dewers was largely influenced by the realisation that “interactions are usually 
quite rich” amid a concentration of resources with positive feedbacks in terms of alleviating 
poverty and social exclusion. He went on to argue that, ‘for the creation of one single job in 
the decentralised zones, 9.2 jobs were lost’, thus calling the economic justification of 
decentralisation into question.  
In her critique of such deductive reasoning, Meadows (2001) warns that before disturbing a 
system in this case a socio-economic system, in any way, planners must observe how it 
behaves. National Party planners and apartheid policy-makers ignored the available 
information and selectively used their own beliefs and value systems to construct what 
Swilling (2002) calls “false certainties” which had unintended implications for the town. 
4.6.1.7. Planning Outcomes  
Cilliers (1998) recognises that systems are usually open and “that they interact with their 
environment”. The framing of the apartheid view of modernism as that of “white dominated 
cities” (WCEC, 2008) heightened tensions with neighbours and overpopulated black or 
coloured homelands forcing uprisings and social dissent. Invariably, industries in these white 
dominated cities also required cheap labour for heavy industries. Despite all this information 
being available to the state at the time, pointing towards a need for better integration and the 
building of relationships between/among the various racial groups, the apartheid planning 
system used “racial and technocratic justifications to support the idea of decentralisation and 
separate development. The boundaries of the apartheid system were predetermined and 
lacked proper consideration of the mounting “political pressures” and the “over-abundance of 
deconcentration zones” which forced competition for limited government resources. Despite 
its ‘best’ intentions to allow separate development, the components of this system “operated 
in conditions far from equilibrium” (Cilliers, 1998). The “poor [were] being driven away from 
centres of growth and [pushed] further into poverty due to inadequate access to resources 









This heightened the political resistance by the black and coloured majority, ultimately leading 
to the political settlement and democratic transition in 1994 (WCEC, 2008).  
4.6.2. Post -2008/2009 Global Economic Recession 
The increasing complexity affecting the township of Atlantis was further exacerbated in the 
post 1994 era. When the incentives programmes linked to the “defence manufacturing 
contracts were stopped [in 1994] … many companies started closing up factories or 
permanently relocated their businesses elsewhere” (Fredericks et al. 2010). This trend 
continued despite the seemingly progressive policies that were passed in the post-1994 
period by the ANC led government. The Constitution of South Africa sought to “promote 
social and economic development”. In addition, the Reconstruction and Development 
Programme (RDP) (1994) was promulgated as an “integrated, coherent socio-economic 
policy framework’ largely aimed at “addressing the historical imbalances in the South African 
economy resulting from many years of systematically enforced racial division in every sphere 
of society” (Urban-Econ, 2011). Due to the systematic segregation in education, health, 
welfare, transport, housing and employment, the apartheid policy left deep scars of 
inequality and economic inefficiency in black and coloured areas including Atlantis (WCEC, 
2008).  
Increasing pressure from a strong neo-liberal agenda the world over forced the post-1994 
government to adopt pro-growth policies in line with world economic adjustment policies 
largely proposed by the West and fronted by the IMF (RDP, 1996). The Growth, Employment 
and Redistribution (GEAR) plan was adopted by government in 1996 as official economic 
policy, replacing the RDP. GEAR was later replaced by ASGISA (2006) in pursuit of 
government’s goal “to halve poverty and unemployment by the year 2014”. In view of this 
ambition, the republic was expected to maintain an average growth rate of 5% until the year 
2014 while also increasing and improving labour-absorbing economic activities. Other 
supportive policies such as the “Joint Initiative on Priority Skills Acquisition (JIPSA, 2006) 
were also pursued, as components of ASGISA. Despite these ambitious national and 
regional goals, the socio-economic fortunes of Atlantis continued to deteriorate.  
4.6.2.1. Issues Analysis 
Atlantis had a highly dependent population, (over 50% of the total population in 2010/11), 









2011a:4), amid unusually high unemployment rates, estimated at between 30-35% (ASED 
TT, 2010a:7) way above the national figure of 25%. As a result of the high levels of 
economic inactivity among the youth, Atlantis has seen an increase in crime and violence. 
By extension, this unusually high level of unemployment, particularly youth unemployment 
had costly implications in terms of the “escalation [of youth] crime, gang activities, drug 
abuse and domestic violence” (AIGTT, 2011:3). In addition, residents of the township also 
experienced “increased food insecurity, inability to pay for municipal services (water, 
electricity) and the demise of the social fabric of society”. The complex web of social issues 
that interacted in a dynamic way rendered Atlantis socially dysfunctional, thus making it an 
unfavourable destination for both local and national investments (CoCT, 2011b:1).  
Due to its linkages to regional and national economies, the effects of the global recession of 
2008/2009 also negatively “impacted … the local industries” especially the manufacturing 
sector which had historically been the backbone of Atlantis. As a result, manufacturing 
sector, particularly the textile and electronic industries, shrunk (continues to shrink) due to 
the closure or downsizing of major companies such as “Arwa Consortium, Herdmans, 23 
Sportswear, Novel Textiles and Novel Garments, GR Pharmaceuticals, Rotex and Tedelex” 
(Urban Econ, 2011). This loss of industries left thousands of semi-skilled Atlantis residents 
unemployed between 2008 – 2010. Atlantis is located 40km away from Cape Town, and this 
geographic isolation from the Mother City also extends to its isolation from the economic 
centre of the province (Manguwo, 2010a). Without a united voice and concerted effort from 
its residents, Atlantis was largely ignored politically, its geographic boundaries are included 
in the Blauwberg District which is one of the largely unequal districts in Cape Town with rich 
coastal suburbs such as Milnerton, Sunset Beach and Melkbosch etc. (Urban-Econ, 2011). 
4.6.2.2. Stakeholder Analysis  
Prompted by the declining socio-economic fortunes of the town, multiple actors in the 
community united behind the collective goal of rescuing Atlantis from economic downfall and 
social meltdown, that was deemed imminent in 2010. In the same year, the stakeholders 
crafted a planning document that become known as the Rescue Strategy for Atlantis to 
manage these multiple complexities. Whilst the issues highlighted above, attracted different 
stakeholders for different reasons, they also came on board at different times of the process 
based on either an opportunity or threat to their interests. Over time, the ability to strike a 
balance between participation and quality of representation was compromised as 









political influence were suddenly replaced by specialised ‘participatory citizens’, mostly ex-
politicians, with specific interests in the planning process. The stakeholder groups that were 
involved in the planning process comprised the following: 
i. Civil society 
The civil society groups, through the JCT, assumed agency and initiated the review and 
rescue process by calling for an all stakeholder meeting in 2009. A large pool of union 
stakeholders, particularly those affiliated to COSATU, expressed grave concerns about job 
losses for their members. These unions played a largely adversarial activist role, and 
included among others NUMSA, SACTU, SACTWU and COSATU Western Cape.  Local 
NGOs also played a critical advocacy role in this debate, led by the WCEC and other local 
NGOs, CBOs and forums which included, World Vision, AIDS/HIV/Network, Urban Farmers 
and Community Policing Forum (CPF). All of these entities joined the call for a revitalisation 
of the town’s fortunes, and their collective concern was based on the declining socio-
economic fabric of the town. They all agreed that an increase in crime, domestic violence 
against children and women, hunger and an increase in drug and alcohol abuse, had costly 
implications on their services, as the declining social fabric and challenging funding 
environment rendered their social services inadequate.   
ii. Business 
The interests of business were obvious, and included the need for financial incentives and a 
rescue package for ailing enterprises. In their lobbying, they also called for the skilling and 
training of the local labour force to avert the need to employing skilled foreigners, which 
further limited available job opportunities for the people of Atlantis. The participating 
businesses cited both financial challenges and a lack of skilled labour as cause for the 
massive layoffs and/or placing workers on short-time. In their quest for labour, they also 
made a plea for bringing back government backed apprenticeships, especially female 
apprentices in order to improve the skills base of the town. Among the notable business 
entities included were, MSG Engineering, Tedlex, Arwa Consortium, Herdmans, 23 
Sportswear, Novel Textiles and Novel Garments, GR Pharmaceuticals, Rotex, Mamre GPA 
Roderick C. Kaytec Engineering, Ahlesha Blankets, Engineering H, Imvusa Security, Atlantis 
Shopping Centre, Dessie’s Bridal, IT Technology, Vrede Textiles Ltd, Atlantis Foundries, 










iii. Strategic Partners 
Another group, termed the strategic partners, which had no representatives on the ASED 
task team was also identified. This group participated in the All Stakeholder Planning 
Workshop and some subsequent meetings, often positioning themselves as technical 
experts. Their interests were varied ranging from financial, to statutory and others were 
simply curious and did not want to miss the opportunity for networking, and other strategic 
reasons. This group included among others, Capitec Bank, Eskom, SAMAF, South African 
Oil and Gas Alliance (SAOGA), West Coast College, Wesfleur Hospital, Proudly Atlantis, 
MERSETA, and CTFL SETA. 
iv. Government Stakeholders 
All three spheres of government were interested and affected by the Atlantis situation. Due 
to their statutory obligations, national government departments including the DED, DTI, DoA 
were directly involved, as were their affiliate agencies such as the IDC and DBSA. At the 
provincial government level, DEDAT and its economic development agencies were also 
involved, with SEDA, Casidra, Khula Enterprise Finance (Ltd), and WESGRO participating in 
the planning process. At the local government level, officials from the City of Cape Town 
Economic Department Directorate were instrumental in crafting some of the policy 
frameworks that later formed the building blocks of the ARF itself. 
4.6.2.3. Interests and Values analysis. 
Whilst the civil society players were largely seized by issues pertaining to the social 
wellbeing of the residents of Atlantis (e.g. raising concern about the state of the social fabric 
of the community), they also expressed concern over the distributional aspects of the local 
economy (Ehrenreich, 2010). Local leaders, including politicians particularly the ANC group 
were concerned about the apparent neglect of the Atlantis people, citing racial biases linked 
to the then apartheid regime as a reason for poor resource allocation by the DA-led local and 
provincial government. By extension they advocated for improved social services such as 
housing, education and youth development, social amenities and health. They brought 
forward arguments for redistribution in the local economy by proposing a range of issues 
related to land availability, agriculture, SMMEs, and most importantly, the Green Economy.  
Both civil society and local businesses noted that there were vast empty tracts of land owned 









advocated for residential use of the land, stating that Atlantis needed land for residential 
purposes with +/-12 000 residential properties shortage in the area (ASER, 2010). Local 
businesses were however consumed by the need for easily accessible land for industrial and 
commercial agriculture purposes. Business players lamented that the CoCT tender process 
for land approvals seemed slow, taking up to 12 months, which was deemed unreasonable 
for business. Both civil society and business recommended that the key hurdles to the 
release of land for housing, industry and agriculture should be addressed by a land 
committee that involved the CoCT, DoA and the Task Team, to unlock and expedite the 
release of land the area (ASED, 2010f). 
Noting the general but inevitable shift of agricultural activities from Philippi (food basket of 
the CoCT) to Atlantis, the civil society representatives particularly the urban farmers 
expressed grave concern over the continued under-utilizstion of vacant land in and around 
Atlantis, for people to grow their own food and sell excess to the local fresh food market. 
They lamented the fact that land in the area was/is being sold at market value which was 
seen to be way more than its production capacity and hence not economically viable for both 
subsistence and/or commercial agricultural ventures. They also noted the lack of support for 
established local farmers from the CoCT and the Province, emphasising that small farmers 
had limited access to credit finance and that their limited access to land inhibited available 
farming options such as animal husbandry etc. which needed special permits or licences 
from the responsible authorities (ASED, 2010f).  
Other areas that the civil society, (particularly the WCEC) advocated for, were the Green 
Economy and the idea of an Integrated Tourism Development strategy for the town. It was 
noted that the City by-laws and energy legislation where a hindrance to the generation of 
home-based alternative energy. Claims that both local industries, the City of Cape Town and 
Eskom procured their energy technologies from overseas was interrogated, and it was 
agreed that it hampered attempts to create jobs through the manufacturing of energy 
technology in South Africa. The potential for developing alternative energy sources such as 
wind, waste to energy, biogas and solar in the area, was elaborated, with others making a 
case for establishing companies that are willing to invest in technology that uses solid waste 
material to produce alternative energy, arguing that the major challenge was the city’s 
reluctance to release its waste for processing by potential waste to energy businesses. A 
resolution was strongly lobbied for by the ASED Task Team, to consider a proposal for a 
Waste to Energy Programme in Atlantis to and develop Atlantis as a Green Energy Hub. 









were made to investigate further access to CoCT waste. Furthermore, the CoCT was going 
to be engaged regarding its alternative energy generation by-laws, and tasked to also 
investigate the potential for solar water heating roll-out and develop proposals (using best 
practice case studies and the subsequent identification of interested businesses) in energy 
projects in Atlantis. Eskom, as a strategic player in the sector was mandated to follow-up on 
these proposed alternatives, as noted in the Atlantis project prioritisation documents (ASED, 
2010f). 
Civil society, led by the WCEC also raised the issue that the local tourism industry (despite a 
lot of potential, but due to lack of integration), missed out on the collective identification of 
opportunities and shared business prospects. The tourism players recognised the need for 
integrated tourism development and suggested the establishment of the Atlantis tourism 
services agency to link local tourism products to the whole West Coast Region. They also 
highlighted the limited access to local tourist attractions, owned by the CoCT, such as the 
bird sanctuary at the Witsands nature reserve and the Atlantis dunefields managed on behalf 
of Atlantis by the CoCT, and attracting players from outside Atlantis, thus not directly 
benefiting the township. The Atlantis Tourism Service Unit (ATSU) was identified as having 
potential to develop integrated tourism products that could support local employment efforts 
and attract people to Atlantis. As such, the ATSU would be tasked to develop a 
comprehensive product or local tourism route whilst the local tourism office, managed by the 
WCEC, was presented as the natural house for ATSU. The lack of resources and capacity to 
organise these tourism projects were raised as a cry for a rescue facility aimed at 
relaunching WCEC’s bid for a viable tourism sector in the area. 
4.6.2.4. Institutional Analysis and Political Influence. 
As a result of the radical socio-economic enquiry championed by the JCT and its COSATU 
affiliated partners, an insurgent planning processes responsive to the complex specificities of 
Atlantis, was launched. Pressed by a deteriorating economic situation linked to job losses, 
rising unemployment and a dysfunctional social fabric, a spirited challenge to the continuous 
exclusion (from the economic) sector of the people of Atlantis was mounted. An ‘organic 
body’ of interested and affected labour union representatives, local businesses and civil 
society sought an audience with local, provincial and national political players to effect 
systemic change in Atlantis. The group assumed agency and drove its mandate from the 
JCT 2009 meeting. Its fortunes were boosted when Minister Pattel proposed the formation of 









and organic structure gained significance, based on the political mandate given to them by 
the EDD. Inevitably, powerful political players with links to the ANC joined the Task Team, at 
the same time I was co-opted to assist with research and documentation of the planning 
process. 
This ‘heroic’ formation of the ASED Task Team inspired the rise of an alternative 
“institutional framework”, not involved in the regulation aspects of the issues at hand. Its 
initial function was inclined towards lobbying, facilitation and networking for the good of 
Atlantis. Through the involvement of the COSATU affiliates, the task team took a radical 
stance in addressing the economic issues informed by their “experiences with oppositional 
practices and a tradition of social mobilisation” (Sandercock, 1998b). The rest of the civil 
society organisations such as WCEC, World Vision and local CBOs such as the CPF, Urban 
Farmers, AYDEF, HIV/AIDS Network and others took advantage of the fact that they were 
located closer to the people both inside and outside the state. They presented themselves 
as local advocacy and lobby groups that preferred alternative institutions capable of initiating 
development from below (Sanyal, 2009).  
The largely ANC and COSATU led local configuration benefitted politically from their access 
to National Government politicians who were themselves former union leaders, and now 
responsible for the economic ministries at National Level. The ASED task team, challenged 
“existing unequal relations and distributions of power, opportunity and resources” in Atlantis, 
and sought to influence the “structural transformation of systemic inequalities” (Sandercock, 
1998b). Their analysis of the status quo borrowed dearly from the epistemological 
underpinnings of advocacy planners centred around participation and representation in the 
planning process (Davidoff, 1956). It also relied on the thinking of “critical theorists from both 
the left and right of the ideological spectrum” (Allmendinger, 2002a; Sanyal, 2009; Brenner 
2009) looking at redistribution as an agenda for transformation. Whilst the views of civil 
society players were argued to be representative of the Atlantis population and meant to 
serve and empower those who had experienced systematic disempowerment, the inherent 
interests of the different players inhibited progress (at times) due to a lack of consensus 
(Sandercock, 1998b). We soon realised that those of us who pushed for access to resources 
through, an open, but coordinated, structure faced resistance from the old guard which for 
various reasons preferred that the resources be channelled, using a largely controversial 
entity whose financial records were known to be ridden with controversy. The ASEDTask 
Team argued for the maintenance of the original ASED members on the grounds of 









activities of the ASED Task Team leading to the inevitable takeover of its plans and 
proposals by the CoCT and PGWC, through the technical advice presented by the IDC.  
The continued influence by the ASED Task Team, drawn from its existing national political 
connections, was eventually diluted. The SPV model for which they were advocating in the 
ASED proposal got rebranded and reconfigured into the Atlantis Intergovernmental Task 
Team led by the CoCT. As technical experts, the CoCT officials insisted on the need for a 
broader representative form of democracy, thus increasing the representation of youth, 
women, the disabled and other groups previously excluded in the Task Team. As a result, 
ASED Task Team became the Atlantis Stakeholder Assembly (ASA) with various plenary 
groups that included youths, business sector, civil society groups, unions, the disabled etc. 
This move diluted the political influence of the ASED which ceased to exist as soon as the 
ARF was adopted. Whilst this move potentially increased the number of ASA attendees in 
line with broader stakeholder demands for more representatives, the body lacked political 
muscle and influence since its role had been weakened vis-a-vis that played by ASED. The 
ASA also lacked constitutional or legislative recognition and the initiative had no decisive 
power to set the agenda, timing, and debates regarding the developmental issues in Atlantis. 
In addition, the Intergovernmental Steering Committee was established, and its members 
included both the CoCT, PGWC and representatives from National Government. Its 
operational role in the subsequent development of projects and programmes aligned to the 
ARF, though not a focus of this study, is noticeable in the Green Economy sector that was 
later established in the town. It also played a critical role in the bespoke Rescue Plan for 
distressed business in Atlantis and can be credited for the training and skills development of 
residents in order to increase their role in the new electronic and Green Energy sectors that 
are currently taking shape in Atlantis.  
The analysis in this study only focused on the planning aspects of the framework, hence a 
critical review of the content and outcomes of the ARF represent an area for another study 
altogether. If anything, the ASED Task Team could be credited with claiming and increasing 
the awareness, participation and voice of local players in the devising and development of 
plans, programmes and/or policies for the Atlantis community. Their collaborative approach 
to planning, which was hugely dialogical, though not adhering to the Habermas 
communicative ideals as proposed by Healey and others, challenged the largely 
instrumental planning approach from the CoCT and PGWC, ensuring that the involvement of 
local players was beyond just participation, as advocated for by activist planners. They 









“epistemological, empowering and relation-building” approach (Mäntysalo, 2002:3), notions 
of “legitimacy, inclusiveness, quality of engagement” (Sager, 2013:3), and to a lesser extent 
broad “transparency and active participation” (Mthethwa, 2014:16). It can be argued that the 
ARF planning process, if presented in its entirety, gained an inclination towards meaningful 
and deeper community engagement and empowerment of the Atlantis people to a certain 
extent.  
4.6.2.5. Role of the State and State Planners. 
The role of the state and that of state planners though contested and marred by political 
interests, was transformed within the ARF. Initially the engagement between the CoCT and 
PGWC was mostly transactional and the local government led by the DA largely ignored the 
union led movement as fronted by ASED with perceived political affiliation to COSATU and 
subsequently, the ANC led National Government. The DA-led legislature at the municipal 
and provincial level, were increasingly uneasy with ASEDs growth in popularity and political 
influence. At best, the CoCT and PGWC planners initially took the role of undisputed 
knower, with the ability to rely “strictly on professional expertise and objectivity to do what 
[was]/is best for an undifferentiated public” (Sandercock, 1998b). They sought to consolidate 
their power and influence by providing information to ASED on the available government 
services run by both the CoCT and PGWC through their directorates as well as various city 
agencies such as WESGRO, Red Doors, Casidra and others. Initially pitching a seemingly 
non-political stance held by an “impartial expert” with no vested interests. The CoCT’s 
response to ASED gave the impression that it had “weighed competing objectives with 
rational, intellectual detachment” as it dismissed ASED’s views and concluded that Atlantis’ 
problems were linked to the global economic recession and as such were not unique to the 
area. Their technical position ignored the history of exclusion and segregation that was 
primarily at the centre of Atlantis issues.  
The role played by the national government was however different, and state planners from 
Min Patel’s office instead assumed an ‘activist role’ to the issues and got actively involved in 
the political process, in search of a rescue plan for Atlantis. They chose to use the political 
ideology of participation and a leftist conception of redistribution fronted by their COSATU 
political allies in the ASED Task Team. The efforts from the EDD and the DTI were largely 
informed by political ideology and politics in the ANC and this position shaped and moulded 
the resultant political processes that led to the ARF. They did not assume a position of 









undifferentiated Atlantis public and instead recognised the historical implications of the then 
apartheid planning policy, resurfacing in the present-day socio-economic decay of Atlantis. 
They noted that Atlantis was far removed from the provincial economic hub in the CoCT 
Metro, which made it less competitive economically.  
Through its political links and influences at the national level, ASED managed to 
demonstrate over time, to both the CoCT and the PGWC, that their general assumptions and 
all the principles and values that they initially fronted were self-evidently political. The stance 
by ASED and its Provincial COSATU partners rejected the seemingly instrumental and 
conservative response by the middle-class intellectuals in the CoCT and PGWC. They chose 
instead, to see the planning process as a ‘normative practice’ (Taylor, 1999), one that sought 
to realise certain valued ends or normative values (which are the realm of politics). Their 
insistence of sticking to a political solution rather than an instrumental one, created space for 
generating socially acceptable approaches for decision making with government, through 
consensus building. These deliberative ways of decision making paid off over-time as the 
political pressure and various political and business interests in the CoCT, PGWC and 
business forced them to join the process and come to the negotiating table as equal 
partners. These discursive ways of decision making, though not balanced due to power and 
resource imbalances, resulted in some socially desirable outcomes such as the convening of 
an All Stakeholders Planning workshop facilitated by COSATU. This milestone allowed the 
multiple-stakeholders to deliberate substantively as they developed the Atlantis project 
prioritisation matrix which was useful in determining the viable projects ready for 
implementation through the work done by Urban Econ. 
Despite the fact that the role of the ASED was later diluted and their political influence 
through the EDD, curtailed, at least at the official ARF level, their combined political efforts 
resulted in the institutional configurations that prioritised communitive action at the local 
government level. The intergovernmental steering committee that was formed between the 
CoCT, PGWC and National Government was a remarkable legislated policy reform geared 
towards increasing collaboration between the three spheres of government. Notably a 
number of substantive goals, insights and ideas that emanated from ASED’s activist actions 
were incorporated in the ARF itself and this indicates a level of success in putting the 
interests of the people of Atlantis on the policy and programme agenda of local and 










4.6.2.6. Planning Approach.  
The planning approach that led to the ARF, had multiple phases and saw different modes of 
planning being implemented at different stages, and in some instances at the same time. 
The pre-2008/2009 period was largely dominated by a market led economic and social 
order, largely due to the neo-liberal policy options such as GEAR and ASGISA adopted by 
the Mbeki government. The role of the government involved the reduction of regulations, 
arguing that this would ensure economic growth (Klosterman, 1985). Such an approach to 
planning is critiqued by radical activist planners for having little if any concern for poverty, 
inequality and sustainability, since it relies largely on “private entrepreneurship and the 
competitive forces of the market”. Hence, it is not surprising that the CoCT and PGWC 
planners were not easily persuaded by the plight of the Atlantis people since ‘experts’ who 
had a rational and moral “ability to apply their objective and scientific knowledge in pursuit of 
a better world” (Harrison, 1995) had linked the Atlantis crisis to the global economic crisis of 
the time. They instead chose to ignore the historical conditions that still existed, such as its 
distant geographical location from the provincial economic hub. Much of the planning at this 
stage was state led, with no consultation whatsoever. One of the duties assumed by state 
planners was the sharing of information as demonstrated in the case study, this made them 
unpopular with the ASED Task team which preferred a rather political approach to the 
planning debate of a rescue strategy for Atlantis. 
i. Civil society 
The civil society partners, particularly the JCT, its COSATU affiliates and the local NGOs 
such as WCEC and World vision together with the CBOS which included AYDEF, CPF, 
HIV/AIDS Network and the Urban Farmers, all preferred the activist planning route. Using 
the Constitution of South Africa as a reference point, ASED sought to transform the practice 
of state planning from its ‘top down’ approaches towards a ‘participatory’ process. They 
initiated a planning process that would bring government planners “face to face with citizens 
in a continuous co-operative venture” (Walters, 2007; Sager, 2013).  They believed that 
citizens must participate in government and retain power to “prevent governmental outcomes 
contrary to their interests” (Fainstein and Fainstein, 1996). They deliberately chose a political 
approach cognisant of the fact that appropriate planning action on behalf of the town could 
not be prescribed from a position of value neutrality. The ASED Task Team forced state 
planners to engage in the political process giving them new roles as “advocates of both the 









for future development of the community” (Daffidoff, 1995). With this view in mind, those 
initially excluded (i.e. youths, the unemployed, the urban farmers, the disabled, women and 
other minority groups who had been previously unrepresented in the CoCT and PGWC 
planning processes) would now be represented in a contentious political arena (Sandercock, 
1998a; Klosterman, 1985). However, we all soon realised that the so-called civil society 
group was not homogenous, as we all had different interests and were all fuelled by different 
ideological and economic ideologies in pursuit of these interests. 
ii. National Government 
The National Government planners, led by political leaders like Minister Patel who had close 
links with the Labour Unions particularly the Western Cape COSATU establishment, took a 
more radical approach to planning. Citing apartheid-era developmental objectives, the EDD 
and the DTI sought to promote the developmental interests of the disadvantaged coloured 
groups that suffered under apartheid. They borrowed dearly from both the left and the right 
ideological positions resorting to promoting growth whilst embarking on a redistribution 
agenda through the EDD’s New Growth Path policy. The EDD proposed the formation of a 
strong-community group later known as the ASED task team which was tasked to spearhead 
the cause of the disenfranchised poor and the marginalised in the town. Ironically business 
interests of the town were also represented on this task team thus balancing the social and 
economic aspects of the proposed rescue strategy.  
Hence, the Atlantis rescue strategy began with a detailed comprehension of the “urban 
inequalities” based on the historical profile of the town by the WCEC (2008). This historical 
context was constantly referred to and cited in all subsequent documents that led to the 
development of the ARF. The unions in particular, sought clarity on the crude political and 
economic questions in the town. They were cognisant of the critical role played by business 
in alleviating job losses in the town. In their often-contentious, conversations with CoCT and 
PGWC they sought to expose and thus frequently oppose the hypocrisy of the proposed 
public policies that seemingly benefited private capital while espousing the vague principle of 
public interest. As such, the Western Cape COSATU Secretary General clearly called for a 
critical reflection on the socio-economic challenges of Atlantis in cognisance of past events 










iii. CoCT and PGWC 
Whilst exercising cautious optimism at first, choosing a rather instrumental approach to 
responding to the Atlantis situation, both the PGWC led by DEDAT and later on, the CoCT 
Economic Development Directorate, started with the provision of information of available 
government services and policies that the ASED Task Team could access. This a-political 
stance backfired at a political level since the ANC led National Government seemed to gain 
momentum as it positioned itself as pro-poor and willing to politically engage and influence 
the Atlantis Rescue process. In a classic response, to recover lost ground, the PGWC 
provided resources through DEDAT for the all-stakeholder planning workshop and the 
specialist study meant to interpret the planning documents produced by ASED into project 
proposals that are viable and implementable. This move usurped the political power and 
influence of ASED, who at that point became mere participants of the process (to be 
consulted as and when necessary) instead of being its leaders. The CoCT and the PGWC 
moved swiftly as they developed a policy to establish the inter-governmental steering 
committee that took leadership of the planning process in consultation with a newly 
established body now called the Atlantis Stakeholder Assembly (ASA) in which ASED had 
been assimilated together with business, civil society, youth, the disabled, women and other 
local players. In this mode of planning, both the CoCT and PGWC acted pragmatically, 
consulting as and when necessary but moving ahead with the vision and goals of the 
framework in as far as it addressed the social, economic and political interests of the 
expanded stakeholders. 
4.7. Conclusion. 
In line with the objectives of the study, this Chapter narrated in detail the specific 
circumstances and the process that led to the development of the ARF. It established the 
events, actions, struggles and experiences of multiple actors (NGOs, the state, mobilised 
communities, private business, research community etc.) involved in the formal and informal 
planning and development process of the ARF. Using the evaluative criteria developed in 
Chapter 3, the study explored the transformative potential inherent in the evolving modes of 
planning and governance that informed the Atlantis Revitalisation (Policy) Framework (ARF) 
developed by the City of Cape Town.  
The historical overview of Atlantis was systematically presented, highlighting Atlantis as a 









evident today. Through complexity theory and systems thinking as practical tools for 
analysis, it was demonstrated that the geographical isolation of Atlantis from the rest of the 
Cape Town Metro had unforeseen implications in terms of its economic growth and social 
fabric. The town was economically isolated from the economic centre of the Western Cape 
Province, leading to a debilitating economic decline since 1994. Furthermore, the concept of 
“optimum city size” used to justify the forced removals of coloured people from Cape Town 
to Atlantis, under the guise of separate but equal development, disregarded established 
academic and economic arguments on city form. The apartheid city planners ignored 
market-led concentration of economic resources in cities. These resources are essential in 
the provision of infrastructure that is attractive for businesses, which then translates into job 
opportunities and a higher standard of living largely, for the poor.  
Academics of the time cautioned against decentralisation policies pursued by the then 
apartheid regime. They argued that it would force capital to conform to the interest of the 
state resulting in higher costs for creating jobs away from the main cities and curtailing 
overall economic growth. Against this backdrop, the Atlantis project was initiated, using the 
idea of incentives and subsidies which attracted light industries and manufacturing 
companies that were not too costly to relocate. This planning action ignored the fact that 
these same industries could also easily close down and move elsewhere when economic 
costs became unfavourable. Eventually, the 1994 political and democratic transition brought 
an abrupt end to these incentive programs. Despite the adoption of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa of 1996 and the passage of progressive laws and policies after 
1994, such as the RDP (1994), GEAR (1996) and later on ASGISA (2006), and JIPSA 
(2006) aimed largely at redistribution, the adoption of a strong neo-liberal economic agenda, 
by both the Mandela and Mbeki Governments, negated the redistributional outcomes, in 
favour of economic growth. Arguments often associated with the New Management 
Approach to planning were adopted, and they were/are often presented to justify 
abandoning planning, reducing regulation, and restricting the size of government. This 
ideological shift was over time accompanied by ideas suggesting an increased “reliance on 
private entrepreneurship and the competitive forces of the market”.  
In the Mbeki era, for instance, the role of the SA government was transformed, as the state 
instead aimed for development led approaches to urban regeneration based on the 
incrementalist, strategic and/or pragmatist planning approaches. The Municipal Systems Act 
(No. 32 of 2000) was adopted as a tool to advance Local Economic Development through 









to embody and explicitly state the municipalities’ LED aims, a step that guaranteed the local 
municipalities LED Strategies’ legal status as part of the Integrated Development Planning 
process. As a result of its isolation from CoCT as an economic hub and the pooling of the 
Atlantis Township with suburbs like Melkbos, Table View, Milnerton and others as part of the 
Blaauwberg District, the township was not a priority in the Urban Regeneration Strategies 
adopted by the CoCT and PGWC.  
The socio-economic status of the township worsened amid the 2008 Economic crisis which 
saw a further decline in the economic growth of the town. Several companies either closed 
down, downsized or relocated from the area due to unfavourable economic trends 
compounded by the declining social fabric of the town. This prompted an activist planning 
process that attracted diverse stakeholders whose common interest was to provide a rescue 
strategy for the township. The Atlantis Socio-Economic Rescue process was initiated by 
multi-stakeholders from civil society, industry and government. This led to a politically 
charged planning process that highlighted the existence of various interest groups and 
numerous value systems all of which, had implications for the substantive framing of the 
issues at hand, the proposed solutions and the expected outcomes of the planning process. 
The lobbyist interests of business were biased towards rescuing their businesses and 
making profits, whilst the activist unions were engaged by the need to save jobs and sustain 
their memberships, and local civil society was consumed by the need to advocate for 
improved social service provision such as housing, health and safety, to guarantee the social 
wellbeing of the locals. However, local and provincial government however initially took the 
role of technical service providers within the limits of available resources and existing 
legislative frameworks.  
Through intense lobbying, advocacy and activist processes, the rescue process for Atlantis 
assumed many forms. It became more than a mere call for participatory democracy and 
representation in the developmental affairs of the Atlantis township by the JCT-led COSATU 
affiliates and civil society. Their role gradually transformed to intense lobbying, advocacy and 
a rather adversarial activist form of planning as the politically charged ASED task team was 
formed. This configuration forced a deliberative political process to unfold, which led to the 
involvement of national government departments and their agencies. The political support 
and buy in at the national level by the ANC government, forced the DA led PGWC and the 
CoCT to meaningfully participate in the discursive process and commit resources to the 
rescue process. A multi-stakeholder planning process was initiated and facilitated with 









of the Atlantis Rescue Plan which had political buy-in from the EDD, DTI, IDC, PGWC, and 
later on the CoCT.  
This emerging multi-stakeholder relationship led to the development of a new governance 
framework that saw high-level co-operation between the PGWC and the CoCT, which later 
formed the Inter-governmental Task Team that jointly managed and facilitated the 
development of the ARF. Furthermore, the involvement of various stakeholders in the 
planning process of the ARF was significant in that it ushered in a new governance culture, 
though perhaps limited to the ARF. The new governance culture was characterised by novel 
institutional arrangements never envisaged in the original planning and development of 
Atlantis. The ASED Task team was itself a combination of stakeholders from civil society 
(labour and community NGOs and CBOs), business and government, indicating their ability 
to co-operate with each other. The proposed ARF also made provision for the Atlantis 
Stakeholder Assembly which replaced the politically charged ASED Task team. Its 
constitution and proposed involvement in the planning processes for Atlantis were 
documented and to a certain degree recognised through the ARF. Though the ASA lacked 
decisive power to set the agenda, timing, and debates regarding the developmental issues in 
Atlantis, it was inclusive and intended to include labour, business, CBOs, NGOs, local 
forums, youth, women, the disabled etc.  
Whilst a review of the content and the outcomes of the ARF were not included as objectives 
of the study, it is noted that much of the substantive planning proposals, insights and ideas 
proposed by the ASED Task team through the Atlantis Planning Workshop of 2010 were 
incorporated in the final Atlantis Revitalisation Framework of 2012. The study also noted that 
different planning issues were raised by the various planning constituencies. The Civil 
society cluster, largely led by local NGOs, namely WCEC and World Vision, and the labour 
unions advocated and championed a coterie of social and economic proposals meant to put 
Atlantis back on a recovery trajectory.  Their push for a redistributive agenda within the local 
economic system was partially echoed as they championed the establishment of a land 
committee to oversee the release of land for housing, industries and commercial agriculture. 
They advocated for the establishment of the ATSU which was meant to revive the tourism 
fortunes of the town by reclaiming its tourist attractions namely, the Witzands Bird’s 
Sanctuary and the Witzands Dunefields, which largely benefited people from outside 
Atlantis. The biggest gain however, was the establishment of a Green Economy Hub in 
Atlantis through WESGRO and other PGWC agencies. A number of semi-skilled workers 









sector. The local businesses that were in distress at the time, were also prioritised in the 
ARF, through a set of bespoke incentives from the IDC and the CoCT, a large number of 
businesses in Atlantis retained their workforce whilst some remained open and averted the 
risk of closing and relocating elsewhere altogether. Despite these notable planning 
milestones, the reconfiguration of the ASED task team into a broader Atlantis Stakeholder 
Assembly, disempowered the ‘local champions’ who had initiated the planning and 
transformation process of Atlantis using activist means. They subsequently lost their agency 
when the ARF was adopted resulting in the formation of the ASA and by extension the 
political influence they had on determining future planning issues, process and solutions also 
dwindled. Following on from the previous chapters, the next chapter summarises the lessons 










Chapter 5: Conclusion and Recommendations 
5.1. Introduction 
In this concluding chapter, the study summarises the various concepts, ideas, insights, 
models and theories that explore the activist planning, transformation and complexity nexus 
presented thus far. The study established both a scientific (literature review) and empirical 
(case study) basis in exploring the theme “seeking transformation through activist planning”. 
It developed and applied the evaluative criteria for planning premised on the notion of 
transformation centred upon the “epistemological, empowering and relation-building” nature 
(Mäntysalo, 2002:3), the “legitimacy, inclusiveness, quality of engagement” (Sager, 2013:3) 
and also aspects of “transparency and active participation” (Mthethwa, 2014:16) within 
activist planning approaches.  
Achieving this objective was challenging due to the contested nature of planning, deemed an 
elusive and slippery subject by those involved with and affected by its processes. As alluded 
to in the research strategy in Chapter 1, Subsection 1.7, the study sought to establish a 
"contextually embedded approach” through the use of multiple research methods which 
were considered and applied conjointly (Beeton, 2005:37). A multiplicity of research 
techniques and tools were used in the thematic analysis of the case study of state-led 
planning, complexity and activist planning in order to establish practical concepts, models 
and theories beyond the positivist scientific traditions.  
To satisfy the need for a meaningful response to local planning issues, the research  
adopted and adapted a seven step research strategy from Kothari (2004). This strategy 
consisted of four distinct analytical phases mirrored on the research questions of the study 
that were strategically selected as broad thematic areas for each chapter. Though presented 
as a linear schematic, the research process itself benefited from being adaptive, dynamic 
and iterative in its approach. It utilised different research methods at each of the said stages. 
Firstly, this process included a thematic literature review of the planning and complexity 
landscape to establish the nexus (connection) between the two. Using thematic content 
analysis as a research method, the study systematically explored and established the 
thematic elements that unify the two concepts. Insights from activist planning were 
established and carefully presented as possible alternatives to deal with the growing 









developed from the state led planning, activist planning and complexity nexus, was 
operationalised in the study, as it proceeded to build empirical questions for the evaluative 
framework for planning. Thirdly, the evaluative criteria and its operational sub‐questions 
developed from the planning, complexity and activist planning literature were applied to the 
ARF case study to explore “the role of activist planning in the planning process and decision-
making of the Atlantis Revitalisation Framework (2012)”. Lastly, this iterative research 
process was used to provide practical lessons and a set of recommendations that may 
potentially inform contemporary planning practice with specific tools and techniques that 
adhere to the transformative tenets of inclusion, equity, liberty, empowerment, relation-
building, legitimacy, transparency, social justice and sustainability as advocated for 
throughout the study. This concluding chapter revisits this phased research process as 
concisely as possible to highlight the lessons learnt and to propose practical 
recommendations to guide present and future planning in South Africa.  
5.2. Answering the Research Questions  
To reiterate the main research question for the study is:  
What transformative role can and did advocacy and activist planning play in 
the complex processes of planning and development of the Atlantis 
Revitalisation Framework (ARF) of 2012 
Four sub-questions linked to the main research question were selected in order to 
collectively provide empirical evidence for the study. By extension, each of the subsequent 
Chapters (2, 3, 4 and 5) addressed each of the four sub-questions in detail, drawing out 
generalisations useful in evaluating past, present and future planning efforts.  
5.2.1. What the literature says about the nexus between planning as government 
activity, planning in its activist and advocacy modes, and complexity (Chapter 
2) 
The objective of Chapter 2 was to “highlight the implications of complexity theory for 
planning and decision making in the Global South in general, and for South Africa in 
particular” in line with the above stated research question. The literature revealed that 
planning was a slippery or elusive concept, which is contested and dependent on context. In 
addition, the governance framework within which planning, and by extension decision-









systems and frameworks (Uvin, 2007). It was also noted that despite the ‘universalisation’ of 
planning discourse over the last five decades or so, contextual conditions were often not 
aligned to the planning processes and their intended outcomes (Mthethwa, 2014:15). This 
was attributed to the fact that planning practice and the laws that inform them, continue to 
borrow “concepts, procedures and [rational] methodologies” developed in the 20th century, in 
response to lived experiences in the West (Watson, 2009; Harrison, 2006:319). These 
Occidental planning cultures are largely unresponsive to the growing needs and lived 
experiences of expanding urban populations, particularly in the Global South, and 
specifically for the excluded (women, children, racial minorities, gays, the poor, prisoners 
and indigenous people amongst others) (Sandercock, 1998a; 1998b; Harrison, 2006:320; 
Watson, 2009).  
The study explicitly linked this growing complexity and uncertainty within state-led planning 
to the official heroic story of the practice which depicts “the rise of the profession, its 
institutionalisation, and its achievements” (Sandercock, 1998b) using the “philosophies, 
epistemologies and theories broadly associated with modernism and positivism”. The study 
also thematically established the positivist arguments or justifications for planning as a tool 
for “irreversible human progress” (Harrison, 1996). It explicitly demonstrated the nexus 
between planning and science and reason, the association of planning with the state and/or 
politics, the linkages between planning and the economy as well as the tools and 
approaches upon which rational planning practice was premised. Planning was therefore 
seen as a ‘scientific process concerned with “maximising welfare whilst offering rational 
solutions to social and economic challenges of the 19th and early 20th century through the 
utilisation of “analytical tools … that influenced decisions”. With that in mind, practitioners 
took for granted, the intricate correspondence that existed among economic, social, and 
historical laws of nature. As such, they justified, ‘rational’ responses to deal with the rapidly 
growing and polluted cities characterised by “rapid urbanisation, unhealthy and polluted 
living conditions for the poor, vanishing open green space, and threatened political 
upheaval” (Watson, 2009).  
Thus, the positivist goal for planning was to ensure the promotion of “human growth” using 
rational procedures of thought-based action guaranteeing “inevitable human progress” 
indicating the intricate links between planning and the economy (Harrison, 1996). Hence, 
planning was established as a tool to address widespread dissatisfaction with the results of 
“market and political processes reflected in the squalor and political corruption of the 









tool to attain both the “political and ideological goals” of elites, based on a distinct set of 
normative values classified along the “binaries of healthy/pathological, normal/abnormal, 
productive/unproductive, etc”. Notably, early forms of planning largely ignored the 
distributional effects of government and private actions as they got overshadowed by an 
obsession to promote narrow public interests. This idea of “public interests” and/or ‘public 
goods’ was utilised to “justify public purchases of goods and services” and a range of 
government activities” giving rise to a complicated state bureaucracy. The early role of the 
state in planning was made functional by “obsessively legislating, defining, structuring, 
segregating, classifying, recording and universalisation” (Watson, 2009) of both the form and 
structure of human settlements.  
This positivist approach to planning was seen as a “gender and race neutral process”, led by 
a value neutral expert planner. Equipped with rational and systems tools of analysis such as 
Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA), Programme Evaluation and Review Techniques (PERT), 
Theory of Change (TOC), Critical Path Methodology (CPM), and Logframes, among others, 
to generate and evaluate alternative plans prior to making planning choices. This positivist 
approach also applied sophisticated forecasting and modelling tools and techniques aimed 
at controlling conditions in towns and cities.  
However, contemporary societies and their attributes, such as political and social institutions, 
economies, technologies and social values, are all subject to continuous and often radical 
change. Over time, planning issues coalesced and became “wicked problems” that were 
difficult to resolve with linear tools alone (Rittel and Webber, 1973). In view of this growing 
uncertainty and complexity, planning was confronted by the impossibility of accurately 
predicting future events, interactions of decisions at different policy levels, conflicting values, 
vested interests and the complex interrelationships between decisions at different scales and 
different points in time. At the same time planning started to acknowledge the links or nexus 
“tying open systems into large and interconnected networks of systems, such that outputs 
from one [system] become inputs to others”, from local to global spaces. The study 
demonstrated empirically the convergence of natural and man-made disasters, that together, 
have since coalesced to become ‘wicked problems’ in a web of intertwined causalities 
assuming ‘poly-crisis status’.  
Through ongoing reflection and learning from this complex state associated with wicked 
problems and the global poly-crisis, the study argued for a rethink in contemporary planning 









demonstrated empirically that humanity cannot continue to pursue limitless human growth 
without trading off on issues of inclusion, liberty, equity, social justice, and environmental 
sustainability. This led to a call for ‘reflective planners’ with a ‘critical reflective edge’ in which 
learning from practice is prioritised. Cilliers (1998) encourages us to “confront” this 
complexity if we wish to prosper and sustain the human species. The “history of the system 
is vitally important”, hence the study painstakingly attempted to reveal the historical 
justifications (arguments and assumptions), conditions and constraints under which the 
profession was founded. From this historical review of the profession, the study revealed that 
a “number of oppositional planning" practices which emanated from the largely oppositional 
actions orchestrated by the marginalised and the excluded played an important role in 
shaping the evolution of planning and decision-making as we know it today.  
As such, a post-positivist conception of planning, began to take shape ‘as an emergent’ 
product of the reform movement within planning practice. The universally accepted views 
associated with instrumental rationality, such as the “notion that planning was scientific; that 
planning was value free; that the planner was planning for a society that was a 
homogeneous aggregate, and that planning was to come to terms with rapid growth and 
change”, were questioned. It was noted that the planning discipline, its methods, tools and 
techniques greatly “overlap” with theories and practices in all the “social science disciplines”, 
since planning as a practice was deeply embedded within “social theory. By extension, 
planning practice also borrowed dearly from the rich and “diverse methodologies from many 
different fields. In this reflective view of planning, the study contends that planners can never 
“have access to all the information” on social change, hence the need for multiple ways of 
seeing and doing.  
Therefore, a post-positivist conception of planning provides both critiques and alternatives 
for planning theory and practice. Whilst the debates on planning “naturally continue … there 
have been new developments in old thinking and the emergence of new paradigms”. 
Contrary to the heroic story on rational planning, the study revealed that “alternative 
traditions to planning have always existed outside the state and [were] sometimes [seen] to 
be in opposition to it”. The study also highlighted that, within the modernist planning tradition, 
there existed a succession of competing planning theories or traditions of good planning 
practice, often missing within classic planning texts. To uncover these competing traditions, 









the excluded, as it systematically reviewed various activist modes of planning in search of 
specific transformative insights that could be useful towards the reform agenda of planning. 
5.2.2. What the literature says about the transformative potential and challenges 
inherent in the advocacy and activist approaches to planning and decision-
making and what criteria can be used to evaluate this (Chapter 3) 
In line with the objective of Chapter 3, aimed at developing criteria for evaluating the 
transformative potential for planning and decision-making, the study gave an empirical 
account of the activist models. It linked each approach to one or more contested themes 
within the positivist model, which they targeted for reform.  
Driven by the need to loosen the “traditional, repressive barrier of class and race”, 
democratic, deliberative or participatory planning was established with the intention of 
affording more people a distinct “voice in the formation of their future” (Walters, 2007). It was 
seen as a mechanism in which government planners were brought ‘face to face’ with citizens 
in a continuous cooperative venture.  The model assumed a process of mutual learning in 
which, involved communities were educated on planning whilst in turn also educating and 
involving the planners in their community. Through this form of participation, decision makers 
would acquire information about the opinions of stakeholders regarding their projects, 
policies or plans thus ensuring, adherence to the will of the people. Inherent to this 
repositioning of power in planning was the belief that “the citizenry” implicitly became 
knowledgeable about the relevant issues within their communities as the democratic agents 
were compelled “to educate them, as well as take direction from them”. The study however 
illustrated that the same public often had biases, was often ignorant or had competing 
interests exacerbated by the unequal distribution of power among its stakeholders. As such, 
the decision-makers still had to “make political judgements”, hence planners often failed to 
achieve genuine participation in planning due to their “narrow technical rationalism”. It 
proved impossible for democratic planners to set aside their “own value systems”, as they 
eventually fell in the trap of imposing their own vision of a “somewhat idealised, middle-
class, bourgeois world” on the marginalised populations. 
Advocacy planning was rooted in the rise of major riots strategically engineered by civil 
rights movements protesting racial discrimination and the consequent demands for social 
justice and political equality. It challenged the presumption that planners were motivated by 









the poor and the weak”. Modelled upon the legal profession, in which citizens must 
participate in government and retain power to “prevent governmental outcomes contrary to 
their interests”, advocacy planning embraced “social justice” principles and practices. It was 
noted that appropriate planning actions could not be prescribed from a position of value 
neutrality but rather they were based on desired functions and outcomes. Seized by the 
“nature of distributive justice”, the planning profession engaged in the political process as 
“advocates of both the interests of government and other groups, organisations, or 
individuals concerned with policies for future development of the community”. Advocacy 
planners embraced the fact that politics played a crucial role in planning to address the 
effects of multiple inequalities that existed in the political process of the time. The model also 
noted that “public interest was not a matter of science”, but rather “politics”, and hence 
planners were persuaded to actively “participate in the political arena”. Often, advocacy 
planners worked outside the state, providing information to citizens necessary for the 
analysis of alternative public policies and the identification of spaces that had the potential to 
increase “interactions amongst empowered groups” enabling the citizens to actively 
participate in democratic process of planning. The advocacy model is accommodative of 
multiple plans rather than a unitary plan, which increases competition and innovative ideas 
among the stakeholders. The study also noted that urban neighbourhoods were not 
homogeneous and that neighbourhood interests were not easily discernible at the 
community level; hence different places were expected to practice and approach advocacy 
planning in different ways with different results. Advocacy planning was also criticised for 
identifying the “stumbling blocks” within the rational systems planning approach without 
being able to “mobilize equally effective support for constructive alternatives”.  It was 
established that the advocacy planers only wanted to consult but still plan for the “women, 
minority groups, gays and lesbians” using their acquired technical skills. This critique 
prompted some more radical advocacy planners who began to call for “the protection of 
minority rights” within the liberal-democratic system to guard against immoderate majorities. 
Equity planners sought to rectify rational planning by “representing the interests of the poor 
and marginalised through political structures aimed at equity”. The model shifted the 
distributional arguments, from who governs to who gets what. As such, “a group of 
professional planners, working for the city, devoted themselves to serving the needs of the 
poor” despite knowledge suggesting that the state and local politics was chasing other 
priorities. Equity planners also recognised the multiplicity of conflicting social interests, which 









planners structured their planning framework within local government bureaucracies and 
attempted to institute reform from within the state system. Like advocacy planners, they 
sought to “represent the shared interests of the community, coordinate the actions of 
individuals and groups and consider the long range” effects of prevailing planning actions. 
They would make alliances with and work for progressive politicians as they promoted a 
wider range of choices for those residents who had access to less resources. The model 
exposed and opposed the hypocrisy of public policies that benefited private capital as its 
proponents argued for the correction of social injustices as a reform objective within the 
existing planning enterprise. However, the model was criticised for ignoring the possibility of 
“drawing on local knowledge” by basically retaining the planner as an “expert” with his role 
narrowly redefined to be “a communicator, a tireless propagandist [with] good 
communication skills”. As such, equity planners seemed to have acquired the “power to 
shape debates, to direct public attention” of pressing socioeconomic issues that they the 
planners themselves identified and not necessarily what was in the public interest. The 
model was criticised for overlooking the essence of ongoing participation, which in hindsight 
wasn’t necessarily the primary aim, the main objective having been limited to “equity” and 
not necessarily “consultation”. This realisation prompted a deeper search for an alternative 
planning model that could merge participation and equity in the planning and transformation 
debate. 
The radical planning tradition has advocacy roots, characterised by challenging “poverty 
and exclusion” ascribed to the inherent weaknesses within the rational planning model.  The 
model had “specific substantive ideas about collective actions” premised on “emancipatory 
practice” often associated with “critical discourses” that can be traced back to the rise of 
“feminist critiques” on rational planning, pockets of riots and civil rights movements and the 
ongoing struggles against racism, sexism as well as the oppression and exploitation of the 
marginalised masses. It explicitly challenged “existing unequal relations and distributions of 
power, opportunity and resources”, as it sought to influence “structural transformation of 
systematic inequalities. Its critical theorists borrowed their “conceptual rationale and 
empirical evidence from both the left and the right ideological spectrum”, with its neo-liberal 
apologists arguing against a “rent seeking state”, whilst the neo-Marxists critiqued the 
legitimacy of the state as a neutral actor. Radical planners sought to expose the class-based 
relationship between capital and state players. They inspired the rise of alternative 
“institutional frameworks” and configurations that were not involved in regulation but inclined 









“experiences with oppositional practices and a tradition of social mobilisation”. As a result, 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and community-based organisations (CBOs) 
located closer to the people and outside the state were promoted as obvious alternative 
institutions capable of initiating and facilitating development from the bottom up. However, 
radical planning was confronted by the reality that urban neighbourhoods were not 
homogeneous and that common neighbourhood interests were not easy to identify, since the 
social establishments were often blurred at the “intersections of racism, poverty, sexism, 
homophobia and anti-migrant sentiments”. The radical planning analytical framework was 
demonstrated as an incomplete approach for planning and had to be further developed in 
yet another new direction by Habermas, Healey, Forester and others. 
Dubbed the communicative turn in planning, the study noted that there were many variations 
within the communicative action and social learning paradigm, notably the “collaborative 
planning approach by Patsy Healey, critical theory of Forester and Flyvberg’s … science of 
the concrete” etc. The approach was developed as a response to the reality that society was 
quickly shifting, whilst the collection of processes (methods, tools and techniques) 
associated with the practice of planning remained fixated on obsolete ideas and procedures 
from a different age. As the positivist planning approach based on “instrumental rationality” 
continued to dismally fail the complexity test, some advocacy planners that had learnt about 
“local knowledge and about political skills who exist[ed] within poor communities” started a 
critical debate and reflection upon the planning enterprise. Their efforts eventually led to the 
“emergence of models of social learning and communicative action”. Its proponents 
challenged the domination of human affairs by scientific rationality, they criticised it for 
exerting hegemonic control upon other alternative forms of “being and knowing, crowding out 
moral and aesthetic discourses” altogether. This prompted a post-positivist appreciation of 
social issues and, ‘diversity and difference’, which propelled practitioners to advocate for 
greater “communication, tolerance and respect between divergent interest groups”. Inter-
personal communication and negotiation skills were seen as central to a non-coercive, 
‘facilitator’ model of … planning”. The pressure to reject the technocratic biases associated 
with the rational planning drove communicative planners to advocate for actively 
participating and reclaiming rationality from its “narrow instrumental/scientific objectivism”.  
These insights from activist planning challenged and promoted the breaking down of the 
dominance of scientific objectivism, which necessitated the ideological dismantling of the 









“thinking, moral judgement, feeling and empathy”. A blend of various planning practices is 
therefore promoted. 
5.2.2.1.  Seeking Confluence in Planning  
In keeping with the second objective of the study, evaluative criteria for assessing the 
transformative potential of planning and decision-making processes and their outcomes 
were developed. The study established that planning covers too much territory, making it 
almost impossible to clearly map its boundaries, thus justifying the need to expose the 
linkages and parallels that existed between planning and other disciplines including the 
environment, the economy, politics and sociology. Furthermore, neither the process of 
urbanisation, nor urban planning constituted independent, self-determinate occurrences, 
rather, they form a series of social events that are embedded within society, deriving their 
internal “logic and historical meaning from the general pattern of society as a whole”. This 
emancipatory view places emphasis on the interconnectedness of social phenomena, 
referred to in this study as the ‘nexus’. A blend of the aforementioned planning theories is 
found in planning practice today, the study proposed seeking confluence or the merging 
of various insights, concepts, models and theories of the emerging post-positivist planning 
thought. With that in mind, each of the planning models reviewed in the study provided 
useful analytical insights on which cotemporary planning practices can be evaluated, 
analysed and critiqued. This made it possible for the study to borrow and blend concepts, 
models, tools and techniques that can potentially enhance and transform specific planning 
processes. The study argued that; such an approach would allow planning practitioners to 
develop contextually specific or “indigenous planning systems and governance 
practices” that are fit to context and the temporal specificities of our spaces. 
Since, planning practices are seen to overlap “far into the terrain of other professions, and as 
its frontiers expand(ed) continually with the historical evolution of social problems” the study 
used the transformative potential inherent in the activist approaches to planning and decision 
making to develop a set of analytical questions linked to the thematic arguments on planning 
as identified in Chapter 2 of the study. In line with the idea of ‘seeking confluence the 
following matrix summarise thematically, the evaluation criteria that was carefully drawn out 
from these activist models. It went on to operationalise the sub‐questions and sub themes in 
the detailed analysis of the ARF case study. It expanded on some of the transformative 
insights identified in the activist planning models to provide clarity and methodological rigor 









analytical variables could also be applicable in more than one thematic area, however, for 
the purposes of this study they were presented under one thematic area to ensure 










Table 3: Questions to evaluate the transformative potential of planning initiatives 
Criteria for evaluating planning processes and their outcomes 
Planning Issues and 
Problem Analysis 
• What are the planning issues or problems under review; 
• What knowledge systems exists; 
• How is the knowledge framed and how is it applied in understanding the issues; 
• What other issues are they interrelated or connected to; and 
• What are the tools of analysis employed in structuring such planning issues or problems 
Role of the Planner • Who is represented as the planner; 
• Are they state or non-state planners and what are their roles; 
• What are their substantive agendas; 
• What knowledge of the system do they have and what are their assumptions; 
• What other forms of rationality are they promoting; and 
• What are the existing or new institutional arrangements in place 
Value Analysis 
 
• What are the normative set of values being presented; 
• Who holds those value systems and why; 
• Was there pluralism in the development of the planning content; 
• Was the notion of public interest addressed;  
• What are the socio-economic and environmental implications of those planning norms and practices;  
• What new, alternative or progressive values are being proposed; and 
• What are the ideological and political arguments being used 











• Who are the stakeholders interested or affected by the policies or plans; 
• Are they represented in the planning process; 
• How were they represented; 
• Who is resisting the existing practices and regulatory regimes; 
• Are there spaces for debate, dialogue and collaborative action; 
• What are the power relationships between stakeholders; and  
• What are the implications of power and interests 
Institutional Analysis 
 
• What institutional, governance and/or regulatory frameworks exists; 
o What are the institutional arrangements at play (informal and formal institutional settings); 
• What are the existing planning and governance frameworks; 
o What is the role of the state; 
o Does the governance system allow self-organisation and distributed representation; and 
• What spaces are created for collaborative and communicative rationality to unravel, allowing co-creation and 
development of shared goals. 
Content Analysis 
 
• Is there a coexistence of multiple discourses or narratives; 
• What value or belief systems were used to inform the planning content and process; 
• What other social science concepts, models or theories are being implemented; 
• Is there consciousness of race, sex, gender, etc; and 
• What are the social, economic and environmental costs of the chosen planning options 
Outcome Analysis • Whose goals or interests were prioritised in the plan; 










• Are there any other different or alternative imaginations or configurations of the planning outcomes; 
• What planning outcomes and ideological assumptions exists; and 
• Did the process uphold the normative goals of equality, justice and sustainability 
Planning System 
Analysis 
• Was the process equitable, and was there genuine participation; 
• Is there space for competition for public opinion; and 
• Was the process participatory or top down. 
Economic Analysis 
 
• What economic ideology informs the state and other interest groups; 
• What form and what role does the state play; 
• What public priority expenditure exists; 
• Who identifies and determines where, when and how public expenditure is allocated; 
• Is there public ownership of the means of production; 
• Is there full employment; 
• Who stands to benefit – who wins and who loses;  
• What are the implications of power and interests; and 









5.2.3. What the Atlantis Revitalisation Framework (2012) case study illustrates about 
complexity and the role of advocacy and activist planning in the planning and 
decision-making processes (Chapter 4). 
With reference to one planning case study, the study carefully traced the actions, struggles 
and experiences of multiple actors (NGOs, the state, mobilised communities, private 
business, research community, etc.) in the formal and informal planning and development 
process of the Atlantis Revitalisation Framework (ARF). Using the evaluative criteria 
developed from the literature review in Chapter 2 and 3, the study explored the role played 
by activist planning as a planning and decision-making tool in the development of the ARF.  
Using the thematic areas on rational planning established from Chapter 2, the study 
explored the transformative potential based on the reform agenda inherent in the post-
positivist school of thought, particularly radical forms of activist planning. Using this 
evaluative criteria, the study sought to understand; what where the planning issues at hand; 
who were the stakeholders involved; what were their normative values; what were their 
interests; what institutional and governance frameworks existed; what was contained 
(language, facts, information etc.) in the plans; what were the goals, objectives and/or the 
outcomes of the plans or policies; what planning system or approach was used, and what 
economic arguments or justifications were presented? Together these sub-questions 
provided a basis for collecting empirical evidence from the case study and determining its 
transformative potential, against the set criteria. 
5.2.3.1. What were the planning issues at hand 
Using insights from complexity theory and systems thinking, the study identified 3 different 
periods in the development of the Atlantis Township. All 3 phases were confronted with 
different but interlinked planning issues and problems. The apartheid era, from 1975 
onwards saw the establishment of the town of Atlantis based on a controversial “government 
initiative”, aimed at fulfilling 20th century apartheid planning objectives premised on the 
assumption of separate but equal development. Atlantis was therefore established with the 
intention to “segregate and classify” its people along racial and class lines. The Atlantis 
project relied on the idea of government incentives and subsidies used to attract large 
businesses to the area and create employment for the people of Atlantis. The post-1994 era, 
highlighted the physical isolation of Atlantis from the economic heart of the Western Cape. In 
fact, Atlantis was not only geographically isolated from the CoCT metro, but it also failed to 









businesses that had responded and took advantage government the incentives were “light 
industries and manufacturing companies that were not too costly to relocate”. These same 
industries readily closed down when economic conditions became unfavourable to them. In 
addition, the majority of the new jobs that were created were low paying jobs. Until 1979 
Atlantis was considered a rural area hence companies could pay their workers 15% less 
than they would have in Cape Town. In 1994, the advent of the new political dispensation 
saw the manufacturing sector abruptly collapsing. This was a direct result of the withdrawal 
of the incentives programmes and the halting of defence manufacturing contracts. Many 
companies started closing factories or permanently relocated their businesses elsewhere. In 
the post 2008/2009 period, the socio-economic issues and problems at hand simply 
worsened. Atlantis had a highly, dependent population, which stood at over 50% of the total 
population of the area in 2010/11. Just over 50,4% of its population earned between R1000 
– R3 200 a month (CoCT, 2011a:4). The town also experienced unusually high 
unemployment rates, estimated at between 30%-35% (ASED, 2010a:7), which was way 
above the national figure of 25% at that stage (now higher). As a result of the high levels of 
economic inactivity amongst the youth, Atlantis has seen an increase in crime and violence, 
and is also confronted by “increased food insecurity, inability to pay for municipal services 
(water, electricity) and the demise of the social fabric of the society”. The effects of the global 
recession of 2008/2009, negatively “impacted … the local industries”, especially the 
manufacturing sector particularly the textile and electronic industries which shrunk 
significantly as a result of the closure or downsizing of major companies. 
5.2.3.2. Who were the stakeholders involved 
In the period from 1975 to 1994, the apartheid government, planned and determined the 
establishment of Atlantis on behalf of the coloured population of the time, with o participation 
or consultation of the coloured people. The post-1994 era, and the worsening of the planning 
issues and problems highlighted above attracted different stakeholders (for different 
reasons), at different times, based on either political or economic opportunities and/or 
threats to their interests. As such, Civil society groups, through the JCT, initiated the review 
and rescue process for Atlantis. Union stakeholders, particularly those affiliated to COSATU, 
such as NUMSA, SACTU, SACTWU, which had grave concerns about job loses for their 
members also came on board. Due to rising concern, about the declining socio-economic 
situation of the town (increase in crime, domestic violence against children and women, 









NGOs, CBOs and Forums which included, World Vision, AIDS/HIV/Network, the Urban 
Farmers and Community Policing Forum (CPF), all joined the call for a revitalisation of the 
town’s fortunes. The business stakeholders that joined the call for a rescue process for 
Atlantis made clear their interests, namely a need for financial incentives and a rescue 
package for ailing businesses. They also made a protracted call for skilling and training of 
the local labour force to avert the need to employ skilled foreigners which further limited 
available job opportunities for the people of Atlantis. The rescue process for Atlantis also 
attracted strategic partners who were not representatives on the ASED task team. This 
group participated in the All Stakeholder Planning Workshops and subsequent meetings that 
led to the development of the ARF. Their interests were varied, ranging from financial to 
statutory obligations, while others were simply curious and did not want to miss the 
opportunity, for networking and other strategic reasons. This group included, among others, 
Capitec Bank, Eskom, SAMAF, South African Oil and Gas Alliance (SAOGA), West Coast 
College, Wesfleur Hospital, Proudly Atlantis, MERSETA, and CTFL SETA. All three spheres 
of government were also interested in/and affected by the Atlantis situation, due to their 
different statutory obligations; the National Government through EDD, DTI, DoA was directly 
involved, and this also included their affiliate state agencies such as IDC, and DBSA. At the 
Provincial Government level, DEDAT and its agencies were also involved, and SEDA, 
Casidra, Khula, and WESGRO also participated in the planning process. At the Local 
Government Level, officials from the City of Cape Town Economic Department Directorate, 
were instrumental in crafting the policy frameworks, that later formed the building blocks of 
the ARF itself. 
5.2.3.3. What were the interests and the normative values held by the stakeholders 
Whilst the civil society players were largely seized by issues pertaining to the social 
wellbeing of the residents of Atlantis, raising concern about the state of the social fabric of 
the community, they also expressed concern over the distributional aspects of the local 
economy. They advocated for improved social services such as housing, education and 
youth development, social amenities and health. They brought forward arguments for 
redistribution in the local economy by proposing a range of issues related to land availability, 
agriculture, SMMEs, and most importantly, the Green Economy. In addition to a call for 
incentives and a business rescue strategy, business players lamented that the CoCT tender 
process for land approvals seemed slow, (taking up to 12 months) which was deemed an 









the re-establishment of broad incentives favourable to their business interests. Civil society, 
particularly the WCEC, advocated for the establishment of a Green Economy and the idea of 
an Integrated Tourism Development strategy for the town. Based on the assumption that 
“policies interpret the values of society”, all three spheres of government were interested and 
affected by the Atlantis situation, due to their statutory obligations. In the 1975 to 1994 era, 
the state explicitly promoted a policy of separate development, as stipulated in the national 
development plan, compiled by the then apartheid government.  The planning objectives of 
the apartheid system were laden with the normative values of the white elites in the National 
Party who believed that Atlantis was “a city dedicated for the segregated development of the 
Coloureds” and that it would “benefit the Coloureds” socially and economically without 
further burdening Cape Town and its limited resources, especially in terms of land. In the 
Post-1994 era, the Constitution of South Africa sought to “promote social and economic 
development”, the RDP was seen as a vehicle to ensure an “integrated, coherent socio-
economic policy framework’, largely aimed at “addressing the historical imbalances in the 
South African economy built through many years of systematically enforced racial division in 
every sphere of society”. However, the pressure from the neo-liberal agenda across the 
globe, forced the then Mbeki Government to adopt pro-growth policies in line with world 
economic adjustment policies largely proposed by the West and fronted by the IMF. A 
plethora of pro-growth policies such as GEAR (1996), ASGISA (2006), JIPSA (2006) 
Municipals Systems Act (2000) etc. were also developed. All these contained ambitious 
national goals which were however not directly aimed at addressing the socio-economic 
fortunes of a space such as Atlantis which continued to deteriorate.  
5.2.3.4. What institutional and governance frameworks existed 
In the Pre-1994 era, the institutions were racially focussed. The 1973 Divisional Council of 
the Cape (DIVCO) was a white elected authority which only included two coloureds and was 
tasked to oversee the development and governance of Atlantis. In the post-1994 era, an 
elected MP, elected ward councillors and ward committees were legislated and put in 
position to lead and guide the development of the township. The overall Legislative and 
Governance framework of the Republic of South Africa was by extension applicable to 
Atlantis which meant that its industries could no longer be incentivised as before. Atlantis, 
like any other township in the country, had to compete for investment on the economic 
market with the rest of the Cape Town. Unfortunately, capital followed lucrative economic 
opportunities elsewhere resulting in the divestment of industries, particularly the 









economic isolation from the economic hub of the Western Cape Province, a trend that was 
worsened by the 2008/9 economic rescission. In the post-2008/2009 period, the Atlantis 
Socio-Economic Development Task Team, made up of members from labour, local BGOs 
and CBOs, Business and Government, was established. Using its political linkages and 
influence, the task team was mandated by the DoED to lead the development of a rescue 
strategy for the township.  
At the provincial and local government level, the CoCT and the PGWC, legislated via 
Council, a policy to establish an Intergovernmental Steering Committee that took over the 
technical leadership of the planning process from the ASED task team. The 
Intergovernmental Steering Committee, in consultation with a newly established body now 
called the Atlantis Stakeholder Assembly (ASA), assimilated ASED and was expanded to 
include business, civil society, youth, the disabled, women and other local players. Whilst 
this increased the number of ASA attendees and ensured broader representation, the body 
lacked political muscle and influence since its role in the ARF had been watered down from 
that played by its predecessor ASED. The lack of specific champions in the ASA resulted in 
forum fatigue which manifested in serious absenteeism of stakeholders in important 
meetings that often-required consultation and collective decision making. ASA was expected 
to exercise economic and political authority, based on the various economic and political 
interests of the expanded stakeholders. However, it lacked constitutional or legislative 
recognition, and the initiative had no decisive power to set the agenda, timing, and debates 
regarding the developmental issues in Atlantis. Its role in the ARF process was depoliticised 
and became a mere formality meant to provide legitimacy and ensure the endorsement of 
pre-determined CoCT and PGWC programmes, including the Green Economy Hub. This 
depoliticisation of ASA weakened the agency that existed with ASED and allowed the COCT 
and PGWC to retreat into their technical and bureaucratic corner, shielded from the political 
noise from the activist unions and civil society.  
5.2.3.4. What planning systems or approaches were used 
Whilst the planning approach that led to the ARF itself had multiple phases and saw different 
modes of planning being implemented at different phases and in some instances at the 
same time, it is important to reflect on the history of the pre-1994 planning system that led to 
the initial establishment of the town. During the pre-1994 era, a purely rational planning 
approach was implemented by the apartheid Government led by the National Party. The 









social engineering project with arguments/justifications that were parallel to those developed 
in the West. Scientific rationality was used to justify the concept of separate but equal 
development and Atlantis was envisioned as a “model apartheid city” providing high level 
infrastructure for the coloured population which included paved roads, taped water, 
electricity, sewers and piped storm water systems. The system was top down and relied on 
instrumental rationality, even though DIVCO was established to include two coloured 
members, their influence was insignificant since they were not representative of the diverse 
interest groups within the coloured population of the time. The idea of optimum city size was 
used to justify the creation of Atlantis which saw the forced removal of 40 000 plus residents 
from District 6 in the CBD of Cape Town. The idea of economic incentives and defence 
contracts used to attract capital, ignored the economic arguments of capital following viable 
investment destinations led by free market forces. This oversight had significant socio-
economic implications for the Post-1994 era in the township.  
The pre-2008/2009 period was largely dominated by a market led economic and social order 
in which the role of government had shrunk. Over time and largely due to the neo-liberal 
policy options such as GEAR and ASGISA adopted by the Mandela and Mbeki 
governments, of government slowly started to introduce the reduction of regulations, arguing 
that this would ensure economic growth. Such a planning approach had little if any concern 
for poverty, inequality and sustainability, since it relied largely on “private entrepreneurship 
and the competitive forces of the market”. Within this frame of reference, experts in the 
CoCT, had concluded that the Atlantis crisis was linked to the global economic crisis of the 
time. They chose to ignore the historical conditions that still existed and which exacerbated 
the plight of the town due to its distant geographical location from the provincial economic 
hub and opted to be a passive player, sharing information with the Atlantis Stakeholders as 
indicated in the case study. This made both CoCT and PGWC extremely unpopular with the 
ASED Task Team which preferred a political approach to the planning debate of a rescue 
strategy for Atlantis. Civil society partners, particularly the JCT, its COSATU affiliates and 
the local NGOs such as WCEC and World Vision, together with the CBOS which included 
AYDEF, CPF, HIV/AIDS Network and the Urban Farmers all preferred the advocacy 
planning route.  
Using the Constitution of South Africa as a reference point, the stakeholders challenged the 
strategic planning approach of the CoCT and PGWC and instead rallied for a ‘participatory’ 
process. They created a space which brought government planners “face to face with 









planning, civil society stakeholders relied on a political approach which forced state planners 
to engage in a contentious political process. The space thus created painstakingly clarified, 
over a period of time, the interests of business, government and other groups, organisations, 
or individuals that were concerned with the Atlantis crisis. However, it was soon realised that 
the so-called civil society groups were not homogenous and all had different interests 
informed by different political and economic ideologies. This diversity in the task team meant 
a plurality of views and interests, which, instead of increasing competition of ideas ended up 
alienating the members of the team from each other as they started making alliances with 
different politicians and state planners to protect their own ideas and interests.  
The National Government planners led by political leaders such as Minister Patel who had 
close links with the Labour Unions, particularly the Western Cape COSATU, took a more 
radical approach to planning. Citing the apartheid era developmental objectives, EDD and 
DTI sought to promote the developmental interests of the disadvantaged coloured groups 
that suffered under apartheid. They also borrowed dearly from both the left and the right 
ideological positions, resorting to promoting growth whilst embarking on a redistribution 
agenda through EDD’s New Growth Path policy. EDD proposed the formation of a strong 
community group, later known as the ASED task team which was tasked to spearhead the 
cause of the disenfranchised poor and marginalised in the town. The business interests of 
the town were also represented on this task team, thus balancing out the social and 
economic aspects of the proposed rescue strategy. The CoCT and PGWC chose a rather 
instrumental approach to responding to the Atlantis situation. As interested and affected 
parties of government, they both initially responded through the mere provision of 
information on available government services and policies to the ASED Task Team could tap 
into.  
This non-committal stance from the CoCT and PGWC backfired at a political level, as the 
ANC led National Government gained ascendency in positioning itself as a pro-poor party 
willing to engage and influence the Atlantis rescue process. In response, the PGWC, through 
DEDAT, later on provided financial resources which funded a specialist study meant to 
interpret the substantive ideas contained in the ASED planning documents and turn them 
into viable project proposals ready for implementation. This strategic shift changed the 
power dynamic of ASED, whose political power and influence was replaced by financial 
power and influence. The ASED Task Team became mere participants in the ARF planning 
process, to be consulted as and when necessary, instead of being its leaders and drivers as 









intergovernmental steering committee that took over leadership of the planning process in 
consultation with a newly established body now called the Atlantis Stakeholder Assembly 
(ASA) in which ASED was assimilated. At the time the ARF was developed, a largely 
strategic planning approach had resurfaced, with elements of communicative action and 
participatory planning placed within the ASA albeit with less political influence, drama and 
contestation as epitomised by the ASED Task Team.  
5.2.4. What practical planning lessons can be learnt from a dynamic collective 
planning and decision-making process (Chapter 5)? 
5.2.4.1. Issues Analysis: Towards Complex Adaptive Systems 
The involvement of different stakeholders in the planning of the ARF created a space in 
which a variety of planning issues were raised. Using complexity thinking as a tool, the 
historical context of Atlantis was established and this understanding created a deeper 
appreciation of the prevailing issues and their root causes. At a technical level, the analysis 
of the issues by the stakeholders, and particularly by the Atlantis Inter-governmental Task 
Team, made extensive use of system performance indicators, required to provide 
information to the public about the overall health of the Atlantis community. Using the policy 
scan done by UrbanEcon, the AIGTT used the policy and programme measures to provide 
the stakeholders and other policy-makers with feedback about specific government 
programmes and policies. They implicitly provided rapid feedback indicators required to 
assist individuals and businesses to make more sustainable decisions at the time, including 
access to government land and available rescue packages that would save jobs and allow 
for expansion and viability, going forward. With the benefit of hindsight, the disparate 
analysis of issues by ASED, CoCT, PGWC and the National Government, that was 
presented in the ARF, adopted elements of “adaptive complex systems thinking” in which 
planning issues are viewed as elements of large “open systems” which are sub-sets of other 
“large and interconnected networks of systems” as proposed by Rittel and Weber (1973).  
The different planning issues that were raised by the various planning constituencies directly 
influenced the final analysis of the issues by the Intergovernmental Steering Committee. 
Though not clearly articulated in the ARF, a broad conceptualisation of issues using a 










5.2.4.2. Pluralism, Diversity and Public Interests: Towards a Multiplicity of 
Competing Plans 
A post-positivist appreciation of diversity by the Atlantis stakeholders led to an appreciation 
of difference and diversity. The involvement of multiple stakeholders from business, civil 
society (labour and local NGOs, CBOs and forums), all spheres of government and their 
strategic partners such as IDC, WESGRO, DBSA, Green Cape etc. benefited from the 
pluralism of ideas, insights, plans and ideologies that were presented during the planning 
process that preceded the ARF. This diversity led to an assortment of ideas and contestation 
of different plans as individual groups tried to capture the imaginations of interested and 
affected groups as they presented their vision for Atlantis. Innovative ideas that include the 
Green Economy Hub for Atlantis, establishment of a land committee, the Atlantis Tourism 
Services, transport integration, urban agriculture support, rescue package for businesses in 
distress, were all presented, debated and actioned at different times, after the adoption of 
the ARF. The political debates, the contestation of space and claiming of certain rights 
mostly by ASED as a representative body of the Atlantis community, allowed a 
communicative process that led to the co-production of the Atlantis Revitalisation Framework 
and its various sub-plans. The highly sensitive, and at times explosive, debates leading to 
the development of the ARF were useful qualitative processes necessary for clarifying the 
values and the normative justifications of the issues and proposed solutions.  
Together, these conversations heralded the prioritisation of substantive claims to planning 
processes in relation to the procedural aspects of planning largely pushed for by the state 
players. This development, though not officially recognised in the final ARF, spawned an 
innovative mix of substantive and procedural judgements that were premised on change, 
and to a greater extent, transformative ideals of diversity, inclusion and redistribution. The 
ASED stakeholders challenged the instrumental rationality and existing modes of 
governance that the CoCT and the PGWC initially assumed, and this radical political action 
forced the construction of “new forums” which enabled a more public, and to some extent 
“democratic argumentation” of planning ideas by all those involved (Martens, date unknown). 
It confirmed Christensen’s (2015) position that both planning processes and outcomes are 
important and mutually reinforcing in any given planning process and that the role of the 
state and that of state planners is to constructively reconcile the substantive debate, 









5.2.4.3. Stakeholder Analysis: Towards a Participatory Planning Process 
The idea argued for in the study, was to uncover the transformative possibilities inherent in 
the activist actions that led to the ARF and to explore who were the actors, practitioners or 
players involved. This process also determined the actions they took, the critical moments or 
events that shaped their actions, their interests and the kinds of institutional and governance 
conditions, which helped or hindered their effectiveness. The multiple stakeholder team that 
fronted the ASED Task Team though not representative of the diverse community groups in 
Atlantis, managed to bring forth a shared community vision derived from a common past of 
exclusion, inequality and oppression by the then apartheid government. They were not a 
homogenous group, and had various interests, they shared divergent ideological constructs 
but they all appreciated the role of politics, power and influence in planning. Through the 
political experience demonstrated by most of the players in ASED, led by ex-politicians and 
union leaders, the Atlantis stakeholders exercised their political power to challenge and test 
the existing institutional and governance context, both at the city and provincial level. They 
used their political networks to navigate their way around the many structural constraints that 
existed, ranging from economic constraints, institutional codes of behaviour, and political 
loyalties in the CoCT and the PGWC. Their political efforts saw the organic development of a 
multi-actor and multi-stakeholder analysis of the planning issues and development of 
substantive planning proposals for the Atlantis township. Their collective efforts eventually 
facilitated the institutionalisation of communicative action in the ARF through the ASA, a 
politically weaker but more representative body that replaced ASED. In theory, this body 
would champion all the discursive framing of planning issues that would inform the AIGTT 
going forward as proposed in the ARF. However, in practice ASA’s lack of legislative 
mandates meant that the body had no decisive power to set the agenda, timing, and 
debates regarding the developmental issues in Atlantis. It merely acted as a legitimation tool 
for plans and decisions already made by the Steering Committee led by the CoCT and 
PGWC. 
5.2.4.4. Planning Goals and Outcomes: Towards a Shared Vision  
The civil society cluster largely led by local NGOs, namely WCEC and World Vision and their 
union partners, championed a coterie of social and economic proposals meant to put Atlantis 
back on a recovery trajectory. Their push for a redistributive agenda within the local 
economic system was partially echoed as they championed for the establishment of a land 









agriculture. They advocated for the establishment of the ATSU which was meant to revive 
the tourism fortunes of the town by reclaiming its tourist attractions (namely the Witzands 
bird’s sanctuary and the Witzands Dunefields) which were largely benefitting people from 
outside Atlantis. The biggest victory was the establishment of a Green Economy Hub in 
Atlantis through WESGRO, Green Cape and other PGWC agencies. A number of semi-
skilled workers underwent an intensive training programming in preparation for jobs in this 
sector. The local businesses that were in distress at the time, were also prioritised in the 
ARF and through a set of incentives from IDC and the CoCT, a large number of businesses 
in Atlantis retained their workforce whilst some remained open and averted the risk of 
closing and relocating elsewhere altogether. 
5.2.4.5. Institutional Analysis: Towards New Modes of Governance 
The ARF benefited from the establishment of both informal and formal institutional groups 
whose roles were clearly established in the case study. Whilst the initial Atlantis stakeholder 
group of 2009, was a voluntary association of interested parties mostly comprised of the 
unions, local businesses (particularly distressed ones), local NGOs, CBOs and local forums, 
all of which were affected by the deteriorating socio-economic status of the town. The ASED 
Task Team was a product of the lobbying, advocacy and radical processes which got its 
legitimacy and derived its mandate from the instruction by Minister Ebrahim Patel to 
establish a ‘task team’ which would facilitate the development of a rescue plan for Atlantis. 
The role that political figures played in the process later forced the CoCT and the PGWC to 
commit time and resources for the rescue process of Atlantis. It also facilitated the multi-
stakeholder planning process which clarified the multiple rescue plans or substantive 
proposals that were later developed by technical experts hired by DEDAT and translated into 
bankable project proposals. The ASED Task Team’s political role also influenced the 
establishment of the Inter-governmental Steering Committee between the CoCT and the 
PGWC, whose role was to replace ASED and facilitate the development of the ARF. In 
addition, the CoCT and the PGWC recognised the need for a political process that would 
see the finalisation of the ARF. This led to the establishment of the ASA in the ARF, which 
not only replaced ASED, but broadened stakeholder participation to include business and 
broad civil society groups. The ASA marked a new governance framework for planning, that 
was not only new for Atlantis, but also offered the potential for a communicative approach to 









5.3. Limitations of the Study and Areas of Future Research 
Whilst the study was limited towards understanding the planning process that led to the 
development of the ARF, it is noted that it did not intend to develop an understanding of; the 
contents (language, facts, information etc.), the goals, objectives and/or the outcomes of the 
plans or policies or the economic arguments or justifications of the ARF. These areas 
present an opportunity for future research to determine the role of information or knowledge 
in planning, how it shapes goals and outcomes, informed by the prevailing economic 
conditions which are themselves a product of market forces and the prevailing political-
economic climate. It is also noted that a quick review of the content and the outcomes of the 
ARF, incorporated within specific planning proposals, insights and ideas that were proposed 
and developed by the ASED task team through the Atlantis Planning Workshop of 2010. 
5.4. Conclusion 
This Chapter endeavoured to give a concise but accurate summary of the study based on 
the research questions.  As noted, each of the Chapters (2, 3, 4 and 5) addressed the four 
research questions in detail, drawing out generalisations useful in evaluating past, present 
and future planning efforts. Using the evaluative criteria on planning, developed in Chapters 
2 and 3, the study established that the planning of the Atlantis Revitalisation Framework was 
a complex, uncertain and contested process. However, there were notable indications that 
suggested that the Atlantis stakeholders were slowly embracing and acknowledging 
complexity and transformation in the planning process. The Atlantis Socio-Economic Task 
Team representing civil society, business and labour unions expanded their analysis of 
planning issues that the CoCT and PGWC had presented. The political role played by 
ASED, strategically introduced to the negotiations, specific substantive claims and rights in 
respect of the social, economic and environmental assets of the community of Atlantis. This 
politically charged planning process attracted multiple stakeholders and thus assumed the 
“multi-actor” arguments advocated for in the various activist planning models reviewed in the 
study. The diversity of players involved in the planning process ranged from civil society 
(local NGOs, CBOs, Unions and local Forums), various local businesses, strategic partners 
such as Eskom and national government departments such as the DED, the DTI, the DoA 
and their affiliate government agencies such as the IDC and the DBSA. At the Provincial 
Government level, DEDAT and its agencies; e.g. SEDA, Casidra, Khula and WESGRO 
participated at the Local Government Level, officials CoCT were instrumental in crafting of 









and divergent ideological constructs. This diversity led to a communicative action that saw 
the spawning of a mix of ideas, insights and the contestation of different plans, as individuals 
and their representative groups tried to capture the imaginations of interested and affected 
groups in the planning process and gain support for their own visons and plans.  
This radical political action by ASED forced the construction of “new forums” which enabled 
a more public and to some extent “democratic argumentation” of planning issues and ideas 
for Atlantis. This effort then mutated into a “forward-looking, adaptive, planning and 
governance system that was squarely aimed at “long term transformation as it brought 
forward innovative ideas that include: the Green Economy Hub for Atlantis, the 
establishment of a land committee, the Atlantis Tourism Services, Transport integration 
through My-Citi, Urban agriculture support, Rescue package for businesses in distress etc. 
ASED forced the adoption of new governance and institutional frameworks, the Atlantis 
Intergovernmental Task Team was established to facilitate and coordinate disparate state 
efforts whilst the ASED evolved into the Atlantis Stakeholders Association (ASA) which was 
broadened to include other civil society players such as unions, NGOs, CBOs, forums, 
women, the disabled, local farmers, etc. ASA’s role was to ensure that the prerequisite 
political processes for determining the substantive goals for the revitalisation framework 
were integral to the procedural efforts of AIGTT depicting confluence of planning approaches 
of the two bodies.  
However, with the benefit of hindsight, the efforts of the stakeholders resulted in several 
rescue packages being extended to business from the IDC, curtailing further job loses whilst 
creating new job opportunities for the unemployed. A number of semi-skilled workers 
underwent an intensive training programming in preparation for jobs in the new Green 
Economy sector that was to be established from scratch. Efforts to revive tourism in Atlantis 
and the surrounding areas were echoed through the establishment of a City of Cape Town 
managed tourism information centre in Mamre. Through the land committee that was 
established, tracts of land were made available for new factories and housing development 
in Atlantis creating potential for more work opportunities. The study however limited its focus 
towards understanding the planning process that led to the ARF and to systematically 
explore its transformative possibilities. It acknowledges the necessity of further studies to 
determine the content of the plans, its economic justifications and overall socio-economic 
and environmental. Understanding the overall outcomes of the ARF and the role played by 
the ASA stand out as areas of future work of interest to me and others interested and 









outside the state is a critical political factor that ensures that local stakeholders maintain 
decisive power to influence the agenda, timing, and debates regarding the developmental 
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